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in the sense we have explained； but not simultaneously in the same
person。 That would involve a man's simultaneously apprehending； e。g。
（1） that man is essentially animal…i。e。 cannot be other than
animal…and （2） that man is not essentially animal； that is； we may
assume； may be other than animal。
Further consideration of modes of thinking and their distribution
under the heads of discursive thought； intuition； science； art；
practical wisdom； and metaphysical thinking； belongs rather partly
to natural science； partly to moral philosophy。
34
Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term
instantaneously。 It would be exemplified by a man who saw that the
moon has her bright side always turned towards the sun； and quickly
grasped the cause of this； namely that she borrows her light from him；
or observed somebody in conversation with a man of wealth and
divined that he was borrowing money； or that the friendship of these
people sprang from a common enmity。 In all these instances he has seen
the major and minor terms and then grasped the causes； the middle
terms。
Let A represent 'bright side turned sunward'； B 'lighted from the
sun'； C the moon。 Then B； 'lighted from the sun' is predicable of C；
the moon； and A； 'having her bright side towards the source of her
light'； is predicable of B。 So A is predicable of C through B。
Book II
1
THE kinds of question we ask are as many as the kinds of things
which we know。 They are in fact four：…（1） whether the connexion of
an attribute with a thing is a fact； （2） what is the reason of the
connexion； （3） whether a thing exists； （4） What is the nature of the
thing。 Thus； when our question concerns a complex of thing and
attribute and we ask whether the thing is thus or otherwise
qualified…whether； e。g。 the sun suffers eclipse or not…then we are
asking as to the fact of a connexion。 That our inquiry ceases with the
discovery that the sun does suffer eclipse is an indication of this；
and if we know from the start that the sun suffers eclipse； we do
not inquire whether it does so or not。 On the other hand； when we know
the fact we ask the reason； as； for example； when we know that the sun
is being eclipsed and that an earthquake is in progress； it is the
reason of eclipse or earthquake into which we inquire。
Where a complex is concerned； then； those are the two questions we
ask； but for some objects of inquiry we have a different kind of
question to ask； such as whether there is or is not a centaur or a
God。 （By 'is or is not' I mean 'is or is not； without further
qualification'； as opposed to 'is or is not ＇e。g。＇ white'。） On the
other hand； when we have ascertained the thing's existence； we inquire
as to its nature； asking； for instance； 'what； then； is God？' or 'what
is man？'。
2
These； then； are the four kinds of question we ask； and it is in the
answers to these questions that our knowledge consists。
Now when we ask whether a connexion is a fact； or whether a thing
without qualification is； we are really asking whether the connexion
or the thing has a 'middle'； and when we have ascertained either
that the connexion is a fact or that the thing is…i。e。 ascertained
either the partial or the unqualified being of the thing…and are
proceeding to ask the reason of the connexion or the nature of the
thing； then we are asking what the 'middle' is。
（By distinguishing the fact of the connexion and the existence of
the thing as respectively the partial and the unqualified being of the
thing； I mean that if we ask 'does the moon suffer eclipse？'； or 'does
the moon wax？'； the question concerns a part of the thing's being； for
what we are asking in such questions is whether a thing is this or
that； i。e。 has or has not this or that attribute： whereas； if we ask
whether the moon or night exists； the question concerns the
unqualified being of a thing。）
We conclude that in all our inquiries we are asking either whether
there is a 'middle' or what the 'middle' is： for the 'middle' here
is precisely the cause； and it is the cause that we seek in all our
inquiries。 Thus； 'Does the moon suffer eclipse？' means 'Is there or is
there not a cause producing eclipse of the moon？'； and when we have
learnt that there is； our next question is； 'What； then； is this
cause？ for the cause through which a thing is…not is this or that；
i。e。 has this or that attribute； but without qualification is…and
the cause through which it is…not is without qualification； but is
this or that as having some essential attribute or some accident…are
both alike the middle'。 By that which is without qualification I
mean the subject； e。g。 moon or earth or sun or triangle； by that which
a subject is （in the partial sense） I mean a property； e。g。 eclipse；
equality or inequality； interposition or non…interposition。 For in all
these examples it is clear that the nature of the thing and the reason
of the fact are identical： the question 'What is eclipse？' and its
answer 'The privation of the moon's light by the interposition of
the earth' are identical with the question 'What is the reason of
eclipse？' or 'Why does the moon suffer eclipse？' and the reply
'Because of the failure of light through the earth's shutting it out'。
Again； for 'What is a concord？ A commensurate numerical ratio of a
high and a low note'； we may substitute 'What ratio makes a high and a
low note concordant？ Their relation according to a commensurate
numerical ratio。' 'Are the high and the low note concordant？' is
equivalent to 'Is their ratio commensurate？'； and when we find that it
is commensurate； we ask 'What； then； is their ratio？'。
Cases in which the 'middle' is sensible show that the object of
our inquiry is always the 'middle'： we inquire； because we have not
perceived it； whether there is or is not a 'middle' causing； e。g。 an
eclipse。 On the other hand； if we were on the moon we should not be
inquiring either as to the fact or the reason； but both fact and
reason would be obvious simultaneously。 For the act of perception
would have enabled us to know the universal too； since； the present
fact of an eclipse being evident； perception would then at the same
time give us the present fact of the earth's screening the sun's
light； and from this would arise the universal。
Thus； as we maintain； to know a thing's nature is to know the reason
why it is； and this is equally t