按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
objections which have reached me from men who show that they have at
heart the discovery of the truth； and I shall continue to do so （for
those who have only their old system before their eyes； and who have
already settled what is to be approved or disapproved； do not desire
any explanation which might stand in the way of their own private
opinion。）
*＇See Kant's 〃Das mag in der Theoric ricktig seyn；〃 etc。 Werke； vol。
vii； p。 182。＇
*＇2＇ It might also have been objected to me that I have not first
defined the notion of the faculty of desire； or of the feeling of
Pleasure； although this reproach would be unfair； because this
definition might reasonably be presupposed as given in psychology。
However； the definition there given might be such as to found the
determination of the faculty of desire on the feeling of pleasure
（as is monly done）； and thus the supreme principle of practical
philosophy would be necessarily made empirical； which； however；
remains to be proved and in this critique is altogether refuted。 It
will； therefore； give this definition here in such a manner as it
ought to be given； in order to leave this contested point open at
the beginning； as it should be。 LIFE is the faculty a being has of
acting according to laws of the faculty of desire。 The faculty of
DESIRE is the being's faculty of being by means of its ideas the
cause of the actual existence of the objects of these ideas。
PLEASURE is the idea of the agreement of the object； or the action
with the subjective conditions of life； i。e。； with the faculty of
causality of an idea in respect of the actuality of its object （or
with the determination of the forces of the subject to action which
produces it）。 I have no further need for the purposes of this critique
of notions borrowed from psychology； the critique itself supplies
the rest。 It is easily seen that the question whether the faculty of
desire is always based on pleasure； or whether under certain
conditions pleasure only follows the determination of desire； is by
this definition left undecided； for it is posed only of terms
belonging to the pure understanding； i。e。； of categories which contain
nothing empirical。 Such precaution is very desirable in all philosophy
and yet is often neglected； namely； not to prejudge questions by
adventuring definitions before the notion has been pletely
analysed； which is often very late。 It may be observed through the
whole course of the critical philosophy （of the theoretical as well as
the practical reason） that frequent opportunity offers of supplying
defects in the old dogmatic method of philosophy； and of correcting
errors which are not observed until we make such rational use of these
notions viewing them as a whole。
When we have to study a particular faculty of the human mind in
its sources； its content； and its limits； then from the nature of
human knowledge we must begin with its parts； with an accurate and
plete exposition of them； plete； namely； so far as is possible
in the present state of our knowledge of its elements。 But there is
another thing to be attended to which is of a more philosophical and
architectonic character； namely； to grasp correctly the idea of the
whole； and from thence to get a view of all those parts as mutually
related by the aid of pure reason； and by means of their derivation
from the concept of the whole。 This is only possible through the
most intimate acquaintance with the system； and those who find the
first inquiry too troublesome； and do not think it worth their while
to attain such an acquaintance； cannot reach the second stage； namely；
the general view； which is a synthetical return to that which had
previously been given analytically。 It is no wonder then if they
find inconsistencies everywhere； although the gaps which these
indicate are not in the system itself； but in their own incoherent
train of thought。
I have no fear； as regards this treatise； of the reproach that I
wish to introduce a new language； since the sort of knowledge here
in question has itself somewhat of an everyday character。 Nor even
in the case of the former critique could this reproach occur to anyone
who had thought it through and not merely turned over the leaves。 To
invent new words where the language has no lack of expressions for
given notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the
crowd； if not by new and true thoughts； yet by new patches on the
old garment。 If； therefore； the readers of that work know any more
familiar expressions which are as suitable to the thought as those
seem to me to be； or if they think they can show the futility of these
thoughts themselves and hence that of the expression； they would； in
the first case； very much oblige me； for I only desire to be
understood： and； in the second case； they would deserve well of
philosophy。 But； as long as these thoughts stand； I very much doubt
that suitable and yet more mon expressions for them can be found。*
*I am more afraid in the present treatise of occasional
misconception in respect of some expressions which I have chosen
with the greatest care in order that the notion to which they point
may not be missed。 Thus； in the table of categories of the Practical
reason under the title of Modality； the Permitted； and forbidden （in a
practical objective point of view； possible and impossible） have
almost the same meaning in mon language as the next category；
duty and contrary to duty。 Here； however； the former means what
coincides with； or contradicts； a merely possible practical precept
（for example； the solution of all problems of geometry and mechanics）；
the latter； what is similarly related to a law actually present in the
reason； and this distinction is not quite foreign even to mon
language； although somewhat unusual。 For example； it is forbidden to
an orator； as such； to forge new words or constructions； in a
certain degree this is permitted to a poet； in neither case is there
any question of duty。 For if anyone chooses to forfeit his
reputation as an orator； no one can prevent him。 We have here only
to do with the distinction of imperatives into problematical；
assertorial； and apodeictic。 Similarly in the note in which I have
pared the moral ideas of practical perfection in different
philosophical schools； I have distinguished the idea of wisdom from
that of holiness； although I have stated that essentially and
objectively they are the same。 But in that place I understand by the
former only that wisdom to which man （the Stoic） lays claim； therefore
I take it subjectively as an attribute alleged to belong to man。
（Perhaps the expression virtue； with which also the made great show；
would better mark the characteristic of his school。） The expression of
a postulate of pure practical reason might give most occasion to
misapprehension in case the reader confounded it with the
signification of the postulates in pure mathematics； which carry
apodeictic certainty with them。 These； however； postulate the
possibility of an action； the object of which has been previously
recognized a priori in theory as possible； and that with perfect
certainty。 But the former post