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freedom； and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in and
consequently the consequently belong to the beings in the world of
intelligence； yet on the other side as events in the world of sense
they belong to phenomena； hence the determinations of a practical
reason are only possible in reference to the latter and； therefore； in
accordance with the categories of the understanding； not indeed with a
view to any theoretic employment of it； i。e。； so as to bring the
manifold of （sensible） intuition under one consciousness a priori； but
only to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of
consciousness of a practical reason； giving it mands in the moral
law； i。e。； to a pure will a priori。
These categories of freedom… for so we choose to call them in
contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of
physical nature… have an obvious advantage over the latter； inasmuch
as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in
an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible
intuition； the former； on the contrary； refer to the determination
of a free elective will （to which indeed no exactly corresponding
intuition can be assigned； but which has as its foundation a pure
practical a priori law； which is not the case with any concepts
belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties）； hence；
instead of the form of intuition （space and time）； which does not
lie in reason itself； but has to be drawn from another source； namely；
the sensibility； these being elementary practical concepts have as
their foundation the form of a pure will； which is given in reason
and； therefore； in the thinking faculty itself。 From this it happens
that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the
determination of the will； not with the physical conditions （of
practical ability） of the execution of one's purpose； the practical
a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom
are at once cognitions； and have not to wait for intuitions in order
to acquire significance； and that for this remarkable reason；
because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they
refer （the intention of the will）； which is not the case with
theoretical concepts。 Only we must be careful to observe that these
categories only apply to the practical reason； and thus they proceed
in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions
and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible
conditions and determined merely by the moral law。
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
and Evil。
I。 QUANTITY。
Subjective； according to maxims （practical opinions of the
individual）
Objective； according to principles （Precepts）
A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom
（laws）
II。 QUALITY。
Practical rules of action （praeceptivae）
Practical rules of omission （prohibitivae）
Practical rules of exceptions （exceptivae）
III。 RELATION。
To personality To the condition of the person。
Reciprocal； of one person to the others of the others。
IV。 MODALITY。
The Permitted and the Forbidden
Duty and the contrary to duty。
Perfect and imperfect duty。
It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered
as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of
determination； in regard to actions possible by it； which are
phenomena in the world of sense； and that consequently it is
referred to the categories which concern its physical possibility；
whilst yet each category is taken so universally that the
determining principle of that causality can be placed outside the
world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of
intelligence； and finally the categories of modality introduce the
transition from practical principles generally to those of morality；
but only problematically。 These can be established dogmatically only
by the moral law。
I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table；
since it is intelligible enough of itself。 A division of this kind
based on principles is very useful in any science； both for the sake
of thoroughness and intelligibility。 Thus； for instance； we know
from the preceding table and its first number what we must begin
from in practical inquiries； namely； from the maxims which every one
founds on his own inclinations； the precepts which hold for a
species of rational beings so far as they agree in certain
inclinations； and finally the law which holds for all without regard
to their inclinations； etc。 In this way we survey the whole plan of
what has to be done； every question of practical philosophy that has
to be answered； and also the order that is to be followed。
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement。
It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of
the will。 They themselves； however； are subject to a practical rule of
reason which； if it is pure reason； determines the will a priori
relatively to its object。 Now； whether an action which is possible
to us in the world of sense； es under the rule or not； is a
question to be decided by the practical judgement； by which what is
said in the rule universally （in abstracto） is applied to an action in
concreto。 But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place
as practical concerns the existence of an object； and in the second
place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as
regards the existence of the action and； therefore； is a practical
law； not a physical law depending on empirical principles of
determination； but a law of freedom by which the will is to be
determined independently on anything empirical （merely by the
conception of a law and its form）； whereas all instances that can
occur of possible actions can only be empirical； that is； belong to
the experience of physical nature； hence； it seems absurd to expect to
find in the world of sense a case which； while as such it depends only
on the law of nature； yet admits of the application to it of a law
of freedom； and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the
morally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto。 Thus； the
judgement of the pure practical reason is subject to the same
difficulties as that of the pure theoretical reason。 The latter；
however； had means at hand of escaping from these difficulties；
because； in regard to the theoretical employment； intuitions were
required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied；
and such intuitions （though only of objects of the senses） can be
given a priori and； therefore； as far as regards the union of the
manifold in them； conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the
understanding as schemata。 On the other hand； the morally good is
something whose object is supersensible； for which； therefore； nothing
corresponding can be found in any sensible intuition。 Judgement
depending on laws of pure practical reason seems； therefore； to be
subject to special difficulties arising fr