the six enneads-第192章

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Substance。　Substance　is　that　which　belongs　essentially　to　itself；　or；　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　part　of　the　differentiated　object；　serves　only　to　complete　the　Composite。　Each　or　either　part　of　the　Composite　belongs　to　itself；　and　is　only　affirmed　of　the　Composite　in　a　special　sense：　only　qua　part　of　the　whole　is　it　predicated　of　something　else；　qua　individual　it　is　never　in　its　essential　nature　predicated　of　an　external。　　　　　It　may　be　claimed　as　a　common　element　in　Matter；　Form　and　the　Couplement　that　they　are　all　substrates。　But　the　mode　in　which　Matter　is　the　substrate　of　Form　is　different　from　that　in　which　Form　and　the　Couplement　are　substrates　of　their　modifications。　　　　　And　is　it　strictly　true　to　say　that　Matter　is　the　substrate　of　Form？　Form　is　rather　the　completion　which　Matter's　nature　as　pure　potentiality　demands。　　　　　Moreover；　Form　cannot　be　said　to　reside　in　Matter　＇as　in　a　substrate＇。　When　one　thing　combines　with　another　to　form　a　unity；　the　one　does　not　reside　in　the　other；　both　alike　are　substrates　of　a　third：　thus；　Man　＇the　Form＇　and　a　man　＇the　Composite＇　are　substrates　of　their　experiences；　and　are　prior　to　their　activities　and　consequents。　　　　　Substance；　then；　is　that　from　which　all　other　things　proceed　and　to　which　they　owe　their　existence；　it　is　the　centre　of　passivity　and　the　source　of　action。　　　　　5。　These　are　incontrovertible　facts　in　regard　to　the　pseudo…substance　of　the　Sensible　realm：　if　they　apply　also　in　some　degree　to　the　True　Substance　of　the　Intellectual；　the　coincidence　is；　doubtless；　to　be　attributed　to　analogy　and　ambiguity　of　terms。　　　　　We　are　aware　that　〃the　first〃　is　so　called　only　in　relation　to　the　things　which　come　after　it：　〃first〃　has　no　absolute　significance；　the　first　of　one　series　is　subsequent　to　the　last　of　another。　〃Substrate；〃　similarly；　varies　in　meaning　＇as　applied　to　the　higher　and　to　the　lower＇；　while　as　for　passivity　its　very　existence　in　the　Intellectual　is　questionable；　if　it　does　exist　there；　it　is　not　the　passivity　of　the　Sensible。　　　　　It　follows　that　the　fact　of　〃not　being　present　in　a　subject　＇or　substrate＇　is　not　universally　true　of　Substance；　unless　presence　in　a　subject　be　stipulated　as　not　including　the　case　of　the　part　present　in　the　whole　or　of　one　thing　combining　with　another　to　form　a　distinct　unity；　a　thing　will　not　be　present　as　in　a　subject　in　that　with　which　it　co…operates　in　the　information　of　a　composite　substance。　Form；　therefore；　is　not　present　in　Matter　as　in　a　subject；　nor　is　Man　so　present　in　Socrates；　since　Man　is　part　of　Socrates。　　　　　Substance；　then；　is　that　which　is　not　present　in　a　subject。　But　if　we　adopt　the　definition　〃neither　present　in　a　subject　nor　predicated　of　a　subject；〃　we　must　add　to　the　second　〃subject〃　the　qualification　〃distinct；〃　in　order　that　we　may　not　exclude　the　case　of　Man　predicated　of　a　particular　man。　When　I　predicate　Man　of　Socrates；　it　is　as　though　I　affirmed；　not　that　a　piece　of　wood　is　white；　but　that　whiteness　is　white；　for　in　asserting　that　Socrates　is　a　man；　I　predicate　Man　＇the　universal＇　of　a　particular　man；　I　affirm　Man　of　the　manhood　in　Socrates；　I　am　really　saying　only　that　Socrates　is　Socrates；　or　that　this　particular　rational　animal　is　an　animal。　　　　　It　may　be　objected　that　non…presence　in　a　subject　is　not　peculiar　to　Substance；　inasmuch　as　the　differentia　of　a　substance　is　no　more　present　in　a　subject　than　the　substance　itself；　but　this　objection　results　from　taking　a　part　of　the　whole　substance；　such　as　〃two…footed〃　in　our　example；　and　asserting　that　this　part　is　not　present　in　a　subject：　if　we　take；　not　〃two…footed〃　which　is　merely　an　aspect　of　Substance；　but　〃two…footedness〃　by　which　we　signify　not　Substance　but　Quality；　we　shall　find　that　this　〃two…footedness〃　is　indeed　present　in　a　subject。　