the six enneads-第179章

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ishing　Action　from　Passion　keeps　Action　impassive；　while　Passion　is　recognised　by　the　fact　that　a　new　state　replaces　the　old；　though　nothing　is　added　to　the　essential　character　of　the　patient；　whenever　Being　＇essential　Being＇　is　produced；　the　patient　remains　distinct。　　　　　Thus；　what　is　Action　in　one　relation　may　be　Passion　in　another。　One　same　motion　will　be　Action　from　the　point　of　view　of　A；　Passion　from　that　of　B；　for　the　two　are　so　disposed　that　they　might　well　be　consigned　to　the　category　of　Relation…　at　any　rate　in　the　cases　where　the　Action　entails　a　corresponding　Passion：　neither　correlative　is　found　in　isolation；　each　involves　both　Action　and　Passion；　though　A　acts　as　mover　and　B　is　moved：　each　then　involves　two　categories。　　　　　Again；　A　gives　motion　to　B；　B　receives　it；　so　that　we　have　a　giving　and　a　receiving…　in　a　word；　a　relation。　　　　　But　a　recipient　must　possess　what　it　has　received。　A　thing　is　admitted　to　possess　its　natural　colour：　why　not　its　motion　also？　Besides；　independent　motions　such　as　walking　and　thought　do；　in　fact；　involve　the　possession　of　the　powers　respectively　to　walk　and　to　think。　　　　　We　are　reminded　to　enquire　whether　thought　in　the　form　of　providence　constitutes　Action；　to　be　subject　to　providence　is　apparently　Passion；　for　such　thought　is　directed　to　an　external；　the　object　of　the　providential　arrangement。　But　it　may　well　be　that　neither　is　the　exercise　of　providence　an　action；　even　though　the　thought　is　concerned　with　an　external；　nor　subjection　to　it　a　Passion。　Thought　itself　need　not　be　an　action；　for　it　does　not　go　outward　towards　its　object　but　remains　self…gathered。　It　is　not　always　an　activity；　all　Acts　need　not　be　definable　as　activities；　for　they　need　not　produce　an　effect；　activity　belongs　to　Act　only　accidentally。　　　　　Does　it　follow　that　if　a　man　as　he　walks　produces　footprints；　he　cannot　be　considered　to　have　performed　an　action？　Certainly　as　a　result　of　his　existing　something　distinct　from　himself　has　come　into　being。　Yet　perhaps　we　should　regard　both　action　and　Act　as　merely　accidental；　because　he　did　not　aim　at　this　result：　it　would　be　as　we　speak　of　Action　even　in　things　inanimate…　〃fire　heats；〃　〃the　drug　worked。〃　　　　　So　much　for　Action　and　Passion。　　　　　23。　As　for　Possession；　if　the　term　is　used　comprehensively；　why　are　not　all　its　modes　to　be　brought　under　one　category？　Possession；　thus；　would　include　the　quantum　as　possessing　magnitude；　the　quale　as　possessing　colour；　it　would　include　fatherhood　and　the　complementary　relationships；　since　the　father　possesses　the　son　and　the　son　possesses　the　father：　in　short；　it　would　include　all　belongings。　　　　　If；　on　the　contrary；　the　category　of　Possession　comprises　only　the　things　of　the　body；　such　as　weapons　and　shoes；　we　first　ask　why　this　should　be　so；　and　why　their　possession　produces　a　single　category；　while　burning；　cutting；　burying　or　casting　them　out　do　not　give　another　or　others。　If　it　is　because　these　things　are　carried　on　the　person；　then　one's　mantle　lying　on　a　couch　will　come　under　a　different　category　from　that　of　the　mantle　covering　the　person。　If　the　ownership　of　possession　suffices；　then　clearly　one　must　refer　to　the　one　category　of　Possession　all　objects　identified　by　being　possessed；　every　case　in　which　possession　can　be　established；　the　character　of　the　possessed　object　will　make　no　difference。　　　　　If　however　Possession　is　not　to　be　predicated　of　Quality　because　Quality　stands　recognised　as　a　category；　nor　of　Quantity　because　the　category　of　Quantity　has　been　received；　nor　of　parts　because　they　have　been　assigned　to　the　category　of　Substance；　why　should　we　predicate　Possession　of　weapons；　when　they　too　are　comprised　in　the　accepted　category　of　Substance？　