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food from Siberia or the Kuban ��if military activities do not make that
impossible�� will impose an almost intolerable strain on the inadequate
transport。 Yet I think internal collapse unlikely。 It may be said almost
with certainty that Governments do not collapse until there is no one left
to defend them。 That moment had arrived in the case of the
Tsar。 It had arrived in the case of Kerensky。 It has not arrived in the
case of the Soviet Government for certain obvious reasons。 For one
thing�察�a collapse of the Soviet Government at the present time would be
disconcerting�察�if not disastrous�察�to its more respectable enemies。 It would�察�
of course�察�open the way to a practically unopposed military advance�察�but at
the same time it would present its enemies with enormous territory�察�which
would overwhelm the organizing powers which they have shown again
and again to be quite inadequate to much smaller tasks。 Nor would
collapse of the present Government turn a bad harvest into a good one。
Such a collapse would mean the breakdown of all existing organizations�察�
and would intensify the horrors of famine for every town dweller。
Consequently�察 �though the desperation of hunger and resentment against
inevitable requisitions may breed riots and revolts here and there
throughout the country�察 �the men who�察 �in other circumstances�察 �might
coordinate such events�察�will refrain from doing anything of the sort。 I do
not say that collapse is impossible。 I do say that it would be extremely
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undesirable from the point of view of almost everybody in Russia。
Collapse of the present Government would mean at best a reproduction of
the circumstances of 1917�察 �with the difference that no intervention from
without would be necessary to stimulate indiscriminate slaughter within。
I say ;at best; because I think it more likely that collapse would be
followed by a period of actual chaos。 Any Government that followed the
Communists would be faced by the same economic problem�察�and would
have to choose between imposing measures very like those of the
Communists and allowing Russia to subside into a new area for
colonization。 There are people who look upon this as a natural�察 �even a
desirable�察 �result of the revolution。 They forget that the Russians have
never been a subject race�察 �that they have immense powers of passive
resistance�察�that they respond very readily to any idea that they understand�察�
and that the idea of revolt against foreigners is difficult not to understand。
Any country that takes advantage of the Russian people in a moment of
helplessness will find�察�sooner or later�察�first that it has united Russia against
it�察 �and secondly that it has given all Russians a single and undesirable
view of the history of the last three years。 There will not be a Russian
who will not believe that the artificial incubation of
civil war within the frontiers of old Russia was not deliberately
undertaken by Western Europe with the object of so far weakening Russia
as to make her exploitation easy。 Those who look with equanimity even on
this prospect forget that the creation in Europe of a new area for
colonization�察�a knocking out of one of the sovereign nations�察�will create a
vacuum�察 �and that the effort to fill this vacuum will set at loggerheads
nations at present friendly and so produce a struggle which may well do
for Western Europe what Western Europe will have done for Russia。
It is of course possible that in some such way the Russian Revolution
may prove to be no more than the last desperate gesture of a stricken
civilization。 My point is that if that is so�察�civilization in Russia will not
die without infecting us with its disease。 It seems to me that our own
civilization is ill already�察�slightly demented perhaps�察�and liable�察�like a man
in delirium�察�to do things which tend to aggravate the malady。 I think that
the whole of the Russian war�察 �waged directly or indirectly by Western
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Europe�察�is an example of this sort of dementia�察�but I cannot help believing
that sanity will reassert itself in time。 At the present moment�察�to use a
modification of Gusev's metaphor�察�Europe may be compared to a burning
house and the Governments of Europe to fire brigades�察�each one engaged
in trying to salve a wing or a room of the building。 It seems a pity that
these fire brigades should be fighting each other�察�and forgetting the fire in
their resentment of the fact that some of them wear red uniforms and some
wear blue。 Any single room to which the fire gains complete control
increases the danger of the whole building�察�and I hope that before the roof
falls in the firemen will come to their senses。
But turning from grim recognition of the danger�察 �and from
speculations as to the chance of the Russian Government collapsing�察�and
as to the changes in it that time may bring�察�let us consider what is likely to
happen supposing it does not collapse。 I have already said that I think
collapse unlikely。 Do the Russians show any signs of being able to carry
out their programme�察�or has the fire gone so far during the quarrelling of
the firemen as to make that task impossible�拭�
I think that there is still a hope。 There is as yet no sign of a general
improvement in Russia�察 �nor is such an improvement possible until the
Russians have at least carried out the first stage of their programme。 It
would even not be surprising if things in general were to continue to go to
the bad during the carrying out of that first stage。 Shortages of food�察�of
men�察�of tools�察�of materials�察�are so acute that they have had to choose those
factories which are absolutely indispensable for the carrying out of this
stage�察�and make of them ;shock; factories�察�like the ;shock; troops of the
war�察 �giv