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wealth。'（4*）
Charles Dupin had； in his work 'On the Productive Powers of
France； and on the Progress of French Industry from 1814 to 1847；'
thrown such a clear light on the results of the commercial policy
which France had followed since the Restoration； that it was
impossible that a French minister could think of sacrificing this
work of half a century； which had cost such sacrifices； which was
so rich in fruits； and so full of promise for the future； merely
for the attractions of a Methuen Treaty。
The American tariff for the year 1828 was a natural and
necessary result of the English commercial system； which shut out
from the English frontiers the North American timber； grain； meal；
and other agricultural products； and only permitted raw cotton to
be received by England in exchange for her manufactured goods。 On
this system the trade with England only tended to promote the
agricultural labour of the American slaves； while on the other
hand； the freest； most enlightened； and most powerful States of the
Union found themselves entirely arrested in their economical
progress； and thus reduced to dispose of their annual surplus of
population and capital by emigration to the waste lands of the
West。 Mr Huskisson understood this position of affairs very well。
It was notorious that the English ambassador in Washington had more
than once correctly informed him of the inevitable consequence of
the English policy。 If Mr Huskisson had really been the man that
people in other countries supposed him to be； he would have made
use of the publication of the American tariff as a valuable
opportunity for making the English aristocracy comprehend the folly
of their corn laws； and the necessity of abolishing them。 But what
did Mr Huskisson do？ He fell into a passion with the Americans （or
at least affected to do so）； and in his excitement he made
allegations the incorrectness of which was well known to every
American planter and permitted himself to use threats which made
him ridiculous。 Mr Huskisson said the exports of England to the
United States amounted to only about the sixth part of all the
exports of England； while the exports of the United States to
England constituted more than half of all their exports。 From this
he sought to prove that the Americans were more in the power of the
English than the latter were in that of the former； and that the
English had much less reason to fear interruptions of trade through
war； cessation of intercourse； and so forth； than the Americans
had。 If one looks merely at the totals of the value of the imports
and exports； Huskisson's argument appears sufficiently plausible；
but if one considers the nature of the reciprocal imports and
exports； it will then appear incomprehensible how Mr Huskisson
could make use of an argument which proves the exact opposite of
that which he desired to prove。 All or by far the greater part of
the exports of the United States to England consisted of raw
materials； whose value is increased tenfold by the English； and
which they cannot dispense with； and also could not at once obtain
from other countries； at any rate not in sufficient quantity； while
on the other hand all the imports of the North Americans from
England consisted of articles which they could either manufacture
for themselves or procure just as easily from other nations。 If we
now consider what would be the operation of an interruption of
commerce between the two nations according to the theory of values；
it will appear as if it must operate to the disadvantage of the
Americans； whereas if we judge of it according to the theory of the
productive powers； it must occasion incalculable injury to the
English。 For by it two…thirds of all the English cotton
manufactories would come to a standstill and fall into ruin。
England would lose as by magic a productive source of wealth； the
annual value of which far exceeds the value of her entire exports；
and the results of such a loss on the peace； wealth； credit；
commerce； and power of England would be incalculable。 What；
however； would be the consequences of such a state of things for
the North Americans？ Compelled to manufacture for themselves those
goods which they had hitherto obtained from England； they would in
the course of a few years gain what the English had lost。 No doubt
such a measure must occasion a conflict for life and death； as
formerly the navigation laws did between England and Holland。 But
probably it would also end in the same way as formerly did the
conflict in the English Channel。 It is unnecessary here to follow
out the consequences of a rivalry which； as it appears to us； must
sooner or later； from the very nature of things； come to a rupture。
What we have said suffices to show clearly the futility and danger
of Huskisson's argument； and to demonstrate how unwisely England
acted in compelling the North Americans （by means of her corn laws）
to manufacture for themselves； and how wise it would have been of
Mr Huskisson had he； instead of trifling with the question by such
futile and hazardous arguments； laboured to remove out of the way
the causes which led to the adoption of the American tariff of
1828。
In order to prove to the North Americans how advantageous to
them the trade of England was； Mr Huskisson pointed out the
extraordinary increase in the English importations of cotton； but
the Americans also knew how to estimate this argument at its true
value。 For the production of cotton in America had for more than
ten years previously so greatly exceeded the consumption of； and
the demand for； this article from year to year； that its prices had
fallen in almost the same ratio in which the export had increased；
as may be seen from the fact that in the year 1816 the Americans
had obtained for 80；000；000 pounds of cotton 24；000；000 dollars；
while in the year 1826 for 204；000；000 pounds of cotton they only
obtained 25；000；000 dollars。
Finally； Mr Huskisson threatened the North Americans with the
organisation of a wholesale contraband trade by way of Canada。 It
is true that under existing circumstances an American protective
system can be endangered by nothing so seriously as by the means
indicated by Mr Huskisson。 But what follows from that？ Is it that
the Americans are to lay their system at the feet of the English
Parliament； and await in humility whatever the latter may be
pleased to determine from year to year respecting their national
industry？ How absurd！ The only consequence would be that the
Americans would annex Canada