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unfortunately it will hurt in other ways。） Nevertheless； our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally： 〃I'll think about it tomorrow。〃 And； almost inevitably； procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences。
只是这些后果发生的时点与影响我们实在无从去预测，不过无法去量化或是锁定这种风险不代表我们就可以忽视它的存在，当然我们的推论也许会不准确，目前的利率水准或可弥补通货膨胀所带来的损失，只是我们对于长期的债券仍报以持续的戒心。
Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable。 But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it。 While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately pensate for the inflationary risk； we retain a general fear of long…term bonds。
然而我们仍愿意把一部份资金摆在这上头，如果在某些特定的有价证券上有特殊的利益，就像是我在1984年年报中曾经提到我们在华盛顿公用电力系统债券上的投资，在1987年我们又持续加码投资，总计到年底我们持有的这类帐面未摊销成本为2。4亿美元债券，市价约为3。16亿美元，还外加每年三千四百万美元的免税利息收入。
We are； however； willing to invest a moderate portion of our funds in this category if we think we have a significant edge in a specific security。 That willingness explains our holdings of the Washington Public Power Supply Systems #1； #2 and #3 issues； discussed in our 1984 report。 We added to our WPPSS position during 1987。 At yearend； we had holdings with an amortized cost of 240 million and a market value of 316 million； paying us tax…exempt ine of 34 million annually。 o We continued to do well in arbitrage last year； though … or perhaps because … we operated on a very limited scale。 We enter into only a few arbitrage mitments each year and restrict ourselves to large transactions that have been publicly announced。 We do not participate in situations in which green…mailers are attempting to put a target pany 〃in play。〃
我们持续在短期套利交易上有所斩获，虽然我们从事的规模有限，每年我们限制自己只专注在几个少数已公开信息的大型交易案，我们不介入那些已被投机套利客锁定的个案。
We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for decades and； to date； our results have been quite good。 Though we've never made an exact calculation； I believe that overall we have averaged annual pre…tax returns of at least 25％ from arbitrage。 I'm quite sure we did better than that in 1987。 But it should be emphasized that a really bad experience or two … such as many arbitrage operations suffered in late 1987 … could change the figures dramatically。
我们从事机率套利已有好几十年的经验，到目前为止，我们的成果还算不错，虽然我们从来没有仔细去算过，我相信我们在套利投资方面的税前年报酬率应该有25％左右，我确信1987年的成绩甚至比以前好的多，但必须强调的是只要发生一、两次像今年其它几个套利惨痛的经验，就可能使得整个结果猪羊变色。
Our only 50 million…plus arbitrage position at yearend 1987 was 1；096；200 shares of Allegis； with a cost of 76 million and a market value of 78 million。
今年我们新增5；000万美元以上的套利案只有斥资7；600万美元投资100万股Allegis，目前的市价约为7；800万美元。
o We had two other large holdings at yearend that do not fit precisely into any of our five categories。 One was various Texaco； Inc。 bonds with short maturities； all purchased after Texaco went into bankruptcy。 Were it not for the extraordinarily strong capital position of our insurance panies； it would be inappropriate for us to buy defaulted bonds。 At prices prevailing after Texaco's bankruptcy filing； however； we regarded these issues as by far the most attractive bond investment available to us。
我们在年底还有其它二个主要的投资组合不在前述五个范围之内，一项是Texaco短期债券，全都是在它破产之后才买进，要不是因为我们旗下保险公司的财务实力雄厚，我们实在不太适合去买这种已发生问题的债券，不过以这些债券在Texaco倒闭后的低廉价格，这是目前我们可以找得到最吸引我们的投资标的。
On a worst…case basis with respect to the Pennzoil litigation； we felt the bonds were likely to be worth about what we paid for them。 Given a sensible settlement； which seemed likely； we expected the bonds to be worth considerably more。 At yearend our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at 104 million and had a market value of 119 million。
考量其所牵涉的诉讼案件，在最坏的情况之下，我们认为应该还是可以将投资成本回收，而若是官司可以和解收场，我们预期债券的价值将会更高，截至年底Texaco债券在我们帐面上的成本约为一亿美元，目前的市值则约为1。2亿美元。
By far our largest … and most publicized … investment in 1987 was a 700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9％ preferred stock。 This preferred is convertible after three years into Salomon mon stock at 38 per share and； if not converted； will be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31； 1995。 From most standpoints； this mitment fits into the medium…term fixed…ine securities category。 In addition； we have an interesting conversion possibility。
在投资银行业，我们当然没有特殊的远见能够预知其未来发展的方向与获利能力，就产业特性而言，投资银行业比起我们其它主要投资的行业更难预测，这也是为什么我们选择以可转换特别股的方式投资。
We； of course； have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking。 By their nature； the economics of this industry are far less predictable than those of most other industries in which we have major mitments。 This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred。
当然我们对于所罗门公司的CEO …John Gutfreund的能力与品格有不错的印象，查理与我都很尊崇且信赖他，我们是在1976年开始认识他，当时他在协助GEICO汽车保险免于破产的命运时出了不少力，之后我们看到他好几次引导客户免于愚蠢的交易，虽然这使得所罗门因此损失许多顾问费收入，这种以客户服务至上的表现在华尔街并不多见。
What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and integrity of John Gutfreund； CEO of Salomon Inc。 Charlie and I like； admire and trust John。 We first got to know him in 1976 when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near…bankruptcy。 Several times since； we have seen John steer clients away from transactions that would have been unwise； but that the client clearly wanted to make … even though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee。 Such service…above…self behavior is far from automatic in Wall Street。
如同查理在50页上所陈述的理由，截至年底我们将在所罗门公司的投资价值定在面额的98％，大约比我们的投资成本少1；400万，不过我们仍然相信这家公司在高品质资本筹募与市场创造营运，将可为我们的投资创造不错的盈余，若果真如此，我们可转换为股权的权利将会非常有价值。
For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50； at yearend we valued our Salomon investment at 98％ of par； 14 million less than our cost。 However； we believe there is a reasonable likelihood that a leading； high…quality capital…raising and market…making operation can average good returns on equity。 If so； our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable。
最后关于我们有价证券的投资再补充两点，第一照例我还是给诸位一个提醒，相较于去年底的持股内容，我们现在的投资组合又有变动，而且在没有知会大家的情况下，还会继续变动。
Two further ments about our investments in marketable securities are appropriate。 First； we