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laws are one and the same。
On the hypothesis； then； of freedom of the will； morality together
with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception。
However； the latter is a synthetic proposition； viz。； an absolutely
good will is that whose maxim can always include itself regarded as
a universal law； for this property of its maxim can never be
discovered by analysing the conception of an absolutely good will。 Now
such synthetic propositions are only possible in this way： that the
two cognitions are connected together by their union with a third in
which they are both to be found。 The positive concept of freedom
furnishes this third cognition； which cannot； as with physical causes；
be the nature of the sensible world （in the concept of which we find
conjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to something
else as effect）。 We cannot now at once show what this third is to
which freedom points us and of which we have an idea a priori； nor can
we make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be
legitimate from principles of pure practical reason and with it the
possibility of a categorical imperative； but some further
preparation is required。
Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will
of all Rational Beings
It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will； from Whatever
reason； if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same
of all rational beings。 For as morality serves as a law for us only
because we are rational beings； it must also hold for all rational
beings； and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom；
it must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational
beings。 It is not enough； then； to prove it from certain supposed
experiences of human nature （which indeed is quite impossible； and
it can only be shown a priori）； but we must show that it belongs to
the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will。 Now I say
every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just
for that reason in a practical point of view really free； that is to
say； all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the
same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in
itself by a proof theoretically conclusive。* Now I affirm that we must
attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also
the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea。 For in such a
being we conceive a reason that is practical； that is； has causality
in reference to its objects。 Now we cannot possibly conceive a
reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with
respect to its judgements； for then the subject would ascribe the
determination of its judgement not to its own reason； but to an
impulse。 It must regard itself as the author of its principles
independent of foreign influences。 Consequently as practical reason or
as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free； that is
to say； the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except
under the idea of freedom。 This idea must therefore in a practical
point of view be ascribed to every rational being。
*I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which
rational beings suppose in their actions； in order to avoid the
necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also。 The former
is sufficient for my purpose； for even though the speculative proof
should not be made out； yet a being that cannot act except with the
idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being
who was actually free。 Thus we can escape here from the onus which
presses on the theory。
Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality
We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the
idea of freedom。 This latter； however； we could not prove to be
actually a property of ourselves or of human nature； only we saw
that it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational
and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions； i。e。； as
endowed with a will； and so we find that on just the same grounds we
must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this
attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its
freedom。
Now it resulted also from the presupposition of these ideas that
we became aware of a law that the subjective principles of action；
i。e。； maxims； must always be so assumed that they can also hold as
objective； that is； universal principles； and so serve as universal
laws of our own dictation。 But why then should I subject myself to
this principle and that simply as a rational being； thus also
subjecting to it all other being endowed with reason？ I will allow
that no interest urges me to this； for that would not give a
categorical imperative； but I must take an interest in it and
discern how this comes to pass； for this properly an 〃I ought〃 is
properly an 〃I would；〃 valid for every rational being； provided only
that reason determined his actions without any hindrance。 But for
beings that are in addition affected as we are by springs of a
different kind； namely； sensibility； and in whose case that is not
always done which reason alone would do； for these that necessity is
expressed only as an 〃ought；〃 and the subjective necessity is
different from the objective。
It seems then as if the moral law； that is； the principle of
autonomy of the will； were properly speaking only presupposed in the
idea of freedom； and as if we could not prove its reality and
objective necessity independently。 In that case we should still have
gained something considerable by at least determining the true
principle more exactly than had previously been done； but as regards
its validity and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to
it； we should not have advanced a step。 For if we were asked why the
universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition
restricting our actions； and on what we ground the worth which we
assign to this manner of acting… a worth so great that there cannot be
any higher interest； and if we were asked further how it happens
that it is by this alone a man believes he feels his own personal
worth； in comparison with which that of an agreeable or disagreeable
condition is to be regarded as nothing； to these questions we could
give no satisfactory answer。
We find indeed sometimes that we can take an interest in a
personal quality which does not involve any interest of external
condition； provided this quality makes us capable of participating
in the condition in case reason were to effect the allotment； that
is to say； the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself
even without the motive of participating in this happiness。 This
judgement； however； is in fact only the effect of the importance of
the moral law which we before presupposed （when by the idea of freedom
we detach ourselves from e