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（5） This is； in fact； a being single and infinite ＇76z＇ ； in other words； it is
the sum total of being； beyond which there is no being found。 ＇76a＇
＇77＇ （1） Thus far we have treated of the false idea。 We have now to
investigate the doubtful idea … that is； to inquire what can cause us to doubt；
and how doubt may be removed。 （2） I speak of real doubt existing in the
mind； not of such doubt as we see exemplified when a man says that he
doubts； though his mind does not really hesitate。 （77：3） The cure of the
latter does not fall within the province of method； it belongs rather to
inquiries concerning obstinacy and its cure。
＇78＇ （1） Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing
doubted of。 （2） In other words； if there were only one idea in the mind；
whether that idea were true or false； there would be no doubt or certainty
present； only a certain sensation。 （3） For an idea is in itself nothing else
than a certain sensation。 （4） But doubt will arise through another idea； not
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clear and distinct enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions
with regard to the matter under consideration； that is； the idea which
causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct。 （5） To take an example。 （78：6）
Supposing that a man has never reflected； taught by experience or by any
other means； that our senses sometimes deceive us； he will never doubt
whether the sun be greater or less than it appears。 （7） Thus rustics are
generally astonished when they hear that the sun is much larger than the
earth。 （8） But from reflection on the deceitfulness of the senses ＇78a＇
doubt arises； and if； after doubting； we acquire a true knowledge of the
senses； and how things at a distance are represented through their
instrumentality； doubt is again removed。
＇79＇ （1） Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition
that there is a deceitful Deity； who leads us astray even in what is most
certain。 （2） We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no
clear and distinct idea … in other words； until we reflect the knowledge
which we have of the first principle of all things； and find that which
teaches us that God is not a deceiver； and until we know this with the same
certainty as we know from reflecting on the are equal to two right angles。
（3） But if we have a knowledge of God equal to that which we have of a
triangle； all doubt is removed。 （79：4） In the same way as we can arrive at
the said knowledge of a triangle； though not absolutely sure that there is
not some arch…deceiver leading us astray； so can we come to a like
knowledge of God under the like condition； and when we have attained to
it； it is sufficient； as I said before； to remove every doubt which we can
possess concerning clear and distinct ideas。
＇80＇ （1） Thus； if a man proceeded with our investigations in due
order； inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into；
never passing over a link in the chain of association； and with knowledge
how to define his questions before seeking to answer them； he will never
have any ideas save such as are very certain； or； in other words； clear and
distinct； for doubt is only a suspension of the spirit concerning some
affirmation or negation which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it
were not in ignorance of something； without which the knowledge of the
matter in hand must needs be imperfect。 （2） We may； therefore； conclude
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that doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation。
＇81＇ （1） These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part of
my treatise on method。 （2） However； in order not to omit anything which
can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its faculties； I will
add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness。 （81：3）
The point most worthy of attention is； that memory is strengthened both
with and without the aid of the understanding。 （4） For the more intelligible
a thing is； the more easily is it remembered； and the less intelligible it is；
the more easily do we forget it。 （5） For instance； a number of
unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same
number in the form of a narration。
＇82＇ （1） The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the
understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or the
sense called common； is affected by some particular physical object。 （2）
I say particular； for the imagination is only affected by particular objects。
（3） If we read； for instance； a single romantic comedy； we shall remember
it very well； so long as we do not read many others of the same kind； for it
will reign alone in the memory （4） If； however； we read several others of
the same kind； we shall think of them altogether； and easily confuse one
with another。 （82：5） I say also； physical。 （6） For the imagination is only
affected by physical objects。 （7） As； then； the memory is strengthened
both with and without the aid of the understanding； we may conclude that
it is different from the understanding； and that in the latter considered in
itself there is neither memory nor forgetfulness。
＇83＇ （1） What； then； is memory？ （2） It is nothing else than the actual
sensation of impressions on the brain； accompanied with the thought of a
definite duration； ＇83d＇ of the sensation。 （3） This is also shown by
reminiscence。 （4） For then we think of the sensation； but without the
notion of continuous duration； thus the idea of that sensation is not the
actual duration of the sensation or actual memory。 （83：5） Whether ideas
are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in philosophy。 （6） If this
seems too absurd to anyone； it will be sufficient for our purpose； if he
reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in proportion to
its singularity； as appears from the example of the comedy just cited。