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uture costs for post…retirement health benefits … though we now have 22；000 employees … are inconsequential。 I need to admit； though； that we had a near miss： In 1982 I made a huge mistake in mitting to buy a pany burdened by extraordinary post…retirement health obligations。 Luckily； though； the transaction fell through for reasons beyond our control。 Reporting on this episode in the 1982 annual report； I said： 〃If we were to introduce graphics to this report； illustrating favorable business developments of the past year； two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold。〃 Even so； I wasn't expecting things to get as bad as they did。 Another buyer appeared； the business soon went bankrupt and was shut down； and thousands of workers found those bountiful health…care promises to be largely worthless。
另一方面查理跟我在进行购并时，也会尽量避开那些潜藏高额退休金负债的公司，也因此虽然Berkshire目前拥有超过22；000名的员工，但在退休金这方面的问题并不严重，不过我还是必须承认，在1982年时我曾经差点犯下大错买下一家背有沉重退休金负债的公司，所幸后来交易因为某项我们无法控制的因素而告吹，而在1982年年报中报告这段插曲时，我曾说：「如果在年报中我们要报告过去年度有何令人觉得可喜的进展，那么两大页空白的跨页插图，可能最足以代表当年度告吹的交易」不过即便如此，我也没有预期到后来情况会如此恶化，当时另外一家买主出现买下这家公司，结果过了没多久公司便走上倒闭关门的命运，公司数千名的员工也发现大笔的退休金健保承诺全部化为乌有。
In recent decades； no CEO would have dreamed of going to his board with the proposition that his pany bee an insurer of uncapped post…retirement health benefits that other corporations chose to install。 A CEO didn't need to be a medical expert to know that lengthening life expectancies and soaring health costs would guarantee an insurer a financial battering from such a business。 Nevertheless； many a manager blithely mitted his own pany to a self…insurance plan embodying precisely the same promises … and thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable consequences。 In health…care； open…ended promises have created open…ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to threaten the global petitiveness of major American industries。
最近几十年来，没有一家公司的总裁会想到，有一天他必须向董事会提出这种没有上限的退休健保计画，他不须要具有专业的医学知识也知道越来越高的预期寿命以及健保支出将会把一家公司给拖垮，但是即便如此，很多经理人还是闭着眼睛让公司透过内部自保的方式，投入这种永无止尽的大坑洞，最后导致公司股东承担后果血本无归，就健保而言，没有上限的承诺所代表的就是没有上限的负债，这种严重的后果，甚至危急了一些美国大企业的全球竞争力。
I believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was that accounting rules did not； for so long； require the booking of post…retirement health costs as they were incurred。 Instead； the rules allowed cash…basis accounting； which vastly understated the liabilities that were building up。 In effect； the attitude of both managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was 〃out…of…sight； out…of…mind。〃 Ironically； some of these same managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing 〃cash…basis〃 thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other programs creating future liabilities of size。
而我相信之所以会有这种不顾后果的行为，一部份原因是由于会计原则并没有要求公司将这种潜藏的退休金负债呈现在会计帐上，相反地，会计原则允许业者采取现金基础制，此举大大地低估了负债，而公司的经营阶层与签证会计师所采取的态度就是眼不见为净，而讽刺的是，这些经理人还常常批评国会对于社会保险采用现金基础的思惟，根本就不顾未来年度所可能产生的庞大负债。
Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles： 〃How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg？〃 The answer： 〃Four； because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg。〃 It behooves managers to remember that Abe's right even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg。
经理人在思索会计原则时，一定要谨记林肯总统本身最常讲的一句俚语：「如果一只狗连尾巴也算在内的话，总共有几条腿﹖ 答案还是四条腿，因为不论你是不是把尾巴当作是一条腿，尾巴永远还是尾巴！」，这句话提醒经理人就算会计师愿意帮你证明尾巴也算是一条腿，你也不会因此多了一条腿。
The most egregious case of let's…not…face…up…to…reality behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of stock options。 In Berkshire's 1985 annual report； I laid out my opinions about the use and misuse of options。 But even when options are structured properly； they are accounted for in ways that make no sense。 The lack of logic is not accidental： For decades； much of the business world has waged war against accounting rulemakers； trying to keep the costs of stock options from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue them。
提到公司主管与会计师鸵鸟心态，最极端的例子就是发行认股权这档子事，在Berkshire 1985年的年报中，我曾经对于认股权的滥用表示过个人的看法，但是即便是认股权规划得当，在许多方面这种做法还是显得相当没有道理，然而缺乏逻辑绝对不是第一次，几十年来，企业界就不断地向会计原则制定者进行攻击，意图将发行认股权的相关成本排除在企业的损益表之外。
Typically； executives have argued that options are hard to value and that therefore their costs should be ignored。 At other times managers have said that assigning a cost to options would injure small start…up businesses。 Sometimes they have even solemnly declared that 〃out…of…the…money〃 options （those with an exercise price equal to or above the current market price） have no value when they are issued。
通常企业主管会辩称很难衡量选择权的价值，也因此其成本应该可以被忽略，有时经理人也会说若认列这方面的成本，将不利于新成立公司的发展，有时他们甚至义正词严地指出处于价外（亦即行使的价格等于或是高于现在的股价）的选择权在发行时并没有价值。
Oddly； the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in with a variation on that theme； opining that options should not be viewed as a cost because they 〃aren't dollars out of a pany's coffers。〃 I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their reported profits。 For example； they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options。 So if you're a CEO and subscribe to this 〃no cash…no cost〃 theory of accounting； I'll make you an offer you can't refuse： Give us a call at Berkshire and we will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long…term options on your pany's stock。
很奇怪的是机构投资人协会这时也插进来表示不同的意见，他们认为选择权不应当被视作为一种成本，因为从头到尾公司根本就不需要从口袋里掏出一毛钱，我认为这样的理由等于是给了所有美国企业大幅改善帐面获利的难得良机，例如他们可以以选择权的方式来支付公司的保险费，所以如果由你来担任CEO，同时充分地运用这种不付现金就没又支出的会计理论，我绝对可以提出一个你无法拒绝的条件，打个电话到Berkshire给我们，我们很愿意以取得贵公司长期认股权的代价，接受你们的保单。
Shareholders should understand that panies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party and not just when cash changes hands。 Moreover； it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision。 Right now； accounting abounds with imprecision。 After all； no manager or auditor knows h