the six enneads-第106章

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　stand　apart；　assuming　that　both　exist　and　endure；　each　soon　for　gets　the　other's　affairs；　retaining　for　a　longer　time　its　own。　Thus　it　is　that　the　Shade　of　Hercules　in　the　lower　regions…　this　〃Shade；〃　as　I　take　it；　being　the　characteristically　human　part…　remembers　all　the　action　and　experience　of　the　life；　since　that　career　was　mainly　of　the　hero's　personal　shaping；　the　other　souls　＇soulphases＇　going　to　constitute　the　joint…being　could；　for　all　their　different　standing；　have　nothing　to　recount　but　the　events　of　that　same　life；　doings　which　they　knew　from　the　time　of　their　association：　perhaps　they　would　add　also　some　moral　judgement。　　　　　What　the　Hercules　standing　outside　the　Shade　spoke　of　we　are　not　told：　what　can　we　think　that　other；　the　freed　and　isolated；　soul　would　recount？　　　　　The　soul；　still　a　dragged　captive；　will　tell　of　all　the　man　did　and　felt；　but　upon　death　there　will　appear；　as　time　passes；　memories　of　the　lives　lived　before；　some　of　the　events　of　the　most　recent　life　being　dismissed　as　trivial。　As　it　grows　away　from　the　body；　it　will　revive　things　forgotten　in　the　corporeal　state；　and　if　it　passes　in　and　out　of　one　body　after　another；　it　will　tell　over　the　events　of　the　discarded　life；　it　will　treat　as　present　that　which　it　has　just　left；　and　it　will　remember　much　from　the　former　existence。　But　with　lapse　of　time　it　will　come　to　forgetfulness　of　many　things　that　were　mere　accretion。　　　　　Then　free　and　alone　at　last；　what　will　it　have　to　remember？　　　　　The　answer　to　that　question　depends　on　our　discovering　in　what　faculty　of　the　soul　memory　resides。　　　　　28。　Is　memory　vested　in　the　faculty　by　which　we　perceive　and　learn？　Or　does　it　reside　in　the　faculty　by　which　we　set　things　before　our　minds　as　objects　of　desire　or　of　anger；　the　passionate　faculty？　　　　　This　will　be　maintained　on　the　ground　that　there　could　scarcely　be　both　a　first　faculty　in　direct　action　and　a　second　to　remember　what　that　first　experiences。　It　is　certain　that　the　desiring　faculty　is　apt　to　be　stirred　by　what　it　has　once　enjoyed；　the　object　presents　itself　again；　evidently；　memory　is　at　work；　why　else；　the　same　object　with　the　same　attraction？　　　　　But；　at　that；　we　might　reasonably　ascribe　to　the　desiring　faculty　the　very　perception　of　the　desired　objects　and　then　the　desire　itself　to　the　perceptive　faculty；　and　so　on　all　through；　and　in　the　end　conclude　that　the　distinctive　names　merely　indicate　the　function　which　happens　to　be　uppermost。　　　　　Yet　the　perception　is　very　different　from　faculty　to　faculty；　certainly　it　is　sight　and　not　desire　that　sees　the　object；　desire　is　stirred　merely　as　a　result　of　the　seeing；　by　a　transmission；　its　act　is　not　in　the　nature　of　an　identification　of　an　object　seen；　all　is　simply　blind　response　＇automatic　reaction＇。　Similarly　with　rage；　sight　reveals　the　offender　and　the　passion　leaps；　we　may　think　of　a　shepherd　seeing　a　wolf　at　his　flock；　and　a　dog；　seeing　nothing；　who　springs　to　the　scent　or　the　sound。　　　　　In　other　words　the　desiring　faculty　has　had　the　emotion；　but　the　trace　it　keeps　of　the　event　is　not　a　memory；　it　is　a　condition；　something　passively　accepted：　there　is　another　faculty　that　was　aware　of　the　enjoyment　and　retains　the　memory　of　what　has　happened。　This　is　confirmed　by　the　fact　that　many　satisfactions　which　the　desiring　faculty　has　enjoyed　are　not　retained　in　the　memory：　if　memory　resided　in　the　desiring　faculty；　such　forgetfulness　could　not　be。　　　　　29。　Are　we；　then；　to　refer　memory　to　the　perceptive　faculty　and　so　make　one　principle　of　our　nature　the　seat　of　both　awareness　and　remembrance？　　　　　