按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
ing… when the body is perishing； no longer supported by that primal life…giving soul； or by the presence of any secondary phase of it； it is clear that the life…principle can no longer remain； but does this mean that the life perishes？ No； not even it； for it； too； is an image of that first out…shining； it is merely no longer where it was。 8。 Imagine that beyond the heavenly system there existed some solid mass； and that from this sphere there was directed to it a vision utterly unimpeded and unrestricted： it is a question whether that solid form could be perceived by what has no sympathetic relation with it； since we have held that sympathetic relation comes about in virtue of the nature inherent in some one living being。 Obviously； if the sympathetic relationship depends upon the fact that percipients and things perceived are all members of one living being； no acts of perception could take place： that far body could be known only if it were a member of this living universe of ours… which condition being met； it certainly would be。 But what if； without being thus in membership； it were a corporeal entity； exhibiting light and colour and the qualities by which we perceive things； and belonging to the same ideal category as the organ of vision？ If our supposition ＇of perception by sympathy＇ is true； there would still be no perception… though we may be told that the hypothesis is clearly untenable since there is absurdity in supposing that sight can fail in grasping an illuminated object lying before it； and that the other senses in the presence of their particular objects remain unresponsive。 ＇The following passage； to nearly the end； is offered tentatively as a possible help to the interpretation of an obscure and corrupt place。＇ ＇But why does such a failing appear impossible to us？ We answer； because here and now in all the act and experience of our senses； we are within a unity； and members of it。 What the conditions would be otherwise； remains to be considered： if living sympathy suffices the theory is established； if not； there are other considerations to support it。 That every living being is self…sensitive allows of no doubt； if the universe is a living being； no more need be said； and what is true of the total must be true of the members； as inbound in that one life。 But what if we are invited to accept the theory of knowledge by likeness （rejecting knowledge by the self…sensitiveness of a living unity）？ Awareness must be determined by the nature and character of the living being in which it occurs； perception； then； means that the likeness demanded by the hypothesis is within this self…identical living being （and not in the object）… for the organ by which the perception takes place is in the likeness of the living being （is merely the agent adequately expressing the nature of the living being）： thus perception is reduced to a mental awareness by means of organs akin to the object。 If； then； something that is a living whole perceives not its own content but things like to its content； it must perceive them under the conditions of that living whole； this means that； in so far as it has perception； the objects appear not as its content but as related to its content。 And the objects are thus perceived as related because the mind itself has related them in order to make them amenable to its handling： in other words the causative soul or mind in that other sphere is utterly alien； and the things there； supposed to be related to the content of this living whole； can be nothing to our minds。＇ This absurdity shows that the hypothesis contains a contradiction which naturally leads to untenable results。 In fact； under one and the same heading； it presents mind and no mind； it makes things kin and no kin； it confuses similar and dissimilar： containing these irreconcilable elements； it amounts to no hypothesis at all。 At one and the same moment it postulates and denies a soul； it tells of an All that is partial； of a something which is at once distinct and not distinct； of a nothingness which is no nothingness； of a complete thing that is incomplete： the hypothesis therefore must be dismissed； no deduction is possible where a thesis cancels its own propositions。 SIXTH TRACTATE。
PERCEPTION AND MEMORY。
1。 Perceptions are no imprints； we have said； are not to be thought of as seal…impressions on soul or mind： accepting this statement； there is one theory of memory which must be definitely rejected。 Memory is not to be explained as the retaining of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression which in fact was never made； the two things stand or fall together； either an impression is made upon the mind and lingers when there is remembrance； or； denying the impression； we cannot hold that memory is its lingering。 Since we reject equally the impression and the retention we are obliged to seek for another explanation of perception and memory； one excluding the notions that the sensible object striking upon soul or mind makes a mark upon it； and that the retention of this mark is memory。 If we study what occurs in the case of the most vivid form of perception； we can transfer our results to the other cases； and so solve our problem。 In any perception we attain by sight； the object is grasped there where it lies in the direct line of vision； it is there that we attack it； there； then； the perception is formed； the mind looks outward； this is ample proof that it has taken and takes no inner imprint； and does not see in virtue of some mark made upon it like that of the ring on the wax； it need not look outward at all if； even as it looked； it already held the image of the object； seeing by virtue of an impression made upon itself。 It includes with the object the interval； for it tells at what distance the vision takes place： how could it see as outlying an impression within itself； separated by no interval from itself？ Then； the point of magnitude： how could the mind； on this hypothesis； define the external size of the object or perceive that it has any… the magnitude of the sky； for instance； whose stamped imprint would be too vast for it to contain？ And； most convincing of all； if to see is to accept imprints of the objects of our vision； we can never see these objects themselves； we see only vestiges they leave within us； shadows： the things themselves would be very different from our vision of them。 And； for a conclusive consideration； we cannot see if the living object is in contact with the eye； we must look from a certain distance； this must be more applicable to the mind； supposing the mind to be stamped with an imprint of the object； it could not grasp as an object of vision what is stamped upon itself。 For vision demands a duality； of seen and seeing： the seeing agent must be distinct and act upon an impression outside it； not upon one occupying the same point with it： sight can deal only with an object not inset but outlying。 2。 But if perception does not go by impression； what is the process？ The mind affirms something not contained within it： this is precisely the characteristic of a power… not to acc