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But if Soul is sinless； how come the expiations？ Here surely is a contradiction； on the one side the Soul is above all guilt； on the other； we hear of its sin； its purification； its expiation； it is doomed to the lower world； it passes from body to body。 We may take either view at will： they are easily reconciled。 When we tell of the sinless Soul； we make Soul and Essential…Soul one and the same： it is the simple unbroken Unity。 By the Soul subject to sin we indicate a groupment； we include that other； that phase of the Soul which knows all the states and passions： the Soul in this sense is compound； all…inclusive： it falls under the conditions of the entire living experience： this compound it is that sins； it is this； and not the other； that pays penalty。 It is in this sense that we read of the Soul： 〃We saw it as those others saw the sea…god Glaukos。〃 〃And；〃 reading on； 〃if we mean to discern the nature of the Soul we must strip it free of all that has gathered about it； must see into the philosophy of it； examine with what Existences it has touch and by kinship to what Existences it is what it is。〃 Thus the Life is one thing； the Act is another and the Expiator yet another。 The retreat and sundering； then； must be not from this body only； but from every alien accruement。 Such accruement takes place at birth； or rather birth is the coming…into…being of that other ＇lower＇ phase of the Soul。 For the meaning of birth has been indicated elsewhere； it is brought about by a descent of the Soul； something being given off by the Soul other than that actually coming down in the declension。 Then the Soul has let this image fall？ And this declension is it not certainly sin？ If the declension is no more than the illuminating of an object beneath； it constitutes no sin： the shadow is to be attributed not to the luminary but to the object illuminated； if the object were not there； the light could cause no shadow。 And the Soul is said to go down； to decline； only in that the object it illuminates lives by its life。 And it lets the image fall only if there be nothing near to take it up； and it lets it fall； not as a thing cut off； but as a thing that ceases to be： the image has no further being when the whole Soul is looking toward the Supreme。 The poet； too； in the story of Hercules； seems to give this image separate existence； he puts the shade of Hercules in the lower world and Hercules himself among the gods： treating the hero as existing in the two realms at once； he gives us a twofold Hercules。 It is not difficult to explain this distinction。 Hercules was a hero of practical virtue。 By his noble serviceableness he was worthy to be a God。 On the other hand； his merit was action and not the Contemplation which would place him unreservedly in the higher realm。 Therefore while he has place above； something of him remains below。 13。 And the principle that reasons out these matters？ Is it We or the Soul？ We； but by the Soul。 But how 〃by the Soul〃？ Does this mean that the Soul reasons by possession ＇by contact with the matters of enquiry＇？ No； by the fact of being Soul。 Its Act subsists without movement； or any movement that can be ascribed to it must be utterly distinct from all corporal movement and be simply the Soul's own life。 And Intellection in us is twofold： since the Soul is intellective； and Intellection is the highest phase of life； we have Intellection both by the characteristic Act of our Soul and by the Act of the Intellectual…Principle upon us… for this Intellectual…Principle is part of us no less than the Soul； and towards it we are ever rising。 SECOND TRACTATE。
ON VIRTUE。
1。 Since Evil is here； 〃haunting this world by necessary law；〃 and it is the Soul's design to escape from Evil； we must escape hence。 But what is this escape？ 〃In attaining Likeness to God；〃 we read。 And this is explained as 〃becoming just and holy； living by wisdom；〃 the entire nature grounded in Virtue。 But does not Likeness by way of Virtue imply Likeness to some being that has Virtue？ To what Divine Being； then； would our Likeness be？ To the Being… must we not think？… in Which； above all； such excellence seems to inhere； that is to the Soul of the Kosmos and to the Principle ruling within it； the Principle endowed with a wisdom most wonderful。 What could be more fitting than that we； living in this world； should become Like to its ruler？ But； at the beginning； we are met by the doubt whether even in this Divine…Being all the virtues find place… Moral…Balance ＇Sophrosyne＇； for example； or Fortitude where there can be no danger since nothing is alien； where there can be nothing alluring whose lack could induce the desire of possession。 If； indeed； that aspiration towards the Intelligible which is in our nature exists also in this Ruling…Power； then need not look elsewhere for the source of order and of the virtues in ourselves。 But does this Power possess the Virtues？ We cannot expect to find There what are called the Civic Virtues； the Prudence which belongs to the reasoning faculty； the Fortitude which conducts the emotional and passionate nature； the Sophrosyne which consists in a certain pact； in a concord between the passionate faculty and the reason； or Rectitude which is the due application of all the other virtues as each in turn should command or obey。 Is Likeness； then； attained； perhaps； not by these virtues of the social order but by those greater qualities known by the same general name？ And if so do the Civic Virtues give us no help at all？ It is against reason； utterly to deny Likeness by these while admitting it by the greater： tradition at least recognizes certain men of the civic excellence as divine； and we must believe that these too had in some sort attained Likeness： on both levels there is virtue for us； though not the same virtue。 Now； if it be admitted that Likeness is possible； though by a varying use of different virtues and though the civic virtues do not suffice； there is no reason why we should not； by virtues peculiar to our state； attain Likeness to a model in which virtue has no place。 But is that conceivable？ When warmth comes in to make anything warm； must there needs be something to warm the source of the warmth？ If a fire is to warm something else； must there be a fire to warm that fire？ Against the first illustration it may be retorted that the source of the warmth does already contain warmth； not by an infusion but as an essential phase of its nature； so that； if the analogy is to hold； the argument would make Virtue something communicated to the Soul but an essential constituent of the Principle from which the Soul attaining Likeness absorbs it。 Against the illustration drawn from the fire； it may be urged that the analogy would make that Principle identical with virtue； whereas we hold it to be something higher。 The objection would be valid if what the soul takes in were one and the same with the source； but in fact virtue is one thing； the source of virtue quite another。 The material house is not identical with the house conceived in th