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Bishop of Exeter； and asking him； merely as a hypothetical
question； whether； in his opinion； Sudanese converts to
Christianity might be permitted to keep three wives。 His Lordship
answered that this would be uncanonical。
A few days later； it appeared that the conversation in the
carriage at Heavitree had borne fruit。 Gordon wrote a letter to
Sir Samuel Baker； further elaborating the opinions on the Sudan
which he had already expressed in his interview with Mr。 Stead；
the letter was clearly intended for publication； and published it
was in 〃The Times〃 of January 14th。 On the same day； Gordon's
name
began once more to buzz along the wires in secret questions and
answers to and from the highest quarters。
'Might it not be advisable；' telegraphed Lord Granville to Mr。
Gladstone； to put a little pressure on Baring； to induce him to
accept the assistance of General Gordon？' Mr。 Gladstone replied；
also by a telegram； in the affirmative； and on the 15th； Lord
Wolseley telegraphed to Gordon begging him to come to London
immediately。 Lord Wolseley； who was one of Gordon's oldest
friends； was at that time Adjutant…General of the Forces； there
was a long interview； and； though the details of the conversation
have never transpired； it is known that； in the course of it；
Lord Wolseley asked Gordon if he would be willing to go to the
Sudan； to which Gordon replied that there was only one
objection
his prior engagement to the King of the Belgians。 Before
nightfall； Lord Granville； by private telegram； had 'put a little
pressure on Baring'。 'He had；' he said； 'heard indirectly that
Gordon was ready to go at once to the Sudan on the following
rather vague terms： His mission to be to report to Her Majesty's
Government on the military situation； and to return without any
further engagement。 He would be under you for instructions and
will send letters through you under flying seal。。。 He might be of
use；'
Lord Granville added； in informing you and us of the situation。
It
would be popular at home； but there may be countervailing
objections。
Tell me；' such was Lord Granville's concluding injunction； 'your
real opinion。'
It was the third time of asking； and Sir Evelyn Baring resisted
no longer。
'Gordon；' he telegraphed on the 16th； 'would be the best man if
he will
pledge himself to carry out the policy of withdrawing from the
Sudan as
quickly as is possible； consistently with saving life。 He must
also understand that he must take his instructions from the
British representative in Egypt。。。 I would rather have him than
anyone else；
provided there is a perfectly clear understanding with him as to
what his
position is to be and what line of policy he is to carry out。
Otherwise；
not。。。 Whoever goes should be distinctly warned that he will
undertake a
service of great difficulty and danger。'
In the meantime； Gordon； with the Sudan upon his lips； with the
Sudan in
his imagination； had hurried to Brussels； to obtain from the King
of the
Belgians a reluctant consent to the postponement of his Congo
mission。 On
the 17th he was recalled to London by a telegram from Lord
Wolseley。 On the
18th the final decision was made。 'At noon；' Gordon told the Rev。
Mr。 Barnes； Wolseley came to me and took me to the Ministers。 He
went in and talked to the Ministers； and came back and said： 〃Her
Majesty's Government wants you to undertake this。 Government is
determined to evacuate the Sudan； for they will not guarantee
future government。 Will you go and do it？〃 I said： 〃Yes。〃 He
said： 〃Go in。〃 I went in and saw them。 They said： 〃Did Wolseley
tell you your orders？〃 I said： 〃Yes。〃 I said： 〃You will not
guarantee future government of the Sudan； and you wish me to go
up and evacuate now。〃 They said： 〃Yes〃； and it was over。'
Such was the sequence of events which ended in General Gordon's
last appointment。 The precise motives of those responsible for
these transactions are less easy to discern。 It is difficult to
understand what the reasons could have been which induced the
Government； not only to override the hesitations of Sir Evelyn
Baring； but to overlook the grave and obvious dangers involved in
sending such a man as Gordon to the Sudan。 The whole history of
his life； the whole bent of his character； seemed to disqualify
him for the task for which he had been chosen。 He was before all
things a fighter； an enthusiast； a bold adventurer； and he was
now to be entrusted with the conduct of an inglorious retreat。 He
was alien to the subtleties of civilised statesmanship； he was
unamenable to official control； he was incapable of the skilful
management of delicate situations； and he was now to be placed in
a position of great complexity； requiring at once a cool
judgment； a clear perception of fact； and a fixed determination
to carry out a line of policy laid down from above。 He had； it is
true； been Governor…General of the Sudan； but he was now to
return to the scene of his greatness as the emissary of a
defeated and humbled power； he was to be a fugitive where he had
once been a ruler； the very success of his mission was to consist
in establishing the triumph of those forces which he had spent
years in trampling underfoot。 All this should have been clear to
those in authority； after a very little reflection。 It was clear
enough to Sir Evelyn Baring； though； with characteristic
reticence；
he had abstained from giving expression to his thoughts。 But；
even
if a general acquaintance with Gordon's life and character were
not
sufficient to lead to these conclusions； he himself had taken
care to
put their validity beyond reasonable doubt。
Both in his interview with Mr。 Stead and in his letter to Sir
Samuel Baker；
he had indicated unmistakably his own attitude towards the Sudan
situation。
The policy which he advocated； the state of feeling in which he
showed
himself to be； was diametrically opposed to the declared
intentions of the
Government。 He was by no means in favour of withdrawing from the
Sudan； he was in favour； as might have been supposed； of vigorous
military action。 It might be necessary to abandon； for the time
being； the more remote garrisons in Darfur and Equatoria； but
Khartoum must be held at all costs。 To allow the Mahdi to enter
Khartoum would not merely mean the return of the whole of the
Sudan to barbarism； it would be a menace to the safety of Egypt
herself。 To attempt to protect Egypt against the Mahdi by
fortifying her southern frontier was preposterous。 'You might as
well fortify against a fever。' Arabia； Syria； the whole
Mohammedan world； would be shaken by the Mahdi's advance。 'In
self…defence；' Gordon declared to Mr。 Stead； the policy of
evacuation cannot possibly be justified。'
The true policy was obvious。 A strong manSir S