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subject to special difficulties arising from this； that a law of
freedom is to be applied to actions； which are events taking place
in the world of sense； and which； so far； belong to physical nature。
But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure
practical judgement。 When I subsume under a pure practical law an
action possible to me in the world of sense； I am not concerned with
the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense。
This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its
theoretic use according to the law of causality； which is a pure
concept of the understanding； for which reason has a schema in the
sensible intuition。 Physical causality； or the condition under which
it takes place； belongs to the physical concepts； the schema of
which is sketched by transcendental imagination。 Here； however； we
have to do； not with the schema of a case that occurs according to
laws； but with the schema of a law itself （if the word is allowable
here）； since the fact that the will （not the action relatively to
its effect） is determined by the law alone without any other
principle； connects the notion of causality with quite different
conditions from those which constitute physical connection。
The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible
intuition； as such； are subject； must have a schema corresponding to
it… that is； a general procedure of the imagination （by which it
exhibits a priori to the senses the pure concept of the
understanding which the law determines）。 But the law of freedom
（that is； of a causality not subject to sensible conditions）； and
consequently the concept of the unconditionally good； cannot have
any intuition； nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the
purpose of its application in concreto。 Consequently the moral law has
no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical
objects （not the imagination）； and the understanding for the
purposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason； not a
schema of the sensibility； but a law； though only as to its form as
law； such a law； however； as can be exhibited in concreto in objects
of the senses； and therefore a law of nature。 We can therefore call
this law the type of the moral law。
The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason
is this： ask yourself whether； if the action you propose were to
take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself
a part； you could regard it as possible by your own will。 Everyone
does； in fact； decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or
evil。 Thus； people say： 〃If everyone permitted himself to deceive；
when he thought it to his advantage； or thought himself justified in
shortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it； or
looked with perfect indifference on the necessity of others； and if
you belonged to such an order of things； would you do so with the
assent of your own will？〃 Now everyone knows well that if he
secretly allows himself to deceive； it does not follow that everyone
else does so； or if； unobserved； he is destitute of passion； others
would not necessarily be so to him； hence； this parison of the
maxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the
determining principle of his will。 Such a law is； nevertheless； a type
of the estimation of the maxim on moral principles。 If the maxim of
the action is not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal
law of nature； then it is morally impossible。 This is the judgement
even of mon sense； for its ordinary judgements； even those of
experience； are always based on the law of nature。 It has it therefore
always at hand； only that in cases where causality from freedom is
to be criticised； it makes that law of nature only the type of a law
of freedom； because； without something which it could use as an
example in a case of experience； it could not give the law of a pure
practical reason its proper use in practice。
It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as
the type of a supersensible system of things； provided I do not
transfer to the latter the intuitions； and what depends on them； but
merely apply to it the form of law in general （the notion of which
occurs even in the monest use of reason； but cannot be definitely
known a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of
reason）； for laws； as such； are so far identical； no matter from
what they derive their determining principles。
Further； since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing ＇is
known＇ except freedom （through the moral law）； and this only so far as
it is inseparably implied in that law； and moreover all
supersensible objects to which reason might lead us； following the
guidance of that law； have still no reality for us； except for the
purpose of that law； and for the use of mere practical reason； and
as reason is authorized and even pelled to use physical nature
（in its pure form as an object of the understanding） as the type of
the judgement； hence； the present remark will serve to guard against
reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs only to the
typic of concepts。 This； namely； as a typic of the judgement； guards
against the empiricism of practical reason； which founds the practical
notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences （so…called
happiness）。 No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would
result from a will determined by self…love； if this will at the same
time erected itself into a universal law of nature； may certainly
serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good； but it is
not identical with it。 The same typic guards also against the
mysticism of practical reason； which turns what served only as a
symbol into a schema； that is； proposes to provide for the moral
concepts actual intuitions； which； however； are not sensible
（intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God）； and thus plunges into the
transcendent。 What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is
only the rationalism of the judgement； which takes from the sensible
system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive of itself；
that is； conformity to law； and transfers into the supersensible
nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by actions in
the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature。
However； the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much
more important； for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity
and sublimity of the moral law； and； besides； it is not very natural
or agreeable to mon habits of thought to strain one's imagination
to supersensible intuitions； and hence the danger on this side is
not so general。 Empiricism； on the contrary； cuts up at the roots
the morality of intentions （in which； and not in actions only；
consists the high worth that men can and ought to give to themselves）；
and substitutes for duty something quite different； namely； an
empirical interest； with which the inclinations generally are secretly
leagued； and empiricism； moreover； being on this account allied with
all the inclinations which （n