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reason （and this is properly the problem）； must begin with the
possibility of practical principles a priori。 Only after that can it
proceed to concepts of the objects of a practical reason； namely；
those of absolute good and evil； in order to assign them in accordance
with those principles （for prior to those principles they cannot
possibly be given as good and evil by any faculty of knowledge）； and
only then could the section be concluded with the last chapter；
that； namely； which treats of the relation of the pure practical
reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence thereon；
which is a priori cognisable； that is； of the moral sentiment。 Thus
the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of
the conditions of its use in mon with the theoretical； but in
reverse order。 The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided
into transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic； that of the
practical reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical
reason （if I may； for the sake of analogy merely； use these
designations； which are not quite suitable）。 This logic again was
there divided into the Analytic of concepts and that of principles：
here into that of principles and concepts。 The Aesthetic also had in
the former case two parts； on account of the two kinds of sensible
intuition； here the sensibility is not considered as a capacity of
intuition at all； but merely as feeling （which can be a subjective
ground of desire）； and in regard to it pure practical reason admits no
further division。
It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts
with its subdivision was not actually adopted here （as one might
have been induced to attempt by the example of the former critique）。
For since it is pure reason that is here considered in its practical
use； and consequently as proceeding from a priori principles； and
not from empirical principles of determination； hence the division
of the analytic of pure practical reason must resemble that of a
syllogism； namely； proceeding from the universal in the major
premiss （the moral principle）； through a minor premiss containing a
subsumption of possible actions （as good or evil） under the former； to
the conclusion； namely； the subjective determination of the will （an
interest in the possible practical good； and in the maxim founded on
it）。 He who has been able to convince himself of the truth of the
positions occurring in the Analytic will take pleasure in such
parisons； for they justly suggest the expectation that we may
perhaps some day be able to discern the unity of the whole faculty
of reason （theoretical as well as practical） and be able to derive all
from one principle； which； is what human reason inevitably demands； as
it finds plete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of
its knowledge。
If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can
have of a pure practical reason； and by means of it； as shown by the
Analytic； we find； along with a remarkable analogy between it and
the theoretical； no less remarkable differences。 As regards the
theoretical； the faculty of a pure rational cognition a priori could
be easily and evidently proved by examples from sciences （in which； as
they put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical
use； there is not so much reason as in mon knowledge to fear a
secret mixture of empirical principles of cognition）。 But； that pure
reason without the admixture of any empirical principle is practical
of itself； this could only be shown from the monest practical use
of reason； by verifying the fact； that every man's natural reason
acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme law of his
will… a law pletely a priori and not depending on any sensible
data。 It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity of its
origin； even in the judgement of this mon reason； before science
could take it in hand to make use of it； as a fact； that is； prior
to all disputation about its possibility； and all the consequences
that may be drawn from it。 But this circumstance may be readily
explained from what has just been said； because practical pure
reason must necessarily begin with principles； which therefore must be
the first data； the foundation of all science； and cannot be derived
from it。 It was possible to effect this verification of moral
principles as principles of a pure reason quite well； and with
sufficient certainty； by a single appeal to the judgement of mon
sense； for this reason； that anything empirical which might slip
into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected
at once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily
attaches to it as exciting desire； whereas pure practical reason
positively refuses to admit this feeling into its principle as a
condition。 The heterogeneity of the determining principles （the
empirical and rational） is clearly detected by this resistance of a
practically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination；
and by a peculiar kind of sentiment； which； however； does not
precede the legislation of the practical reason； but； on the contrary；
is produced by this as a constraint； namely； by the feeling of a
respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for
the law only； and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner
that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an
example presented to him； that empirical principles of volition may
indeed urge him to follow their attractions； but that he can never
be expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason
alone。
The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine
of morality； in the former of which empirical principles constitute
the entire foundation； while in the second they do not form the
smallest part of it； is the first and most important office of the
Analytic of pure practical reason； and it must proceed in it with as
much exactness and； so to speak； scrupulousness； as any geometer in
his work。 The philosopher； however； has greater difficulties to
contend with here （as always in rational cognition by means of
concepts merely without construction）； because he cannot take any
intuition as a foundation （for a pure noumenon）。 He has； however； this
advantage that； like the chemist； he can at any time make an
experiment with every man's practical reason for the purpose of
distinguishing the moral （pure） principle of determination from the
empirical； namely； by adding the moral law （as a determining
principle） to the empirically affected will （e。g。； that of the man who
would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby）。 It is as
if the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric
acid； the acid at once forsakes the lime； bines with the alkali；
and the lime is precipitated。 just in the same way； if to a man who is
otherwise honest （or who for this occasion places himself only in
thought in the position of an honest man）； we present the moral law by
which he recognises the worthlessness of the liar； his practical
reason （in forming a judgement of what ought to