按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body
（II：xxi。）； that is； there is no real distinction between this idea and
the emotion or idea of the modification of the body； save in conception
only。 Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the
emotion； in so far as we are conscious thereof。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 IX。 An emotion； whereof we conceive
the cause to be with us at the present time；
is stronger than if we did not conceive the
cause to be with us。
Proof。… Imagination or conception is the idea； by which the mind regards
a thing as present （II：xvii。note）； but which indicates the disposition of
the mind rather than the nature of the external thing （II：xvi。Coroll。ii）。
An emotion is therefore a conception； in so far as it indicates the
disposition of the body。 But a conception （by II：xvii。） is stronger；
so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external object； wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more
intense； when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time；
than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us。 Q。E。D。
Note。… When I said above in III：xviii。 that we are affected by the image
of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived
were present； I expressly stated； that this is only true in so far as we
look solely to the image of the thing in question itself ； for the thing's
nature is unchanged； whether we have conceived it or not； I did not deny
that the image becomes weaker； when we regard as present to us other
things which exclude the present existence of the future object： I did
not expressly call attention to the fact； because I purposed to treat
of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work。
Corollary。… The image of something past or future； that is； of a thing
which we regard as in relation to time past or time future； to the
exclusion of time present； is； when other conditions are equal； weaker
than the image of something present； consequently an emotion felt towards
what is past or future is less intense； other conditions being equal；
than an emotion felt towards something present。
Prop。 X。 Towards something future； which we
conceive as close at hand； we are affected
more intensely； than if we conceive that
its time for existence is separated from
the present by a longer interval； so too
by the remembrance of what we conceive to
have not long passed away we are affected
more intensely； than if we conceive that
it has long passed away。
Proof。… In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand； or not long
passed away； we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object
less； than if its period of future existence were more distant from the
present； or if it had long passed away （this is obvious） therefore （by the
foregoing Prop。） we are； so far； more intensely affected towards it。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。… From the remarks made in IV：Def。vi。 of this part it follows
that； if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than
we can define in conception； though their dates of occurrence be widely
separated one from the other； they all affect us equally faintly。
Prop。 XI。 An emotion towards that which
we conceive as necessary is； when other
conditions are equal； more intense than
an emotion towards that which impossible；
or contingent； or non…necessary。
Proof。… In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary； we； to that
extent； affirm its existence； on the other hand we deny a thing's
existence； in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary ：xxxiii。note。i。）；
wherefore （IV。ix。） an emotion towards that which is necessary is； other
conditions being equal； more intense than an emotion that which is
non…necessary。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XII。 An emotion towards a thing；
which we know not to exist at the present
time； and which we conceive as possible；
is more intense； other conditions being
equal； than an emotion towards a thing
contingent。
Proof。… In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent； we are affected
by the conception of some further thing； which would assert the existence
of the former （IV：Def。iii。）； but； on the other hand； we （by hypothesis）
conceive certain things； which exclude its present existence。 But； in
so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future； we there by
conceive things which assert its existence （IV：iv。）； that is （III：xviii。）；
things which promote hope or fear： wherefore an emotion towards something
possible is more vehement。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。… An emotion towards a thing； which we know not to exist in the
present； and which we conceive as contingent； is far fainter； than if we
conceive the thing to be present with us。
Proof。… Emotion towards a thing； which we conceive to exist； is more
intense than it would be； if we conceived the thing as future V：ix。Coroll。）；
and is much more vehement； than if the future time be conceived as far
distant from the present （IV：x。）。 Therefore an emotion towards a thing；
whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present；
is far fainter； than if we conceive the thing as present； it is；
nevertheless； more intense； than if we conceived the thing as contingent；
wherefore an emotion towards a thing； which we regard as contingent；
will be far fainter； than if we conceived the thing to be present with us。
Q。E。D。
Prop。 XIII。 Emotion towards a thing contingent；
which we know not to exist in the present； is；
other conditions being equal； fainter than an
emotion towards a thing past。
Proof。… In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent； we are not
affected by the image of any other thing； which asserts the existence
of the said thing （IV：Def。iii。）； but； on the other hand （by hypothesis）；
we conceive certain things excluding its present existence。 But； in so
far as we conceive it in relation to time past； we are assumed to
conceive something； which recalls the thing to memory； or excites the
image thereof （II：xviii。&Note）； which is so far the same as regarding
it as present （II：xvii。Coroll。）。 Therefore （IV：ix。） an emotion towards a
thing contingent； which we know does not exist in the present； is fainter；
other conditions being equal； than an emotion towards a thing past。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XIV。 A true knowledge of good and evil
cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true；
but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion。
Proof。… An emotion is an idea； whereby the mind affirms of its body a
greater or less force of existing than