the six enneads-第105章

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emembered　from　before。　　　　　But　what　prevents　such　a　being　＇from　possessing　memory　in　the　sense　of＇　perceiving；　without　variation　in　itself；　such　outside　changes　as；　for　example；　the　kosmic　periods？　　　　　Simply　the　fact　that　following　the　changes　of　the　revolving　kosmos　it　would　have　perception　of　earlier　and　later：　intuition　and　memory　are　distinct。　　　　　We　cannot　hold　its　self…intellections　to　be　acts　of　memory；　this　is　no　question　of　something　entering　from　without；　to　be　grasped　and　held　in　fear　of　an　escape；　if　its　intellections　could　slip　away　from　it　＇as　a　memory　might＇　its　very　Essence　＇as　the　Hypostasis　of　inherent　Intellection＇　would　be　in　peril。　　　　　For　the　same　reason　memory；　in　the　current　sense；　cannot　be　attributed　to　the　soul　in　connection　with　the　ideas　inherent　in　its　essence：　these　it　holds　not　as　a　memory　but　as　a　possession；　though；　by　its　very　entrance　into　this　sphere；　they　are　no　longer　the　mainstay　of　its　Act。　　　　　The　Soul…action　which　is　to　be　observed　seems　to　have　induced　the　Ancients　to　ascribe　memory；　and　〃Recollection；〃　＇the　Platonic　Anamnesis＇　to　souls　bringing　into　outward　manifestation　the　ideas　they　contain：　we　see　at　once　that　the　memory　here　indicated　is　another　kind；　it　is　a　memory　outside　of　time。　　　　　But；　perhaps；　this　is　treating　too　summarily　a　matter　which　demands　minute　investigation。　It　might　be　doubted　whether　that　recollection；　that　memory；　really　belongs　to　the　highest　soul　and　not　rather　to　another；　a　dimmer；　or　even　to　the　Couplement；　the　Living…Being。　And　if　to　that　dimmer　soul；　when　and　how　has　it　come　to　be　present；　if　to　the　Couplement；　again　when　and　how？　　　　　We　are　driven　thus　to　enquire　into　these　several　points：　in　which　of　the　constituents　of　our　nature　is　memory　vested…　the　question　with　which　we　started…　if　in　the　soul；　then　in　what　power　or　part；　if　in　the　Animate　or　Couplement…　which　has　been　supposed；　similarly　to　be　the　seat　of　sensation…　then　by　what　mode　it　is　present；　and　how　we　are　to　define　the　Couplement；　finally　whether　sensation　and　intellectual　acts　may　be　ascribed　to　one　and　the　same　agent；　or　imply　two　distinct　principles。　　　　　26。　Now　if　sensations　of　the　active　order　depend　upon　the　Couplement　of　soul　and　body；　sensation　must　be　of　that　double　nature。　Hence　it　is　classed　as　one　of　the　shared　acts：　the　soul；　in　the　feeling；　may　be　compared　to　the　workman　in　such　operations　as　boring　or　weaving；　the　body　to　the　tool　employed：　the　body　is　passive　and　menial；　the　soul　is　active；　reading　such　impressions　as　are　made　upon　the　body　or　discerned　by　means　of　the　body；　perhaps　entertaining　only　a　judgement　formed　as　the　result　of　the　bodily　experiences。　　　　　In　such　a　process　it　is　at　once　clear　that　the　sensation　is　a　shared　task；　but　the　memory　is　not　thus　made　over　to　the　Couplement；　since　the　soul　has　from　the　first　taken　over　the　impression；　either　to　retain　or　to　reject。　　　　　It　might　be　ventured　that　memory；　no　less　than　sensation；　is　a　function　of　the　Couplement；　on　the　ground　that　bodily　constitution　determines　our　memories　good　or　bad；　but　the　answer　would　come　that；　whether　the　body　happens　or　not　to　be　a　hindrance；　the　act　of　remembering　would　still　be　an　act　of　the　soul。　And　in　the　case　of　matters　learned　＇and　not　merely　felt；　as　corporeal　experiences＇；　how　can　we　think　of　the　Couplement　of　soul　and　body　as　the　remembering　principle？　Here；　surely；　it　must　be　soul　alone？　　　　　We　may　be　told　that　the　living…being　is　a　Couplement　in　the　sense　of　something　entirely　distinct　formed　from　the　two　elements　＇so　that　it　might　have　memory　though　neither　soul　nor　body　had　it＇。　