Shoes　and　weapons　are　clearly　substances。　　　　　How；　further；　is　〃He　possesses　weapons；〃　signifying　as　it　does　that　the　action　of　arming　has　been　performed　by　a　subject；　to　be　regarded　as　an　entirely　simple　notion；　assignable　to　a　single　category？　　　　　Again；　is　Possession　to　be　restricted　to　an　animate　possessor；　or　does　it　hold　good　even　of　a　statue　as　possessing　the　objects　above　mentioned？　The　animate　and　inanimate　seem　to　possess　in　different　ways；　and　the　term　is　perhaps　equivocal。　Similarly；　〃standing〃　has　not　the　same　connotation　as　applied　to　the　animate　and　the　inanimate。　　　　　Besides；　how　can　it　be　reasonable　for　what　is　found　only　in　a　limited　number　of　cases　to　form　a　distinct　generic　category？　　　　　24。　There　remains　Situation；　which　like　Possession　is　confined　to　a　few　instances　such　as　reclining　and　sitting。　　　　　Even　so；　the　term　is　not　used　without　qualification：　we　say　〃they　are　placed　in　such　and　such　a　manner；〃　〃he　is　situated　in　such　and　such　a　position。〃　The　position　is　added　from　outside　the　genus。　　　　　In　short；　Situation　signifies　〃being　in　a　place〃；　there　are　two　things　involved；　the　position　and　the　place：　why　then　must　two　categories　be　combined　into　one？　　　　　Moreover；　if　sitting　signifies　an　Act；　it　must　be　classed　among　Acts；　if　a　Passion；　it　goes　under　the　category　to　which　belong　Passions　complete　and　incomplete。　　　　　Reclining　is　surely　nothing　but　〃lying　up；〃　and　tallies　with　〃lying　down〃　and　〃lying　midway。〃　But　if　the　reclining　belongs　thus　to　the　category　of　Relation；　why　not　the　recliner　also？　For　as　〃on　the　right〃　belongs　to　the　Relations；　so　does　〃the　thing　on　the　right〃；　and　similarly　with　〃the　thing　on　the　left。〃　　　　　25。　There　are　those　who　lay　down　four　categories　and　make　a　fourfold　division　into　Substrates；　Qualities；　States；　and　Relative　States；　and　find　in　these　a　common　Something；　and　so　include　everything　in　one　genus。　　　　　Against　this　theory　there　is　much　to　be　urged；　but　particularly　against　this　posing　of　a　common　Something　and　a　single　all…embracing　genus。　This　Something；　it　may　be　submitted；　is　unintelligible　to　themselves；　is　indefinable；　and　does　not　account　either　for　bodies　or　for　the　bodiless。　Moreover；　no　room　is　left　for　a　differentia　by　which　this　Something　may　be　distinguished。　Besides；　this　common　Something　is　either　existent　or　non…existent：　if　existent；　it　must　be　one　or　other　of　its　＇four＇　species；…　if　non…existent；　the　existent　is　classed　under　the　non…existent。　But　the　objections　are　countless；　we　must　leave　them　for　the　present　and　consider　the　several　heads　of　the　division。　　　　　To　the　first　genus　are　assigned　Substrates；　including　Matter；　to　which　is　given　a　priority　over　the　others；　so　that　what　is　ranked　as　the　first　principle　comes　under　the　same　head　with　things　which　must　be　posterior　to　it　since　it　is　their　principle。　　　　　First；　then：　the　prior　is　made　homogeneous　with　the　subsequent。　Now　this　is　impossible：　in　this　relation　the　subsequent　owes　its　existence　to　the　prior；　whereas　among　things　belonging　to　one　same　genus　each　must　have；　essentially；　the　equality　implied　by　the　genus；　for　the　very　meaning　of　genus　is　to　be　predicated　of　the　species　in　respect　of　their　essential　character。　And　that　Matter　is　the　basic　source　of　all　the　rest　of　things；　this　school；　we　may　suppose；　would　hardly　deny。　　　　　Secondly：　since　they　treat　the　Substrate　as　one　thing；　they　do　not　enumerate　the　Existents；　they　look　instead　for　principles　of　the　Existents。　There　is　however　a　difference　between　speaking　of　the　actual　Existen