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fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided）； nor is the
mind passive therein； except in so far as a man's power of action is not
increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of
himself and his actions （III：iii。； &Note）。
Wherefore； if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a
state of perfection； that he gains an adequate conception of himself and
his own actions； he will be equally； nay more； capable of those actions；
to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive。 But all
emotions are attributable to pleasure； to pain； or to desire （Def。 of the
Emotions：iv。 explanation）； and desire （Def。 of the Emotions：i。） is nothing
else but the attempt to act； therefore； to all actions； &c。 Q。E。D。
Another Proof。… A given action is called bad； in so far as it arises
from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion。 But no action；
considered in itself alone； is either good or bad （as we pointed out in
the preface to Pt。 IV。）； one and the same action being sometimes good；
sometimes bad； wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad； or arises
from some evil emotion； we may be led by reason （IV：xix。）。 Q。E。D。
Note。… An example will put this point in a clearer light。 The action of
striking； in so far as it is considered physically； and in so far as we
merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm； clenches his fist； and
moves his whole arm violently downwards； is a virtue or excellence which
is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body。 If； then； a man；
moved by anger or hatred； is led to clench his fist or to move his arm；
this result takes place （as we showed in Pt。II。）； because one and the
same action can be associated with various mental images of things；
therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same
action by confused ideas； or by clear and distinct ideas。 Hence it is
evident that every desire which springs from emotion； wherein the mind is
passive； would become useless； if men could be guided by reason。 Let us
now see why desire which arises from emotion； wherein the mind is passive；
is called by us blind。
Prop。 LX。 Desire arising from a pleasure
or pain； that is not attributable； to
the whole body； but only to one or certain
parts thereof； is without utility in
respect to a man as a whole。
Proof。… Let it be assumed； for instance； that A； a part of a body； is so
strengthened by some external cause； that it prevails over the remaining
parts （IV：vi。）。 This part will not endeavour to do away with its own
powers； in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office；
for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing
away with its own powers； which （III：vi。） is absurd。 The said part； and；
consequently； the mind also； will endeavour to preserve its condition。
Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no
utility in reference to a man as a whole。 If it be assumed； on the other
hand； that the part； A； be checked so that the remaining parts prevail；
it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no
utility in respect to a man as a whole。 Q。E。D。
Note。… As pleasure is generally （IV：xliv。Note） attributed to one part
of the body； we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking
into consideration our health as a whole： to which it may be added； that
the desires which have most hold over us （IV：ix。） take account of the
present and not of the future。
Prop。 LXI。 Desire which springs from
reason cannot be excessive。
Proof。… Desire （Def。 of the Emotions：i。） considered absolutely is the
actual essence of man； in so far as it is conceived as in any way
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself。
Hence desire； which arises from reason； that is （III：iii。）； which is
engendered in us in so far as we act； is the actual essence or nature of
man； in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
adequately conceived through man's essence only （III：Def。ii。）。 Now； if
such desire could be excessive； human nature considered in itself alone
would be able to exceed itself； or would be able to do more than it can；
a manifest contradiction。 Therefore； such desire cannot be excessive。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 LXII。 In so far as the mind conceives
a thing under the dictates of reason； it is
affected equally； whether the idea be of a
thing future； past； or present。
Proof。… Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason； it
conceives under the form of eternity or necessity （II：xliv。Coroll。ii。）；
and is therefore affected with the same certitude （II：xliii。&Note）。
Wherefore； whether the thing be present； past； or future； the mind
conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same
certitude； and whether the idea be of something present； past； or future；
it will in all cases be equally true （II：xli。）； that is； it will always
possess the same properties of an adequate idea （II：Def。iv。）； therefore； in
so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason； it is
affected in the same manner； whether the idea be of a thing future； past；
or present。 Q。E。D。
Note。… If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things；
and could determine by reason their periods of existence； we should
contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present； and
the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it
conceived as future； consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser
good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future； and
would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of
evil in the future； as we shall presently show。 However； we can have but
a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things （II：xxxi。） and the
periods of their existence （II：xliv。Note） we can only determine by
imagination； which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the
present。 Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is
merely abstract or general； and the judgment which we pass on the order
of things and the connection of causes； with a view to determining what
is good or bad for us in the； present； is rather imaginary than real。
Therefore it is nothing wonderful； if the desire arising from such
knowledge of good and evil； in so far as it looks on into the future； be
more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the
present time。 （Cf。 IV：xvi。）
Prop。 LXIII。 He who is led by fear；
and does good in order to escape evil；