But；　to　begin　with；　it　is　absurd　to　class　the　living…being　as　neither　body　nor　soul；　these　two　things　cannot　so　change　as　to　make　a　distinct　third；　nor　can　they　blend　so　utterly　that　the　soul　shall　become　a　mere　faculty　of　the　animate　whole。　And；　further；　supposing　they　could　so　blend；　memory　would　still　be　due　to　the　soul　just　as　in　honey…wine　all　the　sweetness　will　be　due　to　the　honey。　　　　　It　may　be　suggested　the　while　the　soul　is　perhaps　not　in　itself　a　remembering　principle；　yet　that；　having　lost　its　purity　and　acquired　some　degree　of　modification　by　its　presence　in　body；　it　becomes　capable　of　reproducing　the　imprints　of　sensible　objects　and　experiences；　and　that；　seated；　as　roughly　speaking　it　is；　within　the　body；　it　may　reasonably　be　thought　capable　of　accepting　such　impressions；　and　in　such　a　manner　as　to　retain　them　＇thus　in　some　sense　possessing　memory＇。　　　　　But；　to　begin　with；　these　imprints　are　not　magnitudes　＇are　not　of　corporeal　nature　at　all＇；　there　is　no　resemblance　to　seal　impressions；　no　stamping　of　a　resistant　matter；　for　there　is　neither　the　down…thrust　＇as　of　the　seal＇　nor　＇the　acceptance＇　as　in　the　wax：　the　process　is　entirely　of　the　intellect；　though　exercised　upon　things　of　sense；　and　what　kind　of　resistance　＇or　other　physical　action＇　can　be　affirmed　in　matters　of　the　intellectual　order；　or　what　need　can　there　be　of　body　or　bodily　quality　as　a　means？　　　　　Further　there　is　one　order　of　which　the　memory　must　obviously　belong　to　the　soul；　it　alone　can　remember　its　own　movements；　for　example　its　desires　and　those　frustrations　of　desire　in　which　the　coveted　thing　never　came　to　the　body：　the　body　can　have　nothing　to　tell　about　things　which　never　approached　it；　and　the　soul　cannot　use　the　body　as　a　means　to　the　remembrance　of　what　the　body　by　its　nature　cannot　know。　　　　　If　the　soul　is　to　have　any　significance…　to　be　a　definite　principle　with　a　function　of　its　own…　we　are　forced　to　recognize　two　orders　of　fact；　an　order　in　which　the　body　is　a　means　but　all　culminates　in　soul；　and　an　order　which　is　of　the　soul　alone。　This　being　admitted；　aspiration　will　belong　to　soul；　and　so；　as　a　consequence；　will　that　memory　of　the　aspiration　and　of　its　attainment　or　frustration；　without　which　the　soul's　nature　would　fall　into　the　category　of　the　unstable　＇that　is　to　say　of　the　undivine；　unreal＇。　Deny　this　character　of　the　soul　and　at　once　we　refuse　it　perception；　consciousness；　any　power　of　comparison；　almost　any　understanding。　Yet　these　powers　of　which；　embodied　it　becomes　the　source　cannot　be　absent　from　its　own　nature。　On　the　contrary；　it　possesses　certain　activities　to　be　expressed　in　various　functions　whose　accomplishment　demands　bodily　organs；　at　its　entry　it　brings　with　it　＇as　vested　in　itself　alone＇　the　powers　necessary　for　some　of　these　functions；　while　in　the　case　of　others　it　brings　the　very　activities　themselves。　　　　　Memory；　in　point　of　fact；　is　impeded　by　the　body：　even　as　things　are；　addition　often　brings　forgetfulness；　with　thinning　and　dearing　away；　memory　will　often　revive。　The　soul　is　a　stability；　the　shifting　and　fleeting　thing　which　body　is　can　be　a　cause　only　of　its　forgetting　not　of　its　remembering…　Lethe　stream　may　be　understood　in　this　sense…　and　memory　is　a　fact　of　the　soul。　　　　　27。　But　of　what　soul；　of　that　which　we　envisage　as　the　more　divine；　by　which　we　are　human　beings；　or　that　other　which　springs　from　the　All？　　　　　Memory　must　be　admitted　in　both　of　these；　personal　memories　and　shared　memories；　and　when　the　two　souls　are　together；　the　memories　also　are　as　one；　when　they　stand　apart；　assuming　that　both　exist　and　endure；　each　soon　for　gets　the　other's　affairs；　retaining