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only results）； we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring； the
law itself； by putting as it were a false foil upon it。 Respect； not
pleasure or enjoyment of happiness； is something for which it is not
possible that reason should have any antecedent feeling as its
foundation （for this would always be sensible and pathological）； and
consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by
no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure； although in relation to
the faculty of desire it produces the same effect； but from
different sources： it is only by this mode of conception； however；
that we can attain what we are seeking； namely； that actions be done
not merely in accordance with duty （as a result of pleasant feelings）；
but from duty； which must be the true end of all moral cultivation。
Have we not； however； a word which does not express enjoyment； as
happiness does； but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence； an
analogue of the happiness which must necessarily acpany the
consciousness of virtue？ Yes this word is self…contentment which in
its proper signification always designates only a negative
satisfaction in one's existence； in which one is conscious of
needing nothing。 Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of
following the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence
of inclinations； at least as motives determining （though not as
affecting） our desire； and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in
following my moral maxims； it is the only source of an unaltered
contentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests on no
special feeling。 This may be called intellectual contentment。 The
sensible contentment （improperly so…called） which rests on the
satisfaction of the inclinations； however delicate they may be
imagined to be； can never be adequate to the conception of it。 For the
inclinations change； they grow with the indulgence shown them； and
always leave behind a still greater void than we had thought to
fill。 Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being； and；
although he cannot lay them aside； they wrest from him the wish to
be rid of them。 Even an inclination to what is right （e。g。； to
beneficence）； though it may much facilitate the efficacy of the
moral maxims； cannot produce any。 For in these all must be directed to
the conception of the law as a determining principle； if the action is
to contain morality and not merely legality。 Inclination is blind
and slavish； whether it be of a good sort or not； and； when morality
is in question； reason must not play the part merely of guardian to
inclination； but disregarding it altogether must attend simply to
its own interest as pure practical reason。 This very feeling of
passion and tender sympathy； if it precedes the deliberation on the
question of duty and bees a determining principle； is even annoying
to right thinking persons； brings their deliberate maxims into
confusion； and makes them wish to be delivered from it and to be
subject to lawgiving reason alone。
From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of
a pure practical reason produces by action （virtue） a consciousness of
mastery over one's inclinations； and therefore of independence of
them； and consequently also of the discontent that always
acpanies them； and thus a negative satisfaction with one's state；
i。e。； contentment； which is primarily contentment with one's own
person。 Freedom itself bees in this way （namely； indirectly）
capable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness； because it
does not depend on the positive concurrence of a feeling； nor is it；
strictly speaking； bliss； since it does not include plete
independence of inclinations and wants； but it resembles bliss in so
far as the determination of one's will at least can hold itself free
from their influence； and thus； at least in its origin； this enjoyment
is analogous to the self…sufficiency which we can ascribe only to
the Supreme Being。
From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason； it
follows that in practical principles we may at least conceive as
possible a natural and necessary connection between the
consciousness of morality and the expectation of a proportionate
happiness as its result； though it does not follow that we can know or
perceive this connection； that； on the other hand； principles of the
pursuit of happiness cannot possibly produce morality； that；
therefore； morality is the supreme good （as the first condition of the
summum bonum）； while happiness constitutes its second element； but
only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned； but necessary
consequence of the former。 Only with this subordination is the
summum bonum the whole object of pure practical reason； which must
necessarily conceive it as possible； since it mands us to
contribute to the utmost of our power to its realization。 But since
the possibility of such connection of the conditioned with its
condition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things and
cannot be given according to the laws of the world of sense；
although the practical consequences of the idea belong to the world of
sense； namely； the actions that aim at realizing the summum bonum；
we will therefore endeavour to set forth the grounds of that
possibility； first； in respect of what is immediately in our power；
and then； secondly； in that which is not in our power； but which
reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence； for the
realization of the summum bonum （which by practical principles is
necessary）。
III。 Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its
Union with the Speculative Reason。
By primacy between two or more things connected by reason； I
understand the prerogative； belonging to one； of being the first
determining principle in the connection with all the rest。 In a
narrower practical sense it means the prerogative of the interest of
one in so far as the interest of the other is subordinated to it；
while it is not postponed to any other。 To every faculty of the mind
we can attribute an interest； that is； a principle； that contains
the condition on which alone the former is called into exercise。
Reason； as the faculty of principles； determines the interest of all
the powers of the mind and is determined by its own。 The interest of
its speculative employment consists in the cognition of the object
pushed to the highest a priori principles： that of its practical
employment； in the determination of the will in respect of the final
and plete end。 As to what is necessary for the possibility of any
employment of reason at all； namely； that its principles and
affirmations should not contradict one another； this constitutes no
part of its interest； but is the condition of having reason at all； it
is only its development； not mere consistency with itself； that is
reckoned as its interest。
If practical reason could not assume or think as given anything
further than what speculative reason of itself could offer it from its
own insight； the latter would have the primacy。 But supposing that
it had of itself original a priori principles with which certain