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在要讨论的主题。事实上，保险浮存金的价值，关键在于其从保险营运移转至投资营运的转拨价格，这点可以简单的以长期无风险的资金利率作为标准。
On the next page we show the numbers that count in an evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business。 We calculate our float … which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume … by adding loss reserves； loss adjustment reserves and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit。 In those years when we have had an underwriting profit； which includes 1993； our cost of float has been negative； and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float ine。
下一页我们将会列出如何计算出Berkshire保险事业价值，首先先计算浮存金总额…相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的，将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利益。
（1） （2） Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long…TermLoss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds （In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1968 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1976 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1991 119。59 1；895。0 6。31％ 7。40％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1992 108。96 2；290。4 4。76％ 7。39％
1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％ 1993 profit 2；624。7 less than zero 6。35％
1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
As you can see； in our insurance operation last year we had the use of 2。6 billion at no cost； in fact we were paid 31 million； our underwriting profit； to hold these funds。 This sounds good … is good … but is far from as good as it sounds。
大家应该看得出，去年我们保险事业的营运结果，等于是让我们可以免费利用26亿美元的浮存金，而事实上，应该还要再加上3；100万美元的承保利益，这看起来相当不错，不过实际上并没有想象中的那么好。
We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of 〃super…cat〃 policies （which other insurance and reinsurance panies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega…catastrophes） and because last year we had no losses of consequence from this activity。 As that suggests； the truly catastrophic Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super…cat losses； the reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from private insurers。
我们试着大家冷静一下，因为我们接下的生意其中有一大部分属于霹雳猫保单 （这是其它保险公司或再保公司专门买来分担他们在发生重大意外灾害时，所可能造成的损失），同时去年这类的业务并没有出现重大的损失，意思是说，就连发生在1993年真正严重的中西部水灾也没有触及霹雳猫损失理赔的门槛，原因在于很少有私人保险公司会去购买水灾险。
It would be fallacious； however； to conclude from this single…year result that the super…cat business is a wonderful one； or even a satisfactory one。 A simple example will illustrate the fallacy： Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century。 If you annually give 5…for…1 odds against its occurrence that year； you will have many more winning years than losers。 Indeed； you may go a straight six； seven or more years without loss。 You also will eventually go broke。
这样很容易会产生错觉，并做出单一年度霹雳猫的成绩是相当不错且令人满意的一年，一个简单的例子足以说明一切，假设每个世纪平均都会发生25次重大的意外事件，而你每年都以以一赔五的比率赌它今年不会发生，则你赌对的年份可能远比赌错的年份多出许多，甚至你有可能连续赌对六年、七年，甚至是更多年，但我必须说，不管怎样，到最后你一定会以破产作为结局。
At Berkshire； we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate premiums and giving more like 3 1/2…for…1 odds。 But there is no way for us … or anyone else … to calculate the true odds on super…cat coverages。 In fact； it will take decades for us to find out whether our underwriting judgment has been sound。
在Berkshire，我们直觉地相信我们已经收到合理的保费，以类似以一赔三又二分之一的赌率接受赌注，当然没有人可以真正正确地算出霹雳猫保险真正的赔率，事实上，可能要等到几十年后，我们才能知道当初的判断是否正确。
What we do know is that when a loss es； it's likely to be a lulu。 There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses from the super…cat business equal to three or four times what we earned from it in 1993。 When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992； we paid out about 125 million。 Because we've since expanded our super…cat business； a similar storm today could cost us 600 million。
不过我们确实知道，当损失真正降临时，铁定是件轰动的事，以后可能会发生三倍或四倍于我们在1993年所赚到的盈余那样大的意外事件，1992年Andrew飓风发生的那次，我们总共赔了1。25亿美元，时至今日由于我们已大幅扩大在霹雳猫保险的业务量，所以同样规模的飓风可能会造成我们六亿美元左右的理赔损失。
So far； we have been lucky in 1994。 As I write this letter； we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake will be nominal。 But if the quake had been a 7。5 instead of a 6。8； it would have been a different story。
1994年到目前为止，我们还算是幸运，在我写这封信时，我们因为洛杉矶大地震所造成的损失还算在正常范围之内，不过要是当时地震发生的规模不是6。8而是7。5的话，那么最后的结果就完全不是那么一回事了。
Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super…cat policies。 In Ajit Jain； we have by far the best manager in this business。 Additionally； panies writing these policies need enormous capital； and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that of our main petitors。 In most lines of insurance； huge resources aren't that important： An insurer can diversify the risks it writes and； if necessary； can lay off risks to reduce concentration in its portfolio。 That isn't possible in the super…cat business。 So these petitors are forced into offering far smaller limits than those we can provide。 Were they bolder； they would run the risk that a mega…catastrophe … or a confluence of smaller catastrophes … would wipe them out。
Berkshire本身很适合从事霹雳猫保险的业务，我们有业界最优秀的经理人Ajit Jain，此外从事这行需要相当雄厚的资金实力，在这点我们公司的净值大概是其他主要竞争对手的10到20倍，对大部分的保险业务而言，背后所拥有的资源还不是那么地重要，一家保险公司可以很轻易地就把它所承担的风险分散出去，若有必要，也可以降低险种集中度以减低风险，但是对霹雳猫保险这种特殊的保险就没有办法这样子做，所以其它的竞争同业只能被迫降低理赔的上限来因应，而要是他们胆敢承担更高的风险，则一个超大型的意外灾害或是连续发生几个较小型的灾害，就有可能让他们粉身碎骨。
One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that each of the four la