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e been valued at market； whereas equities held by our non…insurance subsidiaries or by the parent pany were carried at their aggregate cost or market； whichever was lower。 Now GAAP says that all mon stocks should be carried at market； a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of 1993。 This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about 172million。
3。1993年另外一个会计原则的变动影响的则是我们帐上持有的这些有价证券的价值，近几年来，我们保险公司所持有的不管是普通股或是约当普通股，都是按市价计算，至于母公司或是其它非保险业子公司所持有的的股票则以成本与市价孰低法计算，现在一般公认会计原则则改成全部都按市价计算，这个规定将从1993年的第四季开始实施，此举将使得Berkshire的净值增加1。72亿美元。
4。 Finally； we issued some stock last year。 In a transaction described in last year's Annual Report； we issued 3；944 shares in early January； 1993 upon the conversion of 46 million convertible debentures that we had called for redemption。 Additionally； we issued 25；203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe； a purchase discussed later in this report。 The overall result was that our shares outstanding increased by 29；147 and our net worth by about 478 million。 Per…share book value also grew； because the shares issued in these transactions carried a price above their book value。
4。最后去年我们又发行的一些股份，在一项去年曾提过的购并交易中，我们在1993年一月将4；600万美元的可转换债券赎回，而发行了3；944股，此外在买下Dexter鞋业时，（后面报告还会详加叙述）我们又发行了25；203股，总计一共新发行了29；147股，增加4。78亿美元的净值，每股帐面净值也因发行价格高于原先帐面每股净值而提升。
Of course； it's per…share intrinsic value； not book value； that counts。 Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital； including retained earnings； that has been put into a business。 Intrinsic value is a present…value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life。 At most panies； the two values are unrelated。 Berkshire； however； is an exception： Our book value； though significantly below our intrinsic value； serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure。 In 1993； each measure grew by roughly 14％； advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting。
当然真正重要的是每股实质价值而非帐面净值，帐面净值是一个会计名词，用来衡量一家公司所投入的资本，也包含未分配的盈余在内，实质价值则是对于一家企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数字大多不相关，不过Berkshire算是一个例外，我们的帐面净值，虽然远低于实质价值，但却是追踪实质价值相当好的一项指针，在1993年两项数值大约皆以14％左右的比率增加，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。
These gains； however； were outstripped by a much larger gain … 39％ … in Berkshire's market price。 Over time； of course； market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same destination。 But in the short run the two often diverge in a major way； a phenomenon I've discussed in the past。 Two years ago； Coca…Cola and Gillette； both large holdings of ours； enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains。 In the 1991 Annual Report； I said that the stocks of these panies could not continuously overperform their businesses。
这些利得比起Berkshire本身股价39％的涨幅来说还是略微逊色，当然就长期而言，Berkshire的市价与实质价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的盈余成长，在1991年的年报中，我便说过这些公司的股票市价不可能永远持续超越其本业。
From 1991 to 1993； Coke and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38％ and 37％ respectively； but their market prices moved up only 11％ and 6％。 In other words； the panies overperformed their stocks； a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names。 Whatever the reason； what will count over time is the earnings performance of these panies。 If they prosper； Berkshire will also prosper； though not in a lock…step manner。
从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38％与37％，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11％与6％，换句话说，这些公司的表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于华尔街对于品牌有很深的疑虑，但是不管怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本身的获利情况，如果他们经营顺利，Berkshire也就跟着水涨船高，虽然不是依照一步步稳定的方式前进。
Let me add a lesson from history： Coke went public in 1919 at 40 per share。 By the end of 1920 the market； coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects； had battered the stock down by more than 50％； to 19。50。 At yearend 1993； that single share； with dividends reinvested； was worth more than 2。1 million。 As Ben Graham said： 〃In the short…run； the market is a voting machine … reflecting a voter…registration test that requires only money； not intelligence or emotional stability … but in the long…run； the market is a weighing machine。〃
接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919年可口可乐股票以每股40美元公开上市，到了1920年由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看法相当冷淡，而将股价下修一半至19。5美元，然而时至今日，1993年底，若是将收到的股利再重复投资下去，则当初股票的价值将变成210万美元，就像葛拉罕所说：「短期而言，市场是投票机器，投资人不须靠智能或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票，但就长期而言，股票市场却是一个体重机。」
So how should Berkshire's over…performance in the market last year be viewed？ Clearly； Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year。 On the other hand； in a world of 6％ or 7％ long…term interest rates； Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate if … and you should understand that this is a huge if … Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman； and I can attain our long…standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per…share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15％。 We have not retreated from this goal。 But we again emphasize； as we have for many years； that the growth in our capital base makes 15％ an ever…more difficult target to hit。
所以我们应该如何看待Berkshire去年的股价超越本质的表现呢？ 很明显的在1993年底Berkshire的股价占实质价值比重较年初为高，另外一方面，在长期利率只有6％到7％的投资环境下，同时若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能让Berkshire的实质价值每年达到15％的成长的话，你就知道Berkshire去年这样的股价表现实在是有点反常，虽然对于这样的目标我们从不妥协，但我们必须再一次强调，随着资本规模的日益扩大，想要达到这个目标的困难度也与日俱增。
What we have going for us is a growing collection of good…sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific； run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific。 You need have no worries about this group。
不过另一方面，伴随我们的是由一些相当规模且拥有竞争优势的企业，并且由杰出的经理人所经营，对于这样的梦幻组合大家大可以放心。
The capital…allocation work that Charlie and I do at the parent pany； using the funds that our managers deliver to us； has a less certain oute： It is not easy to find new businesses and managers parable to those we have。 Despite that difficulty； Charlie and I relish the search； and we are happy to report an important success in 1993。
倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所贡献资金所作的资金分配工作，所面临的不确定性就比较高，要找到像我们现在拥有一样好的企业并不容易，但是虽然难度高，查理跟我却绝