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ces to investors。 But before we tackle that subject； let's travel back to Eden； to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten。
去年我们与其它公司所发行的类似债券（尤其是Loews与摩托罗拉公司），与这几年盛行的零息债券有相当大的差异，对于后者，查理跟我一直有相当的意见，后面我会再详加说明，我们认为这些债券隐藏着欺骗行为，对买下他们的投资人有相当不利的影响，不过在谈论这个话题之前，让我们回溯时光到亚当还未引诱夏娃啃下苹果之前的时代。
If you're my age you bought your first zero…coupon bonds during World War II； by purchasing the famous Series E U。 S。 Savings Bond； the most widely…sold bond issue in history。 （After the war； these bonds were held by one out of two U。 S。 households。） Nobody； of course； called the Series E a zero…coupon bond； a term in fact that I doubt had been invented。 But that's precisely what the Series E was。
如果你像我这样的年纪曾在二次世界大战期间第一次买进最有名的E系列美国储蓄零息债券，（这种广为流传的债券几乎每两个家庭最会有人持有），当然在当时没有人会把它当作是零息债券的一种，因为这名词根本就还未出现，但基本上它就是一种零息债券。
These bonds came in denominations as small as 18。75。 That amount purchased a 25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years； terms that gave the buyer a pounded annual return of 2。9％。 At the time； this was an attractive offer： the 2。9％ rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market…fluctuation risk； since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest。
这种债券的面额最小的只有18。75美元，买下10年后美国政府必须偿还25美元，投资人大概可以获得2。9％的年投资报酬率，在当时这是相当不错的一项投资，2。9％的年利率远高于普通的政府债券利率，且持有人不必担心利率波动的风险，而且他可以随时予以变现，利息不会被打折太多。
A second form of zero…coupon U。 S。 Treasury issue； also benign and useful； surfaced in the last decade。 One problem with a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate … say 10％ … the holder cannot be assured that a pounded 10％ return will be realized。 For that rate to materialize； each semi…annual coupon must be reinvested at 10％ as it is received。 If current interest rates are； say； only 6％ or 7％ when these coupons e due； the holder will be unable to pound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate。 For pension funds or other investors with long…term liabilities； 〃reinvestment risk〃 of this type can be a serious problem。 Savings Bonds might have solved it； except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations。 What big buyers needed was huge quantities of 〃Savings Bond Equivalents。〃
第二种形式的美国国库零息债券出现在十几年前，也相当的不错，一般的债券有一个很大的问题，那就是虽然它的票面是10％，但持有人却不一定能够保证就能得到10％的报酬率，因为要能获得10％的话就必须所收到的10％利息收入也能再运用投资也能得到10％以上才行，若是所得的利息之后只能得到6％或7％的报酬，则最后结算的报酬率可能没有办法达到10％的预定利率，这对于退休基金或是其它具有长期负债的投资者来说，再投资所可能遇到的风险可能是一个很严重的问题，储蓄债券则可以解决这样的问题，只可惜它只能发行给个人而且面额都不大，对于大买家来说，它们需要的是类似这种储蓄债券的替代品。
Enter some ingenious and； in this case； highly useful investment bankers （led； I'm happy to say； by Salomon Brothers）。 They created the instrument desired by 〃stripping〃 the semi…annual coupons from standard Government issues。 Each coupon； once detached； takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future。 For example； if you strip the 40 semi…annual coupons from a U。 S。 Government Bond due in the year 2010； you will have 40 zero…coupon bonds； with maturities from six months to 20 years； each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed。 If current interest rates are； say； 10％ for all maturities； the six…month issue will sell for 95。24％ of maturity value and the 20…year issue will sell for 14。20％。 The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a pounded rate of 10％ for his entire holding period。 Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years； as long…term investors； ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts； recognized these high…grade； zero…coupon issues to be well suited to their needs。
这时创意十足的银行家就适时出现了，（我很高兴的向各位报告那就是所罗门兄弟公司），它们从标准的政府债券中，分拆出大家所想要的零息债券，每一张债券都跟储蓄债券一样，在未来的某一天到期后可以拿回完整的一笔钱，举例来说如果你可以将20年期每半年付息的债券，分拆成40张到期日分别为半年到20年不等的零息债券，之后再将到期日相同的债券并起来对外出售，假设现行的殖利率为10％，半年期的价格大概是95。24％，20年期的则只有14。20％，如此一来所有购买这种债券的投资者就可以明确的确保它可以获得的报酬率，分拆债券这几年因符合长期的退休基金与个人的IRA帐户投资者需求，广受欢迎而大量流行。
But as happens in Wall Street all too often； what the wise do in the beginning； fools do in the end。 In the last few years zero…coupon bonds （and their functional equivalent； pay…in…kind bonds； which distribute additional PIK bonds semi…annually as interest instead of paying cash） have been issued in enormous quantities by ever…junkier credits。 To these issuers； zero （or PIK） bonds offer one overwhelming advantage： It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing。 Indeed； if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long…term zero…coupon obligations； they would now have a spotless record as debtors。
但就像是华尔街经常会发生的，不管什么好东西到最后都会变质，最近几年来零息债券（以及功能类似的pay…in…kind债券，只发放PIK债券取代现金），有一大部份是垃圾债券等级，对这些发行公司来说，零息债券有一个很大的好处，因为在发行后直到到期日前根本就不必付出任何资金所以根本就不有无法偿付的情况，事实上，LDC政府在1970年后除了长期零息债券之外就没有发行过其它债券，所以就一个债务人来说，它们到现在还拥有完美无暇的记录。
This principle at work … that you need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time … has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to finance ever…shakier deals。 But its acceptance by lenders took a while： When the leveraged buy…out craze began some years back； purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis； in which conservatively…estimated free cash flow … that is； operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures … was adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt。
这原则实在是管用，你大可以正经八百的说你一定不会还不出钱，原因是因为你有好长一段时间可以不必支付一毛钱，直到支持者与投资银行家再发明出更刺激的融资方式之前，不过债权人也要花好长一段时间才能支持这种做法，当融资购并热开始风行的几年之前，投资者只能借到一点钱，因为债权人会保守地估计其未来的现金流量，亦即营业收益加计折旧与摊销再扣除资本支出，必须要能够确保未来的利息支出与本金的支付。
Later； as the adrenalin of deal…makers surged； businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest。 That left nothing for the paydown of debt。 In effect； a Scarlett O'Hara 〃I'll think about it tomorrow〃 position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a ne