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uestioned。
然而只要市场上费率看起来合理，我们就会继续留在这一行里，而在推销这类保单时，我们所拥有的最大竞争优势就是我们的财务实力，有远见的客户都知道许多再保业者可以很轻松地接下保单，但是当重大的意外灾害接连发生时，要他们支付赔偿金可能就有点困难，（有些再保业者就像Jackie Mason所说的一样，我可以一辈子不花钱，只要我不买任何东西），相对地Berkshire在任何极端的状况下，都能够履行他所做出的承诺。
Overall； insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities。 Mike Goldberg has acplished wonders with this operation since he took charge and it has bee a very valuable asset； albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision。
总的来说，保险业提供Berkshire相当大的机会，Mike Goldberg在他接手这项业务之后，就一直缔造出优异的成绩，也使得保险子公司成为我们非常宝贵的资产，虽然我们无法以精确的数字来衡量。
Marketable mon Stocks有价证券股票投资
On the next page we list our mon stock holdings having avalue of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
Shares pany Cost Market（000s omitted） 12/31/91
3；000；000 46；700；000 2；495；200 6；850；000 24；000；000 31；247；000 1；727；765 5；000；000
Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp GEICO Corp The Gillette pany Guinness PLC The Washington Post pany Wells Fargo & pany
517；500 1；023；920 77；245 45；713 600；000 264；782 9；731 289；431
1；300；500 3；747；675 343；090 1；363；150 1；347；000 296；755 336；050 290；000
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing。 Guinness is a new position。 But we held the other seven stocks a year ago （making allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to mon） and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares。 The exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage （〃Freddie Mac〃）； in which our shareholdings increased slightly。 Our stay…put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient。 （With tongue only partly in check； I suggest that recent events indicate that the much…maligned 〃idle rich〃 have received a bad rap： They have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the 〃energetic rich〃 … aggressive real estate operators； corporate acquirers； oil drillers； etc。 … have seen their fortunes disappear。）
一如往常，以上这张表显示我们李伯大梦式的投资方式，健力士Guinness是我们最新的投资部位，至于其它七项主要的投资都持有一年以上（如果把吉列从特别股转换成普通股也包含在内的话），其中六项投资甚至连持股数都没有变动，唯一的例外是联邦家庭贷款抵押（Freddie Mac），我们投资的股数略微增加，我们以不变应万变的做法主要是反应我们把股票市场当作是财富重分配的中心，而钱通常由积极的份子流到有耐性的投资人手中，（我嘴巴可能闭的不够紧，我认为最近几件事情显示许多躺着赚的有钱人招到许多攻击，因为他们好象没做什么事就使得本身的财富暴涨，而在此同时过去那些积极活跃的有钱人，如房地产大亨、企业购并家与石油钻探大亨等，却眼睁睁地看着自己的财产一点一滴地缩水）。
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant investment in a pany domiciled outside the United States。 Guinness； however； earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca…Cola and Gillette； U。S。…based panies that garner most of their profits from international operations。 Indeed； in the sense of where they earn their profits … continent…by…continent … Coca…Cola and Guinness display strong similarities。 （But you'll never get their drinks confused … and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp。）
我们在健力士Guinness的持股代表Berkshire第一次对海外公司进行大规模的投资，不过Guinness所赚的钱与可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类似，主要都是仰赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看，Guinness与可口可乐的获利来源有相当的共通性，（但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐）。
We continually search for large businesses with understandable； enduring and mouth…watering economics that are run by able and shareholder…oriented managements。 This focus doesn't guarantee results： We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business performance from our panies that validates our assessment。 But this investment approach … searching for the superstars … offers us our only chance for real success。 Charlie and I are simply not smart enough； considering the large sums we work with； to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far…from…great businesses。 Nor do we think many others can achieve long…term investment success by flitting from flower to flower。 Indeed； we believe that according the name 〃investors〃 to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one…night stands a romantic。
我们还是持续地在寻找大型的企业，那种令人容易了解、具有持续性且让人垂涎三尺的事业，并且由有能力才干并以股东利益为优先的经营阶层，虽然这些要求的重点并不一定保证结果就一定令人满意，当然我们一定要以合理的价格投资并且确保我们的被投资公司绩效表现与我们当初所评估的一致，这样的投资方法…寻找产业的超级明星，是我们唯一能够成功的机会，查理跟我的天资实在是有限，以我们目前操作的资金规模，实在是无法靠着买卖一些平凡普通的企业来赚取足够的利益，当然我们也不认为其它人就有办法以这种小蜜蜂飞到西、飞到东的方法成功，事实上我们认为将这些短线进出如此频繁的法人机构称为投资人，就好象是把一个每天寻找一夜情的花花公子称作为浪漫情人一样。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited； say； to private panies in Omaha； I would； first； try to assess the long…term economic characteristics of each business； second； assess the quality of the people in charge of running it； and； third； try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price。 I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town。 Why； then； should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public panies？ And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult； why should we discard proven products？ （I was tempted to say 〃the real thing。〃） Our motto is： 〃If at first you do succeed； quit trying。〃
今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥玛哈地区的私人企业，那么首先我们仔细地评估每家企业长期的竞争力，第二我会再评估经营者的特质，之后再以合理的价格买进一小部份的股权，既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买镇上所有公司的股权，那么为什么Berkshire在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的态度，也因为要找到好的事业并加上好的经理人是如此的困难，那么为什么我们要拋弃那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢？ （通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色），我们的座右铭是如果你第一次就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。
John Maynard Keynes； whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought； wrote a letter to a business associate； F。 C。 Scott； on August 15； 1934 that says it all： 〃As time goes on； I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes。 It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence。 。 。 。 One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterpris