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said type。 Again； we shall that men are more perfect； or more imperfect；
in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type。
For it must be specially remarked that； when I say that a man passes
from a lesser to a greater perfection； or vice versa； I do not mean
that he is changed from one essence or reality to another； for instance；
a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man；
as by being changed into an insect。 What I mean is； that we conceive the
thing's power of action； in so far as this is understood by its nature；
to be increased or diminished。 Lastly； by perfection in general I shall；
as I have said； mean reality in other words； each thing's essence； in so
far as it exists； and operates in a particular manner； and without paying
any regard to its duration。 For no given thing can be said to be more
perfect； because it has passed a longer time in existence。 The duration
of things cannot be determined by their essence； for the essence of
things involves no fixed and definite period of existence； but everything；
whether it be more perfect or less perfect； will always be able to persist
in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist； wherefore； in
this respect； all things are equal。
DEFINITIONS。
I。 By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us。
II。 By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good。 （Concerning these terms see the
foregoing preface towards the end。）
III。 Particular things I call contingent in so far as； while regarding
their essence only； we find nothing therein； which necessarily asserts
their existence or excludes it。
IV。 Particular things I call possible in so far as； while regarding the
causes whereby they must be produced； we know not； whether such causes
be determined for producing them。
（In I：xxxiii。note。i。； I drew no distinction between possible and
contingent； because there was in that place no need to distinguish
them accurately。）
V。 By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different
directions； though they are of the same kind； such as luxury and
avarice； which are both species of love； and are contraries； not
by nature； but by accident。
VI。 What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing； future； present； and
past； I explained in III：xviii。；notes。i。；&ii。； which see。
（But I should here also remark； that we can only distinctly conceive
distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit； that is； all
objects distant from us more than two hundred feet； or whose distance
from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive；
seem to be an equal distance from us； and all in the same plane； so also
objects； whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present
by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive； seem to be all
equally distant from the present； and are set down； as it were； to the
same moment of time。）
VII。 By an end； for the sake of which we do something； I mean a desire。
VIII。 By virtue （virtus） and power I mean the same thing； that is
（III：vii。）； virtue； in so far as it is referred to man； is a man's
nature or essence； in so far as it has the power of effecting what
can only be understood by the laws of that nature。
AXIOM。
There is no individual thing in nature； than which there is not
another more powerful and strong。 Whatsoever thing be given； there is
something stronger whereby it can be destroyed。
PROPOSITIONS。
Prop。 I。 No positive quality possessed by a
false idea is removed by the presence of
what is true； in virtue of its being true。
Proof。… Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which
inadequate ideas involve （II：xxxv。）； nor have they any positive
quality on account of which they are called false （II：xxxiii。）； contrariwise； in so far as they
are referred to God； they are true
（II：xxxii。）。 Wherefore； if the positive quality possessed by a false
idea were removed by the presence of what is true； in virtue of its
being true； a true idea would then be removed by itself； which
（IV：iii。） is absurd。 Therefore； no positive quality possessed by a
false idea； &c。 Q。E。D。
Note。… This proposition is more clearly understood from II：xvi。Coroll。ii。
For imagination is an idea； which indicates rather the present disposition
of the human body than the nature of the external body； not indeed
distinctly； but confusedly； whence it comes to pass； that the mind is
said to err。 For instance； when we look at the sun； we conceive that it
is distant from us about two hundred feet； in this judgment we err； so
long as we are in ignorance of its true distance； when its true distance
is known； the error is removed； but not the imagination； or； in other
words； the idea of the sun； which only explains tho nature of that
luminary； in so far as the body is affected thereby： wherefore； though
we know the real distance； we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun
to be near us。 For； as we said in III：xxxv。note； we do not imagine the sun
to be so near us； because we are ignorant of its true distance； but because
the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is
affected thereby。 Thus； when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of
water are reflected into our eyes； we imagine the sun as if it were in the
water； though we are aware of its real position； and similarly other
imaginations； wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the
natural disposition of the body； or that its power of activity is
increased or diminished； are not contrary to the truth； and do not vanish
at its presence。 It happens indeed that； when we mistakenly fear an evil；
the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings； but the contrary also
happens； namely； that we fear an evil which will certainly come； and our
fear vanishes when we hear false tidings； thus imaginations do not vanish
at the presence of the truth； in virtue of its being true； but because
other imaginations； stronger than the first； supervene and exclude the
present existence of that which we imagined； as I have shown in II：。xvii。
Prop。 II。 We are only passive； in so far as
we are apart of Nature； which cannot be
conceived by itself without other parts。
Proof。… We are said to be passive； when something arises in us； whereof
we are only a partial cause （III：Def。ii。）； that is （III：Def。i。）； something
which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature。 We are passive
therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature； which c