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＇8＇ Cf。 Eur。 〃Autolycus；〃 fr。 1； trans。 by J。 A。 Symonds； 〃Greek
Poets；〃 2nd series； p。 283。
＇9＇ Cf。 Plut。 〃Pelop。〃 34 （Clough； ii。 p。 235）： 〃And yet who would
compare all the victories in the Pythian and Olympian games put
together； with one of these enterprises of Pelopidas； of which he
successfully performed so many？〃
＇10＇ 〃To bind about the brows of states happiness as a coronal。〃
And this； too； is worth noting： that the buccaneer by sea； the
privateersman； through long practice in endurance； is able to live at
the expense of far superior powers。 Yes； and the life of the
freebooter is no less natural and appropriate to landsmenI do not
say； to those who can till and gather in the fruit of their fields；
but to those who find themselves deprived of sustenance； since there
is no alternativeeither men must till their fields or live on the
tillage of others； otherwise how will they find the means either of
living or of obtaining peace？＇11＇
＇11＇ Cf。 〃Econ。〃 v。 7。
Here； too； is a maxim to engrave upon the memory： in charging a
superior force； never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear
of your attack； since there is all the difference in the world between
a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit。
There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note。 Some
generals；＇12＇ in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior
to their own； will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force；＇13＇
so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury
they were minded to inflict。 Conversely； in attacking any enemy whose
superiority is a well…known fact； they will bring the whole of their
force into action。
＇12＇ Or； 〃one knows of generals；〃 e。g。 Iphicrates at Oneion； 369 B。C。
Cf。 〃Hell。〃 VI。 v。 51。
＇13＇ Lit。 〃an absolutely weak force。〃
Now； my maxim would be precisely converse： if you attack with a
prospect of superiority； do not grudge employing all the power at your
command； excess of victory＇14＇ never yet caused any conqueror one pang
of remorse。
＇14＇ Or； 〃a great and decided victory。〃 Cf。 〃Hiero；〃 ii。 16。
But in any attempt to attack superior forces； in full certainty that；
do what you can； you must eventually retire； it is far better； say I；
under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force
into action； which fraction should be the pick and flower of the
troops at your command； both horses and men。 A body of that size and
quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater
security。 Whereas； if a general brings all his troops into action
against a superior force； when he wishes to retire； certain things
must happen： those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured；
others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown； and a
third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground； since it is
impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would
desire。 If for no other reason； through sheer stress of numbers there
will be collisions； and much damage done by kicks through mutual
entanglement； whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape
offhand；＇15＇ especially if you have invention to create a scare in the
minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of
action。＇16＇ For this purpose false ambuscades will be of use。
＇15＇ Or； 〃by themselves；〃 reading ｛ex auton｝； as L。 Dind。 suggests。
Cf。 Polyb。 x。 40。 6； or if as vulg。 ｛ex auton｝ （sub。 ｛kheiron｝；
Weiske）； transl。 〃to slip through their fingers。〃
＇16＇ Zeune and other commentators cf Liv。 v。 38 （Diod。 xiv。 114）； but
the part played by the Roman subsidiarii at the battle of the
Allia； if indeed 〃una salus fugientibus；〃 was scarcely happy。
Would not 〃Hell。〃 VII。 v。 26 be more to the point？ The detachment
of cavalry and infantry placed by Epaminondas 〃on certain crests；
to create an apprehension in the minds of the Athenians〃 in that
quarter of the field at Mantinea was a ｛mekhanema｝ of the kind
here contemplated。
Another serviceable expedient will be to discover on which side a
friendly force may suddenly appear and without risk to itself put a
drag on the wheels of the pursuer。 Nay； it is self…evident； I think；
that； as far as work and speed are concerned； it is the small body
which will assert its superiority more rapidly over the larger； and
not vice versanot of course that the mere fact of being a small body
will enable them to endure toil or give them wings； but simply it is
easier to find five men than five hundred； who will take the requisite
care and pains with their horses； and personally practise of their own
accord the art of horsemanship。
But suppose the chance should occur of entering the lists against an
equal number of the enemy's cavalry； according to my judgment it were
no bad plan to split the squadron into divisions；＇17＇ the first of
which should be commanded by the squadron…leader； and the other by the
ablest officer to be found。 This second…officer will for the time
being follow in rear of the leading division with the squadron leader；
and by and by； when the antagonist is in near proximity； and when the
word of command is passed； form squadron to the front and charge the
hostile ranks＇18＇a manouvre calculated； as I conceive； to bring the
whole mass down upon the enemy with paralysing force； and to cause him
some trouble to extricate himself。 Ideally speaking； both
divisions＇19＇ will be backed by infantry kept in rear of the cavalry；
these will suddenly disclose themselves； and rushing to close
quarters； in all probability clench the nail of victory。＇20＇ So at any
rate it strikes me； seeing as I do the effects of what is unexpected
how； in the case of good things； the soul of man is filled to
overflowing with joy； and again； in the case of things terrible；
paralysed with amazement。 In proof of what I say； let any one reflect
on the stupor into which a body of men with all the weight of
numerical advantage on their side will be betrayed by falling into an
ambuscade； or again； on the exaggerated terror mutually inspired in
belligerents during the first few days； of finding themselves posted
in face of one another。
＇17＇ Or； 〃troops。〃
＇18＇ Possibly on flank。 See Courier； p。 35； on Spanish cavalry
tactics。
＇19＇ Lit。 〃supposing both divisions to be backed by footmen；〃 etc。
＇20＇ Or； 〃achieve a much more decisive victory。〃 C