按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Further； the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we
are a priori conscious； and which is apodeictically certain； though it
be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can
be found。 Hence； the objective reality of the moral law cannot be
proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason；
whether speculative or empirically supported； and therefore； even if
we renounced its apodeictic certainty； it could not be proved a
posteriori by experience； and yet it is firmly established of itself。
But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral
principle； something else is found which was quite unexpected； namely；
that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the
deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove；
but of which speculative reason was pelled at least to assume the
possibility （in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the
unconditioned in the chain of causality； so as not to contradict
itself）… I mean the faculty of freedom。 The moral law； which itself
does not require a justification； proves not merely the possibility of
freedom； but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law
as binding on themselves。 The moral law is in fact a law of the
causality of free agents and； therefore； of the possibility of a
supersensible system of nature； just as the metaphysical law of events
in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of
nature； and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was
pelled to leave undetermined； namely； the law for a causality；
the concept of which in the latter was only negative； and therefore
for the first time gives this concept objective reality。
This sort of credential of the moral law； viz。； that it is set forth
as a principle of the deduction of freedom； which is a causality of
pure reason； is a sufficient substitute for all a priori
justification； since theoretic reason was pelled to assume at least
the possibility of freedom； in order to satisfy a want of its own。 For
the moral law proves its reality； so as even to satisfy the critique
of the speculative reason； by the fact that it adds a positive
definition to a causality previously conceived only negatively； the
possibility of which was inprehensible to speculative reason； which
yet was pelled to suppose it。 For it adds the notion of a reason
that directly determines the will （by imposing on its maxims the
condition of a universal legislative form）； and thus it is able for
the first time to give objective； though only practical； reality to
reason； which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed
speculatively with its ideas。 It thus changes the transcendent use
of reason into an immanent use （so that reason is itself； by means
of ideas； an efficient cause in the field of experience）。
The determination of the causality of beings in the world of
sense； as such； can never be unconditioned； and yet for every series
of conditions there must be something unconditioned； and therefore
there must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself。 Hence；
the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found
to be a want but； as far as its possibility is concerned； an
analytic principle of pure speculative reason。 But as it is absolutely
impossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this
idea； because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be
impossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination
of causality； we were only able to defend our supposition that a
freely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense； in so
far as it is considered in the other point of view as a noumenon；
showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as
subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena； and yet
regarding its causality as physically unconditioned； in so far as
the acting being belongs to the world of understanding； and in thus
making the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason。 By
this principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which
that sort of causality is attributed； but I remove the difficulty；
for； on the one side； in the explanation of events in the world； and
consequently also of the actions of rational beings； I leave to the
mechanism of physical necessity the right of ascending from
conditioned to condition ad infinitum； while on the other side I
keep open for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant；
namely； the intelligible； in order to transfer the unconditioned
thither。 But I was not able to verify this supposition； that is； to
change it into the knowledge of a being so acting； not even into the
knowledge of the possibility of such a being。 This vacant place is now
filled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an
intelligible world （causality with freedom）； namely； the moral law。
Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its
insight； but only as regards the certainty of its problematical notion
of freedom； which here obtains objective reality； which； though only
practical； is nevertheless undoubted。 Even the notion of causality…
the application； and consequently the signification； of which holds
properly only in relation to phenomena； so as to connect them into
experiences （as is shown by the Critique of Pure Reason）… is not so
enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits。 For if reason
sought to do this； it would have to show how the logical relation of
principle and consequence can be used synthetically in a different
sort of intuition from the sensible； that is how a causa noumenon is
possible。 This it can never do； and； as practical reason； it does
not even concern itself with it； since it only places the
determining principle of causality of man as a sensible creature
（which is given） in pure reason （which is therefore called practical）；
and therefore it employs the notion of cause； not in order to know
objects； but to determine causality in relation to objects in general。
It can abstract altogether from the application of this notion to
objects with a view to theoretical knowledge （since this concept is
always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any
intuition）。 Reason； then； employs it only for a practical purpose； and
hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the
intelligible order of things； admitting； at the same time； that we
cannot understand how the notion of cause can determine the
knowledge of these things。 But reason must cognise causality with
respect to the actions of the will in the sensible world in a definite
manner； otherwise； practical reason could not really produce any
action。 But as to the notion which it forms of its own causality as
noumenon； it need not determine it theoretically with a view to the
cognition of its supersensible existence； so as to give it
significance in this way。 For it acquires significance apart from
this； though only for practical use； namely； through the moral law。
Theoretically viewed； it remains always a pure a priori concep