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reserved for service upon the Mediterranean sea…board for
co…operation with the fleet。 France suffers； however； to a
certain degree from the length of her battle…line； which is over
200 miles in length。 The French aerial fleet has been
particularly active in the Vosges and the Argonne； where the
difficult； mountainous； and densely wooded country has rendered
other systems of observation of the enemy's movements a matter of
extreme difficulty。 The Germans have laboured under a similar
handicap in this territory； and have likewise been compelled to
centre a considerable proportion of their aerial fleet upon this
corner of the extended battlefield。
It is in this region that the greatest wastage has been manifest。
I have been informed by one correspondent who is fighting in this
sternly contested area； that at one time a daily loss of ten
German machines was a fair average； while highwater mark was
reached； so far as his own observations and ability to glean
information were concerned by the loss of 19 machines during a
single day。 The French wastage； while not so heavy upon the
average； has been considerable at times。
The term wastage is somewhat misleading； if not erroneous。 It
does not necessarily imply the total loss of a machine； such as
its descent upon hostile territory； but includes damage to
machines； no matter how slight； landing within their own lines。
In the difficult country of the Vosges many aeroplanes have come
to earth somewhat heavily； and have suffered such damage as to
render them inoperative； compelling their removal from the
effective list until they have undergone complete overhaul or
reconstruction。 Upon occasions this wastage has been so
pronounced that the French aviators； including some of the
foremost fliers serving with the forces； have been without a
machine and have been compelled to wait their turn。
I am informed that one day four machines； returning from a
reconnaissance in force； crashed successively to the ground； and
each had to be hauled away to the repair sheds； necessitating
withdrawal from service for several days。 Unfortunately the
French； owing to their decision to rule out certain machines as
unsuited to military service； have not yet perfected their
organisation for making good this wastage； although latterly it
has been apprecably reduced by greater care among the aviators in
handling their vessels。
The fast vessels of the French aerial fleet have proved
exceptionally valuable。 With these craft speeds of 95 and 100
miles or more per hour have been attained under favourable
conditions； and pace has proved distinctly advantageous； inasmuch
as it gives the French aviators a superiority of about 40 per
cent over the average German machine。 It was the activity and
daring of the French fliers upon these high speed machines which
induced the German airmen to change their tactics。 Individual
effort and isolated raiding operations were abandoned in favour
of what might be described as combined or squadron attack。 Six
or eight machines advancing together towards the French lines
somewhat nonplussed these fleet French mosquito craft； and to
a certain degree nullified their superiority in pace。 Speed
was discounted； for the simple reason that the enemy when so
massed evinced a disposition to fight and to follow harassing
tactics when one of the slowest French machines ventured into
the air。
It is interesting to observe that aerial operations； now that
they are being conducted upon what may be termed methodical lines
as distinct from corsair movements； are following the broad
fundamental principles of naval tactics。 Homogeneous squadrons；
that is； squadrons composed of vessels of similar type and armament；
put out and follow roughly the 〃single line ahead〃 formation。
Upon sighting the enemy there is the manoeuvring for position
advantage which must accrue to the speedier protagonist。 One
then； witnesses what might almost be described as an application
of the process of capping the line or 〃crossing the 'T。'〃 This
tends to throw the slower squadron into confusion by bending it
back upon itself； meanwhile exposing it to a demoralizing fire。
The analogy is not precisely correct but sufficiently so to
indicate that aerial battles will be fought much upon the same
lines； as engagements between vessels upon the water。 If the
manoeuvres accomplish nothing beyond breaking up and scattering
the foe； the result is satisfactory in as much as in this event
it is possible to exert a driving tendency and to force him back
upon the lines of the superior force； when the scattered vessels
may be brought within the zone of spirited fire from the ground。
Attacks in force are more likely to prove successful than
individual raiding tactics； as recent events upon the battlefield
of Europe have demonstrated more or less convincingly。 An attack
in force is likely to cause the defenders upon the ground beneath
to lose their heads and to fire wildly and at random； with the
result that the airmen may achieve their object with but little
damage to themselves。 This method of attacking in force was
essayed for the first time by the British aerial fleet； which
perhaps is not surprising； seeing that the machines are manned
and the operations supervised by officers who have excelled in
naval training； and who are skilled in such movements。
No doubt this practice； combined with the daring of the British
aviators； contributed very materially to the utter demoralisation
of the German aerial forces； and was responsible for that
hesitancy to attack a position in the vicinity of the British
craft which became so manifest in the course of a few weeks after
the outbreak of hostilities。
One of the foremost military experts of the United States； who
passed some time in the fighting zone； expressed his opinion that
the British aerial force is the most efficient among the
belligerents when considered as a unit； the French flier being
described by the same authority as most effective when acting
individually； owing to personal intrepidity。 As a scout the
French aviator is probably unequalled； because he is quick to
perceive and to collect the data required； and when provided with
a fast machine is remarkably nimble and venturesome in the air。
The British aviators； however； work as a whole； and in the
particular phases where such tactics are profitable have
established incontestable superiority。 At first the German
aerial force appeared to possess no settled system of operation。
Individual effort was pronounced； but it lacked method。 The
Germans have； however； profited from the lessons taught by their
antagonists； and now are emulating their tactics； but owing to
their imperfect training and knowledge the results they achieve
appear to be negligible。
The dirigible still remains an unknown quantity in these
activities； although strange to relate； in the