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of 6。67 per share； and after…tax operating earnings per share last year were 9。01。 In cases such as these； Mr。 Market has proven to be a mighty good friend。
一个矛盾又有趣的会计现象，从上面的表你可以看到，我们在这三家公司的股权投资市值超过20亿，但是他们在1987年总共贡献给Berkshire帐面税后盈余却只有一千一百万美元。
An interesting accounting irony overlays a parison of the reported financial results of our controlled panies with those of the permanent minority holdings listed above。 As you can see； those three stocks have a market value of over 2 billion。 Yet they produced only 11 million in reported after…tax earnings for Berkshire in 1987。
会计原则规定我们必须在这些公司分配股利的时候才能认列利益，这通常要比公司实际所赚的数字要少的多，以这三家公司合计， 1987年可以分配到的盈余数字高达一亿美元，另一方面，会计原则规定这三家公司的股份若是有保险公司所持有，则其帐面价值应该要以其市场价格列示，结果是一般公认会计原则要求我们在资产负债表上秀出这些被投资事业的实际价值，却不准让我们在损益表是反应他们实质的获利能力。
Accounting rules dictate that we take into ine only the dividends these panies pay us … which are little more than nominal … rather than our share of their earnings； which in 1987 amounted to well over 100 million。 On the other hand； accounting rules provide that the carrying value of these three holdings … owned； as they are； by insurance panies … must be recorded on our balance sheet at current market prices。 The result： GAAP accounting lets us reflect in our net worth the up…to…date underlying values of the businesses we partially own； but does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our ine account。 In the case of our controlled panies； just the opposite is true。 Here； we show full earnings in our ine account but never change asset values on our balance sheet； no matter how much the value of a business might have increased since we purchased it。
在我们具有控制权的投资事业，情况却刚好相反，我们可以在损益表上充分表示其获利状况，但不管这些资产在我们买下之后，价值在无形间如何地增加，我们也无法在资产负债表上做任何的变动。
Our mental approach to this accounting schizophrenia is to ignore GAAP figures and to focus solely on the future earning power of both our controlled and non…controlled businesses。 Using this approach； we establish our own ideas of business value； keeping these independent from both the accounting values shown on our books for controlled panies and the values placed by a sometimes foolish market on our partially…owned panies。 It is this business value that we hope to increase at a reasonable （or； preferably； unreasonable） rate in the years ahead。
我们对于这种会计精神分裂症的调整心态方式就是不去理会一般公认会计原则所编制的数字，而只专注于这些具控制权或者是部份股权的公司，其未来的获利能力，采用这种方法，我们依自己的概念建立一套企业价值的评价模式，它有别于会计帐上所显示的具控制权的帐面投资成本以及有的时候高的离谱的部份股权投资市值，这才是我们真正想要在未来年度持续稳定增加的数字（当然若能以不合理的速度成长的话更好）。
Marketable Securities – Other
其它有价证券
除了上述的三家重要投资事业，我们的保险公司也持有大量的有价证券，
主要可以分为五个类型，分别为：
（1）长期股票投资（2）长期固定收益债券（3）中期固定收益债券（4）短期约当现金（5）短期套利交易
In addition to our three permanent mon stock holdings； we hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance panies。 In selecting these； we can choose among five major categories： （1） long…term mon stock investments； （2） medium…term fixed…ine securities； （3） long…term fixed ine securities； （4） short…term cash equivalents； and （5） short…term arbitrage mitments。
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
We have no particular bias when it es to choosing from these categories。 We just continuously search among them for the highest after…tax returns as measured by 〃mathematical expectation；〃 limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand。 Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings； our goal； rather； is to maximize eventual net worth。
首先谈谈普通股投资，1987年股市的表现精彩连连，但最后指数却没有太大的进展，道琼整个年度只涨了2。3％，你知道这就好象是在坐云霄飞车一样，市场先生在十月以前爆跳如雷，但之后却突然收敛了下来。
o Let's look first at mon stocks。 During 1987 the stock market was an area of much excitement but little net movement： The Dow advanced 2。3％ for the year。 You are aware； of course； of the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change。 Mr。 Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced a sudden； massive seizure。
市场上有所谓专业的投资人，掌管着数以亿万计的资金，就是这些人造成市场的动荡，他们不去研究企业下一步发展的方向，反而专研于其它基金经理人下一步的动向，对他们来说，股票只不过是赌博交易的筹码，就像是大富翁里的棋子一样。
We have 〃professional〃 investors； those who manage many billions； to thank for most of this turmoil。 Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead； many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead。 For them； stocks are merely tokens in a game； like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly。
他们的做法发展到极致，便形成所谓的投资组合保险，一个在1986到1987年间广为基金经理人所接受的一种策略，这种策略只不过是像投机者停损单一样，当投资组合或是类似指数期货价格下跌时就必须处分持股，这种策略不管如此，只要下跌到一定程度便会涌出一大堆卖单，根据一份研究报告显示：有高达600亿到900亿的股票投资在1987年十月中面临一触即发的险境。
An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is 〃portfolio insurance；〃 a money…management strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in 1986…1987。 This strategy … which is simply an exotically…labeled version of the small speculator's stop…loss order dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock portfolio； or their index…future equivalents； be sold as prices decline。 The strategy says nothing else matters： A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order。 According to the Brady Report； 60 billion to 90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid…October of 1987。
若是你认为投资顾问是被请来投资的，那你就大错特错了，在买下一家农场后，一个理性的主人会不会叫其不动产经纪人开始寻求可能的买主，只因为隔壁的农场最近卖出的价格更低一些？或是你会不会一早起来就想要把你的房子卖掉，只因为几分钟前你听到隔壁的房子以比以前便宜的价格脱手。
If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to invest； you may be bewildered by this technique。 After buying a farm； would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property was sold at a lower price？ Or would you sell your house to whatever bidder was available at 9：31 on some morning merely because at 9：30 a similar house sold for less than it would have
brought on the previous day？
这样的举动正是投资组合风险理论告诉退休基金或是学术单位当他们持有福特或是通用电气部份股权时，应该要做的动作，因为这些公司的价值越被低估，你就越应该赶快把他们处分掉，根据逻辑推论，这种方法还要求投资机构在股价反弹时再把他们买回来，一想到有这么多的资金，掌握