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all the rest that they may claim to enter into intercourse with one
another； and they have a right to make an attempt in this direction；
while a foreign nation would not be entitled to treat them on this
account as enemies。 This right； in so far as it relates to a
possible union of all nations； in respect of certain laws
universally regulating their intercourse with each other； may be
called 〃cosmopolitical right〃 （jus cosmopoliticum）。
It may appear that seas put nations out of all communion with each
other。 But this is not so； for by means of commerce； seas form the
happiest natural provision for their intercourse。 And the more there
are of neighbouring coastlands； as in the case of the Mediterranean
Sea； this intercourse becomes the more animated。 And hence
communications with such lands； especially where there are settlements
upon them connected with the mother countries giving occasion for such
communications； bring it about that evil and violence committed in one
place of our globe are felt in all。 Such possible abuse cannot；
however； annul the right of man as a citizen of the world to attempt
to enter into communion with all others； and for this purpose to visit
all the regions of the earth； although this does not constitute a
right of settlement upon the territory of another people （jus
incolatus）； for which a special contract is required。
But the question is raised as to whether； in the case of newly
discovered countries； a people may claim the right to settle
（accolatus）； and to occupy possessions in the neighbourhood of another
people that has already settled in that region； and to do this without
their consent。
Such a right is indubitable； if the new settlement takes place at
such a distance from the seat of the former that neither would
restrict or injure the other in the use of their territory。 But in the
case of nomadic peoples； or tribes of shepherds and hunters （such as
the Hottentots； the Tungusi； and most of the American Indians）；
whose support is derived from wide desert tracts； such occupation
should never take place by force； but only by contract； and any such
contract ought never to take advantage of the ignorance of the
original dwellers in regard to the cession of their lands。 Yet it is
commonly alleged that such acts of violent appropriation may be
justified as subserving the general good of the world。 It appears as
if sufficiently justifying grounds were furnished for them； partly
by reference to the civilization of barbarous peoples （as by a pretext
of this kind even Busching tries to excuse the bloody introduction
of the Christian religion into Germany）； and partly by founding upon
the necessity of purging one's own country from depraved criminals；
and the hope of their improvement or that of their posterity； in
another continent like New Holland。 But all these alleged good
purposes cannot wash out the stain of injustice in the means
employed to attain them。 It may be objected that； had such
scrupulousness about making a beginning in founding a legal state with
force been always maintained； the whole earth would still have been in
a state of lawlessness。 But such an objection would as little annul
the conditions of right in question as the pretext of the political
revolutionaries that； when a constitution has become degenerate； it
belongs to the people to transform it by force。 This would amount
generally to being unjust once and for all； in order thereafter to
found justice the more surely； and to make it flourish。
CONCLUSION
Conclusion。
If one cannot prove that a thing is； he may try to prove that it
is not。 And if he succeeds in doing neither （as often occurs）； he
may still ask whether it is in his interest to accept one or other
of the alternatives hypothetically； from the theoretical or the
practical point of view。 In other words； a hypothesis may be
accepted either in order to explain a certain phenomenon （as in
astronomy to account for the retrogression and stationariness of the
planets）； or in order to attain a certain end； which again may be
either pragmatic； as belonging merely to the sphere of art； or
moral； as involving a purpose which it is a duty to adopt as a maxim
of action。 Now it is evident that the assumption （suppositio） of the
practicability of such an end； though presented merely as a
theoretical and problematical judgement； may be regarded as
constituting a duty； and hence it is so regarded in this case。 For
although there may be no positive obligation to believe in such an
end； yet even if there were not the least theoretical probability of
action being carried out in accordance with it； so long as its
impossibility cannot be demonstrated； there still remains a duty
incumbent upon us with regard to it。
Now； as a matter of fact； the morally practical reason utters within
us its irrevocable veto： There shall be no war。 So there ought to be
no war； neither between me and you in the condition of nature； nor
between us as members of states which； although internally in a
condition of law； are still externally in their relation to each other
in a condition of lawlessness； for this is not the way by which any
one should prosecute his right。 Hence the question no longer is as
to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing； or
as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the
former alternative； but we must act on the supposition of its being
real。 We must work for what may perhaps not be realized； and establish
that constitution which yet seems best adapted to bring it about
（mayhap republicanism in all states； together and separately）。 And
thus we may put an end to the evil of wars； which have been the
chief interest of the internal arrangements of all the states
without exception。 And although the realization of this purpose may
always remain but a pious wish； yet we do certainly not deceive
ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in
working incessantly for it； for it is a duty to do this。 To suppose
that the moral law within us is itself deceptive； would be
sufficient to excite the horrible wish rather to be deprived of all
reason than to live under such deception； and even to see oneself；
according to such principles； degraded like the lower animals to the
level of the mechanical play of nature。
It may be said that the universal and lasting establishment of peace
constitutes not merely a part； but the whole final purpose and end
of the science of right as viewed within the limits of reason。 The
state of peace is the only condition of the mine and thine that is
secured and guaranteed by laws in the relationship of men living in
numbers contiguous to each other； and who are thus combined in a
constitution whose rule is derived not from the mere experience of
those who have found it the best as a normal guide for others； but
which must be taken by the reason a priori from the i