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Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry：
下表是我们惯用保险业主要指数的最近更新数字
Yearly Change in bined Ratio Yearly Change in GNP Deflators
Premiums Written Incurred Loss
1981 3。8％ 106。0％ 6。5％ 9。7％
1982 4。4％ 109。8％ 8。4％ 6。4％
1983 4。6％ 112。0％ 6。8％ 3。9％
1984 9。2％ 117。9％ 16。9％ 3。8％
1985 22。1％ 116。5％ 16。1％ 3。3％
1986 （Rev。） 22。2％ 108。0％ 13。5％ 2。6％
1987 （Est。） 8。7％ 104。7％ 6。8％ 3。0％
综合比率代表所有保险成本（发生损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，一百以下表示有承保的获利，一百以上则有承保的损失，若考量保险公司利用保费收入（浮存金）所赚取的投资收益列入计算，则107到111之间大约是损益两平点，当然这是不包含公司自有资金所运用的收益。
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107…111 range typically produces an overall break…even result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
保险事业的数字，若以上面那张简表来说明，事实上并不会太复杂，当同业平均保费收入年成长只在4％或5％徘徊，则当年承保损失一定会上升，原因不在于车祸、火灾、暴风等意外事件发生更频繁，也不是因为一般通货膨胀的关系。主要的祸首在于今天社会与司法过度膨胀，法律诉讼费用暴增，一方面是因为诉讼更频繁，一方面是由于陪审团与法官倾向扩大保险单上的保险理赔范围，若这种乱象不能加以抑止，则保险公司每年至少要有10％以上的保费收入年成长，才有办法收支打平，即使在通货膨胀相对温和的状况下也是如此。
The math of the insurance business； encapsulated by the table； is not very plicated。 In years when the industry's annual gain in revenues （premiums） pokes along at 4％ or 5％； underwriting losses are sure to mount。 That is not because auto accidents； fires； windstorms and the like are occurring more frequently； nor has it lately been the fault of general inflation。 Today； social and judicial inflation are the major culprits； the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned。 Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts； and part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the insurer when the policies were written。 Seeing no let…up in either trend； we continue to believe that the industry's revenues must grow at about 10％ annually for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability； even though general inflation may be running at a considerably lower rate。
过去三年来保费收入的大幅成长几乎可以确定今年同业的绩效都会相当不错，事实证明也是如此，不过接下来的情况可就不太妙了，根据Best's统计预估， 1988年的每季的成长率将由12。9％按季逐渐下滑至11。1％、5。7％、5。6％，可以确定的是1988年的保费成长一定会低于10％的损益两平点，很明显的好日子已经不多了。
The strong revenue gains of 1985…87 almost guaranteed the industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and； indeed； it was a banner year。 But the news soured as the quarters rolled by： Best's estimates that year…over…year volume increases were 12。9％； 11。1％； 5。7％； and 5。6％。 In 1988； the revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10％ 〃equilibrium〃 figure。 Clearly； the party is over。
然而盈余数字却不会马上滑落，这个产业具有递延的现象，因为大部分的保单都是一年期，所以对于损益的影响会在往后的一年之间陆续浮现，因此打个比方，在party结束、酒吧关门之前，你还可以把手上的那杯喝完了再走，假设往后几年没有发生什么天灾地变，我们预期1988年的同业平均综合比率将会微幅上扬，紧接下来的几年则会大幅攀升。
However； earnings will not immediately sink。 A lag factor exists in this industry： Because most policies are written for a one…year term； higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on earnings until many months after they go into effect。 Thus； to resume our metaphor； when the party ends and the bar is closed； you are allowed to finish your drink。 If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe； we predict a small climb for the industry's bined ratio in 1988； followed by several years of larger increases。
保险业最近受到几项不利的经济因素所困而前景黯淡，数以百计的竞争对手、进入障碍低、无法大幅差异化的产品特性，在这种类似商品型产业之中，只有营运成本低的公司或是一些受到保护的利基产品才有可能有长期获利成长的机会。
The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long…term outlook： hundreds of petitors； ease of entry； and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way。 In such a modity…like business； only a very low…cost operator or someone operating in a protected； and usually small； niche can sustain high profitability levels。
当产品供给短缺时，即使是商品化产业也能蓬勃发展，不过在保险业界，这种好日子早就已经过去了，资本主义最讽刺的地方就是商品型产业大部分的经理人都痛恨商品短缺不足，但偏偏这是唯一可能让这些公司有获利的机会，当短缺出现时，经理人便会迫不及待地想要扩充产能，这无异是将源源不断流入现金的水龙头关掉一样，这就是过去三年保险公司经理人的最佳写照，再次验证Disraeli的名言：「我们唯一从历史得到的教训就是我们从来无法从历史得到教训！」
When shortages exist； however； even modity businesses flourish。 The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate for a while but it is now gone。 One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in modity industries abhor shortage conditions … even though those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns。 Whenever shortages appear； the typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through which money is showering upon him。 This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985…87； confirming again Disraeli's observation： 〃What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history。〃
在Berkshire，我们努力避免自己的公司成为商品化的企业，首先我们凭借着自己强大的资金实力，来凸显我们产品的不同，但这种效果实在是有限，尤其在个人险的部份，因为即使是其所投保的保险公司倒闭（事实上这种状况还不少），汽车险或或房屋险的购买者仍可获得理赔，在商业险的部份也是如此，当情况好时，许多大企业投保户与保险掮客都不太关心保险业者的财务状况，即使是比较复杂的案件，顶多拖个三、五年，最后还是有办法可以解决， （眼不见为净的结果，可能会让你的口袋落空）
At Berkshire； we work to escape the industry's modity economics in two ways。 First； we differentiate our product by our financial strength； which exceeds that of all others in the industry。 This strength； however； is limited in its usefulness。 It means nothing in the personal insurance field： The buyer of an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even if his insurer fails （as many have）。 It often means nothing in the mercial insurance arena： When times are good； many major corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more adverse conditions that may exist； say； five years later when a plicated claim is finally resolved。 （Out of sight； out of mind … and； later on； maybe out…of…pocket。）
不过一段期间保户会偶尔想起富兰克林所说的空沙包很难站的直挺，并了解寻找一个可靠稳定的保险公司的重要性，这时我们发挥优势的机会就来了，当客户认真想到往后五到十年，若是面对景气不佳同时又碰上金融市场低迷，再保业者