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existence； it must be understood through its proximate cause。 （3） For； in
reality； the knowledge； ＇92f＇ of an effect is nothing else than the
acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause。
＇93＇ （1） Therefore； we may never； while we are concerned with
inquiries into actual things； draw any conclusion from abstractions； we
shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the
understanding with that which is in the thing itself。 （2） The best basis for
drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence； or
a true and legitimate definition。 （93：3） For the understanding cannot
descend from universal axioms by themselves to particular things； since
axioms are of infinite extent； and do not determine the understanding to
contemplate one particular thing more than another。
＇94＇ （1） Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts from
some given definition。 （2） This process will be the more fruitful and easy
in proportion as the thing given be better defined。 （3） Wherefore； the
cardinal point of all this second part of method consists in the knowledge
of the conditions of good definition； and the means of finding them。 （4） I
will first treat of the conditions of definition。
＇95＇ （1） A definition； if it is to be called perfect； must explain the
inmost essence of a thing； and must take care not to substitute for this any
of its properties。 （2） In order to illustrate my meaning； without taking an
example which would seem to show a desire to expose other people's
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errors； I will choose the case of something abstract； the definition of which
is of little moment。 （95：3） Such is a circle。 （4） If a circle be defined as
a figure； such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the
circumference are equal； every one can see that such a definition does not
in the least explain the essence of a circle； but solely one of its properties。
（5） Though； as I have said； this is of no importance in the case of figures
and other abstractions； it is of great importance in the case of physical
beings and realities： for the properties of things are not understood so long
as their essences are unknown。 （6） If the latter be passed over； there is
necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should reflect the
succession of nature； and we go far astray from our object。
＇96＇ In order to be free from this fault； the following rules should be
observed in definition：… I。 （1） If the thing in question be created； the
definition must （as we have said） comprehend the proximate cause。
（2） For instance； a circle should； according to this rule； be defined as
follows： the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and
the other free。 （3） This definition clearly comprehends the proximate
cause。 II。 （4） A conception or definition of a thing should be such
that all the properties of that thing； in so far as it is considered by
itself； and not in conjunction with other things； can be deduced from it；
as may be seen in the definition given of a circle： for from that it
clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the
circumference are equal。 （5） That this is a necessary characteristic of
a definition is so clear to anyone； who reflects on the matter； that there
is no need to spend time in proving it； or in showing that； owing to
this second condition； every definition should be affirmative。 （6） I
speak of intellectual affirmation； giving little thought to verbal
affirmations which； owing to the poverty of language； must
sometimes； perhaps； be expressed negatively； though the idea
contained is affirmative。
＇97＇ The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing are as
follows： I。 The exclusion of all idea of cause … that is； the thing
must not need explanation by Anything outside itself。 II。 When the
definition of the thing has been given； there must be no room for
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doubt as to whether the thing exists or not。 III。 It must contain； as far as
the mind is concerned； no substantives which could be put into an
adjectival form； in other words； the object defined must not be
explained through abstractions。 IV。 Lastly； though this is not
absolutely necessary； it should be possible to deduce from the
definition all the properties of the thing defined。 All these rules
become obvious to anyone giving strict attention to the matter。
＇98＇ （1） I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a
conclusion is a particular affirmative essence。 （2） The more specialized
the idea is； the more it is distinct； and therefore clear。 （3） Wherefore a
knowledge of particular things should be sought for as diligently as
possible。
＇99＇ （1） As regards the order of our perceptions； and the manner in
which they should be arranged and united； it is necessary that； as soon as
is possible and rational； we should inquire whether there be any being （and；
if so； what being）； that is the cause of all things； so that its essence；
represented in thought； may be the cause of all our ideas； and then our
mind will to the utmost possible extent reflect nature。 （2） For it will
possess； subjectively； nature's essence； order； and union。 （3） Thus we can
see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from
physical things … that is； from real entities； proceeding； as far as may be；
according to the s