按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
邓吹谋ǔ晖ǔＴ陡哂谕蹲蔛&P 500指数。
A second important factor to consider … and one that significantly hurts our relative performance … is that both the ine and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre…tax。 To prehend the damage； imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28…year period covered。 In that case； the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P。 Under present tax laws； a gain for the S&P of 18％ delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13％。 And this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise。 This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with； there is no antidote for it。
第二项应该要特别注意的因素…也是影响我们相对表现的因素，那就是我们投资证券所产生的收益与资本利得必须要负担相当重的税负，而在此同时S&P 500指数却是以免税基础计算的，为了让大家了解这期间的差异性，假设Berkshire在过去28年间就只投资S&P 500指数，则最后所得到的投资报酬将远低于S&P 500指数本身的表现，依照目前的税率，若是S&P 500上涨18％，则在课税后投资人真正得到的报酬只有13％不到，而这个问题若是考量目前税率即将调高的情况，将会变得更严重，这是一个我们必须要忍受的结构性问题，基本上没有办法可解。
The third point incorporates two predictions： Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner； and I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade； and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index。
第三点包含两个预测，查理孟格…Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人，跟我都相当清楚，那就是未来十年内S&P 500指数的表现将无法像过去十年那样的好，而我们同样也相信以Berkshire目前资本规模越来越大的趋势，将会大大影响过去我们大幅超越指数的表现。
Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain： We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good。 Even now； Charlie and I continue to believe that short…term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place； away from children and also from grown…ups who behave in the market like children。 However； it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses； as they have so dramatically done for some time； and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last。 Our second conclusion … that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance … seems incontestable。 The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable； though slowed； pace。
做出第一项预测有违我们的本性，一直以来我们认为股市预言家唯一的价值就是让算命先生看起来像那么一回事，即便是现在，查理跟我还是相信短期股市的预测是毒药，应该要把他们摆在最安全的地方，远离儿童以及那些在股市中的行为像小孩般幼稚的投资人，虽然有时股市的表现会有相当大的起伏，然而很明显的股市的表现不可能永远都能超越其背后所代表的企业，这也是为何我们胆敢预测未来十年投资人在股市所获得的报酬将很难再像过去十年那样的优异的原因。我们第二点结论，规模越来越大的资金将会拖累我们的绩效，对于这点倒是不容置疑，唯一的问题在于我们拖着这样的重担的同时，如何还能以缓慢但是可以忍受的速度前进。
We will continue to experience considerable volatility in our annual results。 That's assured by the general volatility of the stock market； by the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few panies； and by certain business decisions we have made； most especially our move to mit large resources to super…catastrophe insurance。 We not only accept this volatility but wele it： A tolerance for short…term swings improves our long…term prospects。 In baseball lingo； our performance yardstick is slugging percentage； not batting average。
往后我们将会继续经历年度绩效的上下变动，面对多变的股市，这点绝对可以确定，尤其是我们将资金集中在几家主要的被投资公司之上，同时也因为我们将大部分的资源摆在超级意外险之上的商业决策，我们不但接受这种变动，而且相当能够接受，只要忍受短期变动的同时可以为我们带来长期的效果，套句棒球常用的术语，我们的表现主要是看长打率而不是打击率。
The Salomon Interlude所罗门插曲
Last June； I stepped down as Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc after ten months in the job。 You can tell from Berkshire's 1991…92 results that the pany didn't miss me while I was gone。 But the reverse isn't true： I missed Berkshire and am delighted to be back full…time。 There is no job in the world that is more fun than running Berkshire and I count myself lucky to be where I am。
去年六月，在接手十个月后，我正式辞去所罗门董事会临时主席的职务，大家可以从1991年到1992年Berkshire的经营绩效看出，公司并没有因为我暂时不在而发生任何差错，不过反过来说就不一定了，我很怀念Berkshire且很愿意再度回到公司担任全职工作，对我而言，世界上没有任何其它工作比起经营Berkshire更有乐趣，很庆幸我自己能够身处现在这个位置。
The Salomon post； though far from fun； was interesting and worthwhile： In Fortune's annual survey of America's Most Admired Corporations； conducted last September； Salomon ranked second among 311 panies in the degree to which it improved its reputation。 Additionally； Salomon Brothers； the securities subsidiary of Salomon Inc； reported record pre…tax earnings last year … 34％ above the previous high。
这次所罗门的任务虽然不是很愉快，但却相当有趣且值得，在去年九月财富杂志票选全美最受崇敬企业的年度调查中，所罗门在全部的311家公司中名列第二进步奖，此外所罗门兄弟…所罗门集团其下的证券子公司，其税前盈余更是创下之前历史新高34％之多。
Many people helped in the resolution of Salomon's problems and the righting of the firm； but a few clearly deserve special mention。 It is no exaggeration to say that without the bined efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan； Bob Denham； Don Howard； and John Macfarlane； the firm very probably would not have survived。 In their work； these men were tireless； effective； supportive and selfless； and I will forever be grateful to them。
所罗门能够得到解救需要感谢许多人，其中有几位尤其要特别提到的，若是没有Deryck Maughhan、Bob Denham、Don Howard与John Macfarlane等人的通力合作，这家证券商很可能无法幸免，这些人努力不懈、有效率、无私奉献的精神，让我永远感佩他们。
Salomon's lead lawyer in its Government matters； Ron Olson of Munger； Tolles & Olson； was also key to our success in getting through this trouble。 The firm's problems were not only severe； but plex。 At least five authorities … the SEC； the Federal Reserve Bank of New York； the U。S。 Treasury； the U。S。 Attorney for the Southern District of New York； and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice … had important concerns about Salomon。 If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and prompt manner； we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal； business and human skills。 Ron had them all。
所罗门在政府事务方面的首席律师…Munger； Tolles&Olson联合律师事务所的Ron Olson也是这次问题能够顺利解决的核心人物，所罗门所面临的问题不但严重而且相当复杂，至少有五个主管机关…证管会、纽约联邦准备银行、美国财政部、纽约南区地方法院与司法部的反托拉斯部门都牵涉其中，若是我们想要以明快有组织性地解决