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　neither　Time　nor　Place　is　present　in　a　subject。　But　if　the　definition　of　Time　as　the　measure　of　Motion　be　regarded　as　denoting　something　measured；　the　〃measure〃　will　be　present　in　Motion　as　in　a　subject；　while　Motion　will　be　present　in　the　moved：　if；　on　the　contrary；　it　be　supposed　to　signify　a　principle　of　measurement；　the　〃measure〃　will　be　present　in　the　measurer。　　　　　Place　is　the　limit　of　the　surrounding　space；　and　thus　is　present　in　that　space。　　　　　The　truth　is；　however；　that　the　〃Substance〃　of　our　enquiry　may　be　apprehended　in　directly　opposite　ways：　it　may　be　determined　by　one　of　the　properties　we　have　been　discussing；　by　more　than　one；　by　all　at　once；　according　as　they　answer　to　the　notions　of　Matter；　Form　and　the　Couplement。　　　　　6。　Granted；　it　may　be　urged；　that　these　observations　upon　the　nature　of　Substance　are　sound；　we　have　not　yet　arrived　at　a　statement　of　its　essence。　Our　critic　doubtless　expects　to　see　this　〃Sensible〃：　but　its　essence；　its　characteristic　being；　cannot　be　seen。　　　　　Do　we　infer　that　fire　and　water　are　not　Substance？　They　certainly　are　not　Substance　because　they　are　visible。　Why；　then？　Because　they　possess　Matter？　No。　Or　Form？　No。　Nor　because　they　involve　a　Couplement　of　Matter　and　Form。　Then　why　are　they　Substance？　By　existing。　But　does　not　Quantity　exist；　and　Quality？　This　anomaly　is　to　be　explained　by　an　equivocation　in　the　term　〃existence。〃　　　　　What；　then；　is　the　meaning　of　〃existence〃　as　applied　to　fire；　earth　and　the　other　elements？　What　is　the　difference　between　this　existence　and　existence　in　the　other　categories？　It　is　the　difference　between　being　simply…　that　which　merely　is…　and　being　white。　But　surely　the　being　qualified　by　〃white〃　is　the　same　as　that　having　no　qualification？　It　is　not　the　same：　the　latter　is　Being　in　the　primary　sense；　the　former　is　Being　only　by　participation　and　in　a　secondary　degree。　Whiteness　added　to　Being　produces　a　being　white；　Being　added　to　whiteness　produces　a　white　being：　thus；　whiteness　becomes　an　accident　of　Being；　and　Being　an　accident　of　whiteness。　　　　　The　case　is　not　equivalent　to　predicating　white　of　Socrates　and　Socrates　of　white：　for　Socrates　remains　the　same；　though　white　would　appear　to　have　a　different　meaning　in　the　two　propositions；　since　in　predicating　Socrates　of　white　we　include　Socrates　in　the　＇whole＇　sphere　of　whiteness；　whereas　in　the　proposition　〃Socrates　is　white〃　whiteness　is　plainly　an　attribute　of　Socrates。　　　　　〃Being　is　white〃　implies；　similarly；　that　Being　possesses　whiteness　as　an　attribute；　while　in　the　proposition　〃whiteness　is　Being　＇or；　is　a　being＇〃　Being　is　regarded　as　comprising　whiteness　in　its　own　extension。　　　　　In　sum；　whiteness　has　existence　because　it　is　bound　up　with　Being　and　present　in　it：　Being　is；　thus；　the　source　of　its　existence。　Being　is　Being　on　its　own　account；　but　the　white　is　due　to　whiteness…　not　because　it　is　〃present　in〃　whiteness；　but　because　whiteness　is　present　in　it。　　　　　The　Being　of　the　Sensible　resembles　the　white　in　not　originating　in　itself。　It　must　therefore　be　regarded　as　dependent　for　its　being　upon　the　Authentic　Being；　as　white　is　dependent　upon　the　Authentic　Whiteness；　and　the　Authentic　Whiteness　dependent　for　its　whiteness　upon　participation　in　that　Supreme　Being　whose　existence　is　underived。　　　　　7。　But　Matter；　it　may　be　contended；　is　the　source　of　existence　to　the　Sensible　things　implanted　in　it。　From　what　source；　then；　we　retort；　does　Matter　itself　derive　existence