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Being is entirely mediated； it is a substantial content； that is likewise directly in the possession of
the ego； has the character of self； is notion。 With the attainment of this the Phenomenology of Mind
concludes。 What mind prepares for itself in the course of its phenomenology is the element of true
knowledge。 In this element the moments of mind are now set out in the form of thought pure and
simple； which knows its object to be itself。 They no longer involve the opposition between being
and knowing； they remain within the undivided simplicity of the knowing function； they are the truth
in the form of truth； and their diversity is merely diversity of the content of truth。 The process by
which they are developed into an organically connected whole is Logic or Speculative Philosophy。
11。 In what way the Phenomenology of the Spirit is negative or contains what is
false
Now； because the systematic statement of the mind's experience embraces merely its ways of
appearing； it may well seem that the advance from that to the science of ultimate truth in the form
of truth is merely negative； and we might readily be content to dispense with the negative process
as something altogether false； and might ask to be taken straight to the truth at once： why meddle
with what is false at all？ The point formerly raised； that we should have begun with science at
once； may be answered here by considering the character of negativity in general regarded as
something false。 The usual ideas on this subject particularly obstruct the approach to the truth。 The
consideration of this point will give us an opportunity to speak about mathematical knowledge；
which non…philosophical knowledge looks upon as the ideal which philosophy ought to try to
attain； but has so far striven in vain to reach。
Truth and falsehood as commonly understood belong to those sharply defined ideas which claim a
completely fixed nature of their own； one standing in solid isolation on this side； the other on that；
without any community between them。 Against that view it must be pointed out； that truth is not
like stamped coin that is issued ready from the mint and so can be taken up and used。 Nor； again；
is there something false； any more than there is something evil。 Evil and falsehood are indeed not
so bad as the devil； for in the form of the devil they get the length of being particular subjects； qua
false and evil they are merely universals； though they have a nature of their own with reference to
one another。 Falsity （that is what we are dealing with here） would be otherness； the negative
aspect of the substance； which ＇substance＇； qua content of knowledge； is truth。 But the substance
is itself essentially the negative element； partly as involving distinction and determination of content；
partly as being a process of distinguishing pure and simple； i。e。 as being self and knowledge in
general。 Doubtless we can know in a way that is false。 To know something falsely means that
knowledge is not adequate to； is not on equal terms with； its substance。 Yet this very dissimilarity
is the process of distinction in general； the essential moment in knowing。 It is； in fact； out of this
active distinction that its harmonious unity arises； and this identity； when arrived at； is truth。 But it is
not truth in a sense which would involve the rejection of the discordance； the diversity； like dross
from pure metal； nor； again； does truth remain detached from diversity； like a finished article from
the instrument that shapes it。 Difference itself continues to be an immediate element within truth as
such； in the form of the principle of negation； in the form of the activity of Self。 All the same； we
cannot for that reason say that falsehood is a moment or forms even a constituent part of truth。
That 〃in every case of falsity there is something true〃 is an expression in which they are taken to be
like oil and water； which do not mix and are merely united externally。 Just in the interest of their
real meaning； precisely because we want to designate the aspect or moment of complete
otherness； the terms true and false must no longer be used where their otherness has been
cancelled and superseded。 Just as the expressions 〃unity of subject and object〃； of 〃finite and
infinite〃； of 〃being and thought〃； etc。； are clumsy when subject and object； etc。； are taken to mean
what they are outside their unity； and are thus in that unity not meant to be what its very
expression conveys； in the same way falsehood is not； qua false； any longer a moment of truth。
Dogmatism as a way of thinking； whether in ordinary knowledge or in the study of philosophy； is
nothing else but the view that truth consists in a proposition； which is a fixed and final result； or
again which is directly known。 To questions like； 〃When was Caesar born？〃。 〃How many feet
make a furlongs〃； etc。； a straight answer ought to be given； just as it is absolutely true that the
square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right…angled
triangle。 But the nature of a so…called truth of that sort is different from the nature of philosophical
truth。
12。 Historical and mathematical truth
As regards truth in matters of historical fact…to deal briefly with this subject — so far as we
consider the purely historical element； it will be readily granted that they have to do with the sphere
of particular existence； with a content in its contingent and arbitrary aspects； features that have no
necessity。 But even bare truths of the kind； say； like those mentioned； are impossible without the
activity of self …consciousness。 In order to know any one of them； there has to be a good deal of
comparison； books must be consulted； or in some way or other inquiry has to be made。 Even in a
case of direct perception； only when we know it along with the reasons behind it； is it held to be
something of real value； although it is merely the naked fact itself that we are； properly speaking；
supposed to be concerned about。
As to mathematical truths； we should be still less inclined to consider anyone a geometer who had
got Euclid's theorems by heart （auswendig） without knowing the proofs； without； if we may say
so by way of contrast； getting them into his head （inwendig）。 Similarly； if anyone came to know
by measuring many right…angled triangles that their sides are related in the way everybody knows；
we should regard knowledge so obtained as unsatisfactory。 All the same； while proof is essential in
the case of mathematical knowledge； it still does not have the significance and nature of being a
moment in the result itself ； the proof is over when we get the result； and has disappeared。 Qua
result the theorem is； no doubt； one that is seen to be true。 But this eventuality has nothing to do
with its content； but only with its relation to the knowing subject。 The process of mathematical
proof does not belong to the object； it is a function that takes place outside the matter in hand。
Thus； the nature of a right…angled triangle does not break itself up into factors in the manner set
forth in th