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is very rarely so； but he must have so much of the attributes of
a single person as to be determinate。 If he is not a single
person； he must be a number of persons capable of acting in a
corporate or collegiate capacity。 This part of the definition is
absolutely necessary； since the Sovereign must effect his
exertions of power； must issue his orders； by a definite exercise
of his will。 The possession of physical power； which is one
characteristic of Sovereignty； has as matter of historical fact
repeatedly been for a time in the hands of a number of persons
not determinate； not so connected together as to be capable of
exercising volition； but such a state of things Austin would call
anarchy； though it might not have all the usually recognised
symptoms of a revolutionary interval。 At the same time； the
limitation of Sovereignty to determinate groups； when the
Sovereign is not an individual； is extremely important； since it
qualities the notion of Sovereignty by rendering it subject to
the various artifices by which an exercise of volition is
elicited from a corporate body。 Familiar to us as is the practice
of taking the opinion of a majority as the opinion of an entire
group； and natural as it seems； nothing can be more artificial。
Again； the bulk of the society must obey the superior who is
to be called Sovereign。 Not the whole of the society； for in that
case Sovereignty would be impossible； but the bulk； the large
majority； must obey。 After the accession of the House of Hanover
to the British throne； a certain number of Jacobites and a
considerable portion of the Scottish Highlanders habitually
disobeyed or disregarded the commands of the British Crown and
Parliament； but the bulk of the nation； including no doubt the
bulk of the Jacobites themselves； gave to these commands a
practical obedience。 On Austin's principles； therefore； there is
not the least ground for questioning the Sovereignty of George
the First and Second and of the Parliaments elected at their
summons。 The Jacobite view； that the Hanoverian Kings were
exclusively Sovereign in Hanover； would at once be throw aside by
Austin as not raising that question of fact which is alone
disputable under his system。
Next； the Sovereign must receive an habitual obedience from
the bulk of the community。 In European societies professing the
Roman Catholic faith； the great majority of the population
receives a variety of directions on points of personal conduct；
either mediately or immediately； from the See of Rome。 But；
compared with the number of times it submits itself to the laws
of the country it inhabits； its obedience to these extrinsic
commands is only occasional； and not habitual。 At the same time a
dim appreciation of the principles brought into light by Austin
may be detected in several famous ecclesiastical controversies；
which sometimes tend to become disputes whether the obedience to
the See of Rome which is actually paid is or is not so frequent
as to fall under the description of habitual。
A further characteristic of Sovereignty is immunity from the
control of every other human superior。 The limitation is
obviously necessary； for otherwise the Governor…General of India
in Council would be Sovereign； and indeed would exhibit a closer
correspondence with the more salient features of Sovereignty than
almost any other potentate on the face of the globe。
Those who have observed with what slowness definite
conceptions are developed in the field of history and politics
will be prepared to hear that this whole view of the nature of
Sovereignty is older than Austin's work。 But； so far as my own
knowledge extends； I do not think that any material portion of it
is older than Hobbes。 On the other hand； in the Leviathan of
Hobbes and in the Chapter De Cive in his Treatise first published
in Latin； called the Elementa Philosophiae； the analysis of
Government and Society and the determination of Sovereignty are
so nearly completed that little could be added to them by Bentham
and Austin。 The originality of these later writers； and more
particularly of Austin； resides in their much fuller examination
of the conceptions dependent on the notion of Sovereignty
positive law； positive duty； sanction and right in setting
forth the relations of these conceptions to others superficially
resembling them； in combating objections to the theory by which
the entire group of notions are connected together； and in
applying this theory to certain complex states of fact which had
arisen since Hobbes wrote。 There is； however； one great
difference between Hobbes and his latest successor。 The process
of Hobbes was scientific； but his object was less scientific than
political。 When； with a keenness of intuition and lucidity of
statement which have never been rivalled； he has made out a case
for the universal theoretical existence of Sovereignty； it
becomes clear that he has； to say the least； a strong preference
for monarchies over aristocracies and democracies； or （to use the
phraseology of the school which he founded） for individual over
corporate Sovereignty。 Those of his intellectual followers who
would have repudiated his politics have often asserted that he
has been misunderstood； and no doubt some superficial readers
have supposed that he was pointing at despotism when he was
really referring to the essentially unqualified power of the
Sovereign whatever the form of the Sovereignty。 But I do not
think it can in candour be denied that his strong dislike of the
Long Parliament and of the English Common law； as the great
instrument of resistance to the Stuart Kings； has occasionally
coloured the language which he uses in examining the nature of
Sovereignty； Law； and Anarchy； nor is it matter for surprise that
he should have been charged during his life with having devised
his system with the secret intention of making his peace with the
Protector； though the accusation itself is sufficiently refuted
by dates。 But Austin's object is strictly scientific。 If he has
fallen into errors； he has been led into them by his philosophy；
and his language scarcely ever betrays the colour of his
political opinions。
Another considerable difference is this。 Hobbes； it is well
known； speculated on the origin of Government and Sovereignty。 It
is the one fact which some persons seem to have learned about
him； and they appear to think his philosophy sufficiently
condemned by it。 But Austin barely enters on this enquiry；。 and
indeed he occasionally； though perhaps inadvertently； uses
language which almost seems to imply that Sovereignty and the
conceptions dependent on it have an * priori existence。 Now in
this matter I myself hold that the method of Hobbes was