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duties； which are generally divided into duties to God and duties to
man。 If we did a good act merely from the love of God and a belief
that it is pleasing to Him； whence arises the morality of the
Atheist？ It is idle to say； as some do； that no such being exists。
We have the same evidence of the fact as of most of those we act on；
to…wit： their own affirmations； and their reasonings in support of
them。 I have observed； indeed； generally； that while in protestant
countries the defections from the Platonic Christianity of the
priests is to Deism； in catholic countries they are to Atheism。
Diderot； D'Alembert； D'Holbach； Condorcet； are known to have been
among the most virtuous of men。 Their virtue； then； must have had
some other foundation than the love of God。
The ｛To chylon｝ of others is founded in a different faculty；
that of taste； which is not even a branch of morality。 We have
indeed an innate sense of what we call beautiful； but that is
exercised chiefly on subjects addressed to the fancy； whether through
the eye in visible forms； as landscape； animal figure； dress；
drapery； architecture； the composition of colors； &c。； or to the
imagination directly； as imagery； style； or measure in prose or
poetry； or whatever else constitutes the domain of criticism or
taste； a faculty entirely distinct from the moral one。
Self…interest； or rather self…love； or _egoism_； has been more
plausibly substituted as the basis of morality。 But I consider our
relations with others as constituting the boundaries of morality。
With ourselves we stand on the ground of identity； not of relation；
which last； requiring two subjects； excludes self…love confined to a
single one。 To ourselves； in strict language； we can owe no duties；
obligation requiring also two parties。 Self…love； therefore； is no
part of morality。 Indeed it is exactly its counterpart。 It is the
sole antagonist of virtue； leading us constantly by our propensities
to self…gratification in violation of our moral duties to others。
Accordingly； it is against this enemy that are erected the batteries
of moralists and religionists； as the only obstacle to the practice
of morality。 Take from man his selfish propensities； and he can have
nothing to seduce him from the practice of virtue。 Or subdue those
propensities by education； instruction or restraint； and virtue
remains without a competitor。 Egoism； in a broader sense； has been
thus presented as the source of moral action。 It has been said that
we feed the hungry； clothe the naked； bind up the wounds of the man
beaten by thieves； pour oil and wine into them； set him on our own
beast and bring him to the inn； because we receive ourselves pleasure
from these acts。 So Helvetius； one of the best men on earth； and the
most ingenious advocate of this principle； after defining 〃interest〃
to mean not merely that which is pecuniary； but whatever may procure
us pleasure or withdraw us from pain； ＇_de l'esprit_ 2； 1；＇ says；
＇ib。 2； 2；＇ 〃the humane man is he to whom the sight of misfortune is
insupportable； and who to rescue himself from this spectacle； is
forced to succor the unfortunate object。〃 This indeed is true。 But
it is one step short of the ultimate question。 These good acts give
us pleasure； but how happens it that they give us pleasure？ Because
nature hath implanted in our breasts a love of others； a sense of
duty to them； a moral instinct； in short； which prompts us
irresistibly to feel and to succor their distresses； and protests
against the language of Helvetius； ＇ib。 2； 5；＇ 〃what other motive
than self…interest could determine a man to generous actions？ It is
as impossible for him to love what is good for the sake of good； as
to love evil for the sake of evil。〃 The Creator would indeed have
been a bungling artist； had he intended man for a social animal；
without planting in him social dispositions。 It is true they are not
planted in every man； because there is no rule without exceptions；
but it is false reasoning which converts exceptions into the general
rule。 Some men are born without the organs of sight； or of hearing；
or without hands。 Yet it would be wrong to say that man is born
without these faculties； and sight； hearing； and hands may with truth
enter into the general definition of man。 The want or imperfection
of the moral sense in some men； like the want or imperfection of the
senses of sight and hearing in others； is no proof that it is a
general characteristic of the species。 When it is wanting； we
endeavor to supply the defect by education； by appeals to reason and
calculation； by presenting to the being so unhappily conformed； other
motives to do good and to eschew evil； such as the love； or the
hatred； or rejection of those among whom he lives； and whose society
is necessary to his happiness and even existence； demonstrations by
sound calculation that honesty promotes interest in the long run； the
rewards and penalties established by the laws； and ultimately the
prospects of a future state of retribution for the evil as well as
the good done while here。 These are the correctives which are
supplied by education； and which exercise the functions of the
moralist； the preacher； and legislator； and they lead into a course
of correct action all those whose disparity is not too profound to be
eradicated。 Some have argued against the existence of a moral sense；
by saying that if nature had given us such a sense； impelling us to
virtuous actions； and warning us against those which are vicious；
then nature would also have designated； by some particular ear…marks；
the two sets of actions which are； in themselves； the one virtuous
and the other vicious。 Whereas； we find； in fact； that the same
actions are deemed virtuous in one country and vicious in another。
The answer is that nature has constituted _utility_ to man the
standard and best of virtue。 Men living in different countries；
under different circumstances； different habits and regimens； may
have different utilities； the same act； therefore； may be useful； and
consequently virtuous in one country which is injurious and vicious
in another differently circumstanced。 I sincerely； then； believe
with you in the general existence of a moral instinct。 I think it
the brightest gem with which the human character is studded； and the
want of it as more degrading than the most hideous of the bodily
deformities。 I am happy in reviewing the roll of associates in this
principle which you present in your second letter； some of which I
had not before met with。 To these might be added Lord Kaims； one of
the ablest of our advocates； who goes so far as to say； in his
Principles of Natural Religion； that a man owes no duty to which he
is not urged by some impulsive feeling。 This is correct； if referred
to the standard of general feeling in the given case； and not to the
feeling of a single individual。 Perhaps I may misquote him； it being
fifty