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coextensive with the totality of the species。 Then if you take the
middle which is proximate； it is a definition of deciduous。 I say
that； because you will first reach a middle next the subject； and a
premiss asserting it of the whole subject； and after that a middle…the
coagulation of sap or something of the sort…proving the connexion of
the first middle with the major： but it is the coagulation of sap at
the junction of leaf…stalk and stem which defines deciduous。
If an explanation in formal terms of the inter…relation of cause and
effect is demanded； we shall offer the following。 Let A be an
attribute of all B； and B of every species of D； but so that both A
and B are wider than their respective subjects。 Then B will be a
universal attribute of each species of D （since I call such an
attribute universal even if it is not commensurate； and I call an
attribute primary universal if it is commensurate； not with each
species severally but with their totality）； and it extends beyond each
of them taken separately。
Thus； B is the cause of A's inherence in the species of D：
consequently A must be of wider extent than B； otherwise why should
B be the cause of A's inherence in D any more than A the cause of
B's inherence in D？ Now if A is an attribute of all the species of
E； all the species of E will be united by possessing some common cause
other than B： otherwise how shall we be able to say that A is
predicable of all of which E is predicable； while E is not
predicable of all of which A can be predicated？ I mean how can there
fail to be some special cause of A's inherence in E； as there was of
A's inherence in all the species of D？ Then are the species of E； too；
united by possessing some common cause？ This cause we must look for。
Let us call it C。
We conclude； then； that the same effect may have more than one
cause； but not in subjects specifically identical。 For instance； the
cause of longevity in quadrupeds is lack of bile； in birds a dry
constitution…or certainly something different。
18
If immediate premisses are not reached at once； and there is not
merely one middle but several middles； i。e。 several causes； is the
cause of the property's inherence in the several species the middle
which is proximate to the primary universal； or the middle which is
proximate to the species？ Clearly the cause is that nearest to each
species severally in which it is manifested； for that is the cause
of the subject's falling under the universal。 To illustrate
formally： C is the cause of B's inherence in D； hence C is the cause
of A's inherence in D； B of A's inherence in C； while the cause of A's
inherence in B is B itself。
19
As regards syllogism and demonstration； the definition of； and the
conditions required to produce each of them； are now clear； and with
that also the definition of； and the conditions required to produce；
demonstrative knowledge； since it is the same as demonstration。 As
to the basic premisses； how they become known and what is the
developed state of knowledge of them is made clear by raising some
preliminary problems。
We have already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration
is impossible unless a man knows the primary immediate premisses。
But there are questions which might be raised in respect of the
apprehension of these immediate premisses： one might not only ask
whether it is of the same kind as the apprehension of the conclusions；
but also whether there is or is not scientific knowledge of both； or
scientific knowledge of the latter； and of the former a different kind
of knowledge； and； further； whether the developed states of
knowledge are not innate but come to be in us； or are innate but at
first unnoticed。 Now it is strange if we possess them from birth；
for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than
demonstration and fail to notice them。 If on the other hand we acquire
them and do not previously possess them； how could we apprehend and
learn without a basis of pre…existent knowledge？ For that is
impossible； as we used to find in the case of demonstration。 So it
emerges that neither can we possess them from birth； nor can they come
to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of
having no such developed state at all。 Therefore we must possess a
capacity of some sort； but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than
these developed states。 And this at least is an obvious characteristic
of all animals； for they possess a congenital discriminative
capacity which is called sense…perception。 But though sense…perception
is innate in all animals； in some the sense…impression comes to
persist； in others it does not。 So animals in which this persistence
does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of
perceiving； or no knowledge of objects of which no impression
persists； animals in which it does come into being have perception and
can continue to retain the sense…impression in the soul： and when such
persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once
arises between those which out of the persistence of such
sense…impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those
which do not。 So out of sense…perception comes to be what we call
memory； and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing
develops experience； for a number of memories constitute a single
experience。 From experience again…i。e。 from the universal now
stabilized in its entirety within the soul； the one beside the many
which is a single identity within them all…originate the skill of
the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science； skill in the
sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being。
We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a
determinate form； nor developed from other higher states of knowledge；
but from sense…perception。 It is like a rout in battle stopped by
first one man making a stand and then another； until the original
formation has been restored。 The soul is so constituted as to be
capable of this process。
Let us now restate the account given already； though with
insufficient clearness。 When one of a number of logically
indiscriminable particulars has made a stand； the earliest universal
is present in the soul： for though the act of sense…perception is of
the particular； its content is universal…is man； for example； not
the man Callias。 A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary
universals； and the pro