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lay at New York。 Why did they not move？ Washington knew perfectly well what he himself would have done in Howe's place。 He would have attacked rapidly in April the weak American army and； after destroying or dispersing it； would have turned to meet Burgoyne coming southward from Canada。 Howe did send a strong force into New Jersey。 But he did not know how weak Washington really was； for that master of craft in war disseminated with great skill false information as to his own supposed overwhelming strength。 Howe had been bitten once by advancing too far into New Jersey and was not going to take risks。 He tried to entice Washington from the hills to attack in open country。 He marched here and there in New Jersey and kept Washington alarmed and exhausted by counter marches； and always puzzled as to what the next move should be。 Howe purposely let one of his secret messengers be taken bearing a despatch saying that the fleet was about to sail for Boston。 All these things took time and the summer was slipping away。 In the end Washington realized that Howe intended to make his move not by land but by sea。 Could it be possible that he was not going to make aid to Burgoyne his chief purpose？ Could it be that he would attack Boston？ Washington hoped so for he knew the reception certain at Boston。 Or was his goal Charleston？ On the 23d of July； when the summer was more than half gone； Washington began to see more clearly。 On that day Howe had embarked eighteen thousand men and the fleet put to sea from Staten Island。
Howe was doing what able officers with him； such as Cornwallis； Grey； and the German Knyphausen； appear to have been unanimous in thinking he should not do。 He was misled not only by the desire to strike at the very center of the rebellion； but also by the assurance of the traitorous Lee that to take Philadelphia would be the effective signal to all the American Loyalists； the overwhelming majority of the people； as was believed； that sedition had failed。 A tender parent； the King； was ready to have the colonies back in their former relation and to give them secure guarantees of future liberty。 Any one who saw the fleet put out from New York Harbor must have been impressed with the might of Britain。 No less than two hundred and twenty…nine ships set their sails and covered the sea for miles。 When they had disappeared out of sight of the New Jersey shore their goal was still unknown。 At sea they might turn in any direction。 Washington's uncertainty was partly relieved on the 30th of July when the fleet appeared at the entrance of Delaware Bay； with Philadelphia some hundred miles away across the bay and up the Delaware River。 After hovering about the Cape for a day the fleet again put to sea； and Washington； who had marched his army so as to be near Philadelphia； thought the whole movement a feint and knew not where the fleet would next appear。 He was preparing to march to New York to menace General Clinton； who had there seven thousand men able to help Burgoyne when he heard good news。 On the 22d of August he knew that Howe had really gone southward and was in Chesapeake Bay。 Boston was now certainly safe。 On the 25th of August； after three stormy weeks at sea； Howe arrived at Elkton； at the head of Chesapeake Bay； and there landed his army。 It was Philadelphia fifty miles away that he intended to have。 Washington wrote gleefully 〃Now let all New England turn out and crush Burgoyne。〃 Before the end of September he was writing that he was certain of complete disaster to Burgoyne。
Howe had； in truth； made a ruinous mistake。 Had the date been May instead of August he might still have saved Burgoyne。 But at the end of August； when the net was closing on Burgoyne； Howe was three hundred miles away。 His disregard of time and distance had been magnificent。 In July he had sailed to the mouth of the Delaware； with Philadelphia near； but he had then sailed away again； and why？ Because the passage of his ships up the river to the city was blocked by obstructions commanded by bristling forts。 The naval officers said truly that the fleet could not get up the river。 But Howe might have landed his army at the head of Delaware Bay。 It is a dozen miles across the narrow peninsula from the head of Delaware Bay to that of Chesapeake Bay。 Since Howe had decided to attack from the head of Chesapeake Bay there was little to prevent him from landing his army on the Delaware side of the peninsula and marching across it。 By sea it is a voyage of three hundred miles round a peninsula one hundred and fifty miles long to get from one of these points to the other； by land only a dozen miles away。 Howe made the sea voyage and spent on it three weeks when a march of a day would have saved this time and kept his fleet three hundred miles by sea nearer to New York and aid for Burgoyne。
Howe's mistakes only have their place in the procession to inevitable disaster。 Once in the thick of fighting he showed himself formidable。 When he had landed at Elkton he was fifty miles southwest of Philadelphia and between him and that place was Washington with his army。 Washington was determined to delay Howe in every possible way。 To get to Philadelphia Howe had to cross the Brandywine River。 Time was nothing to him。 He landed at Elkton on the 25th of August。 Not until the l0th of September was he prepared to attack Washington barring his way at Chadd's Ford。 Washington was in a strong position on a front of two miles on the river。 At his left； below Chadd's Ford； the Brandywine is a torrent flowing between high cliffs。 There the British would find no passage。 On his right was a forest。 Washington had chosen his position with his usual skill。 Entrenchments protected his front and batteries would sweep down an advancing enemy。 He had probably not more than eleven thousand men in the fight and it is doubtful whether Howe brought up a greater number so that the armies were not unevenly matched。 At daybreak on the eleventh the British army broke camp at the village of Kenneth Square； four miles from Chadd's Ford； and； under General Knyphausen； marched straight to make a frontal attack on Washington's position。
In the battle which followed Washington was beaten by the superior tactics of his enemy。 Not all of the British army was there in the attack at Chadd's Ford。 A column under Cornwallis had filed off by a road to the left and was making a long and rapid march。 The plan was to cross the Brandywine some ten miles above where Washington was posted and to attack him in the rear。 By two o'clock in the afternoon Cornwallis had forced the two branches of the upper Brandywine and was marching on Dilworth at the right rear of the American army。 Only then did Washington become aware of his danger。 His first impulse was to advance across Chadd's Ford to try to overwhelm Knyphausen and thus to get between Howe and the fleet at Elkton。 This might； however； have brought disaster and he soon decided to retire。 His movement was ably carried out。 Both sides suffered in the woodland fighting but that night the British army encamped in Washington's position at Chadd's Ford； and Howe had fought skillfully and won an important battle。
Washington had retired in good order and was