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happy than the man without them： the utmost profusion of such boons would not help even to make a flute…player。 We discuss the happy man after our own feebleness； we count alarming and grave what his felicity takes lightly： he would be neither wise nor in the state of happiness if he had not quitted all trifling with such things and become as it were another being； having confidence in his own nature； faith that evil can never touch him。 In such a spirit he can be fearless through and through； where there is dread； there is not perfect virtue； the man is some sort of a half…thing。 As for any involuntary fear rising in him and taking the judgement by surprise； while his thoughts perhaps are elsewhere； the Sage will attack it and drive it out； he will； so to speak； calm the refractory child within him； whether by reason or by menace； but without passion； as an infant might feel itself rebuked by a glance of severity。 This does not make the Sage unfriendly or harsh： it is to himself and in his own great concern that he is the Sage： giving freely to his intimates of all he has to give； he will be the best of friends by his very union with the Intellectual…Principle。 16。 Those that refuse to place the Sage aloft in the Intellectual Realm but drag him down to the accidental； dreading accident for him； have substituted for the Sage we have in mind another person altogether； they offer us a tolerable sort of man and they assign to him a life of mingled good and ill； a case； after all； not easy to conceive。 But admitting the possibility of such a mixed state； it could not be deserved to be called a life of happiness； it misses the Great； both in the dignity of Wisdom and in the integrity of Good。 The life of true happiness is not a thing of mixture。 And Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme； fixing his gaze on That； becoming like to That； living by That。 He can care for no other Term than That： all else he will attend to only as he might change his residence； not in expectation of any increase to his settled felicity； but simply in a reasonable attention to the differing conditions surrounding him as he lives here or there。 He will give to the body all that he sees to be useful and possible； but he himself remains a member of another order； not prevented from abandoning the body； necessarily leaving it at nature's hour； he himself always the master to decide in its regard。 Thus some part of his life considers exclusively the Soul's satisfaction； the rest is not immediately for the Term's sake and not for his own sake； but for the thing bound up with him； the thing which he tends and bears with as the musician cares for his lyre； as long as it can serve him： when the lyre fails him； he will change it； or will give up lyre and lyring； as having another craft now； one that needs no lyre； and then he will let it rest unregarded at his side while he sings on without an instrument。 But it was not idly that the instrument was given him in the beginning： he has found it useful until now； many a time。 FIFTH TRACTATE。
HAPPINESS AND EXTENSION OF TIME。
1。 Is it possible to think that Happiness increases with Time； Happiness which is always taken as a present thing？ The memory of former felicity may surely be ruled out of count； for Happiness is not a thing of words； but a definite condition which must be actually present like the very fact and act of life。 2。 It may be objected that our will towards living and towards expressive activity is constant； and that each attainment of such expression is an increase in Happiness。 But in the first place； by this reckoning every to…morrow's well…being will be greater than to…day's； every later instalment successively larger that an earlier； at once time supplants moral excellence as the measure of felicity。 Then again the Gods to…day must be happier than of old： and their bliss； too； is not perfect； will never be perfect。 Further； when the will attains what it was seeking； it attains something present： the quest is always for something to be actually present until a standing felicity is definitely achieved。 The will to life which is will to Existence aims at something present； since Existence must be a stably present thing。 Even when the act of the will is directed towards the future； and the furthest future； its object is an actually present having and being： there is no concern about what is passed or to come： the future state a man seeks is to be a now to him； he does not care about the forever： he asks that an actual present be actually present。 3。 Yes； but if the well…being has lasted a long time； if that present spectacle has been a longer time before the eyes？ If in the greater length of time the man has seen more deeply； time has certainly done something for him； but if all the process has brought him no further vision； then one glance would give all he has had。 4。 Still the one life has known pleasure longer than the other？ But pleasure cannot be fairly reckoned in with Happiness… unless indeed by pleasure is meant the unhindered Act ＇of the true man＇； in which case this pleasure is simply our 〃Happiness。〃 And even pleasure； though it exist continuously； has never anything but the present； its past is over and done with。 5。 We are asked to believe； then； it will be objected； that if one man has been happy from first to last； another only at the last； and a third； beginning with happiness； has lost it； their shares are equal？ This is straying from the question： we were comparing the happy among themselves： now we are asked to compare the not…happy at the time when they are out of happiness with those in actual possession of happiness。 If these last are better off； they are so as men in possession of happiness against men without it and their advantage is always by something in the present。 6。 Well； but take the unhappy man： must not increase of time bring an increase of his unhappiness？ Do not all troubles… long…lasting pains； sorrows； and everything of that type… yield a greater sum of misery in the longer time？ And if thus in misery the evil is augmented by time why should not time equally augment happiness when all is well？ In the matter of sorrows and pains there is； no doubt； ground for saying that time brings increase： for example； in a lingering malady the evil hardens into a state； and as time goes on the body is brought lower and lower。 But if the constitution did not deteriorate； if the mischief grew no worse； then； here too； there would be no trouble but that of the present moment： we cannot tell the past into the tale of unhappiness except in the sense that it has gone to make up an actually existing state… in the sense that； the evil in the sufferer's condition having been extended over a longer time； the mischief has gained ground。 The increase of ill…being then is due to the aggravation of the malady not to the extension of time。 It may be pointed out also that this greater length of time is not a thing existent at any given moment； and surely a 〃more〃 is not to be made out by adding to something