Now　supposing　the　very　Shade；　as　we　were　saying　in　the　case　of　Hercules；　has　memory；　then　the　perceptive　faculty　is　twofold。　　　　　＇（And　if　（on　the　same　supposition）　the　faculty　that　remembers　is　not　the　faculty　that　perceives；　but　some　other　thing；　then　the　remembering　faculty　is　twofold。＇　　　　　And　further　if　the　perceptive　faculty　＇=　the　memory＇　deals　with　matters　learned　＇as　well　as　with　matters　of　observation　and　feeling＇　it　will　be　the　faculty　for　the　processes　of　reason　also：　but　these　two　orders　certainly　require　two　separate　faculties。　　　　　Must　we　then　suppose　a　common　faculty　of　apprehension　＇one　covering　both　sense　perceptions　and　ideas＇　and　assign　memory　in　both　orders　to　this？　　　　　The　solution　might　serve　if　there　were　one　and　the　same　percipient　for　objects　of　sense　and　objects　of　the　Intellectual…Kind；　but　if　these　stand　in　definite　duality；　then；　for　all　we　can　say　or　do；　we　are　left　with　two　separate　principles　of　memory；　and；　supposing　each　of　the　two　orders　of　soul　to　possess　both　principles；　then　we　have　four。　　　　　And；　on　general　grounds；　what　compelling　reason　is　there　that　the　principle　by　which　we　perceive　should　be　the　principle　by　which　we　remember；　that　these　two　acts　should　be　vested　in　the　one　faculty？　Why　must　the　seat　of　our　intellectual　action　be　also　the　seat　of　our　remembrance　of　that　action？　The　most　powerful　thought　does　not　always　go　with　the　readiest　memory；　people　of　equal　perception　are　not　equally　good　at　remembering；　some　are　especially　gifted　in　perception；　others；　never　swift　to　grasp；　are　strong　to　retain。　　　　　But；　once　more；　admitting　two　distinct　principles；　something　quite　separate　remembering　what　sense…perception　has　first　known…　still　this　something　must　have　felt　what　it　is　required　to　remember？　　　　　No；　we　may　well　conceive　that　where　there　is　to　be　memory　of　a　sense…perception；　this　perception　becomes　a　mere　presentment；　and　that　to　this　image…grasping　power；　a　distinct　thing；　belongs　the　memory；　the　retention　of　the　object：　for　in　this　imaging　faculty　the　perception　culminates；　the　impression　passes　away　but　the　vision　remains　present　to　the　imagination。　　　　　By　the　fact　of　harbouring　the　presentment　of　an　object　that　has　disappeared；　the　imagination　is；　at　once；　a　seat　of　memory：　where　the　persistence　of　the　image　is　brief；　the　memory　is　poor；　people　of　powerful　memory　are　those　in　whom　the　image…holding　power　is　firmer；　not　easily　allowing　the　record　to　be　jostled　out　of　its　grip。　　　　　Remembrance；　thus；　is　vested　in　the　imaging　faculty；　and　memory　deals　with　images。　Its　differing　quality　or　degree　from　man　to　man；　we　would　explain　by　difference　or　similarity　in　the　strength　of　the　individual　powers；　by　conduct　like　or　unlike；　by　bodily　conditions　present　or　absent；　producing　change　and　disorder　or　not…　a　point　this；　however；　which　need　not　detain　us　here。　　　　　30。　But　what　of　the　memory　of　mental　acts：　do　these　also　fall　under　the　imaging　faculty？　　　　　If　every　mental　act　is　accompanied　by　an　image　we　may　well　believe　that　this　image；　fixed　and　like　a　picture　of　the　thought；　would　explain　how　we　remember　the　object　of　knowledge　once　entertained。　But　if　there　is　no　such　necessary　image；　another　solution　must　be　sought。　Perhaps　memory　would　be　the　reception；　into　the　image…taking　faculty；　of　the　Reason…Principle　which　accompanies　the　mental　conception：　this　mental　conception…　an　indivisible　thing；　and　one　that　never　rises　to　the　exterior　of　the　consciousness…　lies　unknown　below；　the　Reason…Principle　the　revealer；　the　bridge　between　the　concept　and　the　image…taking　faculty　exhibits　the　concept　as　in　a　mirror；　the　apprehension　by　the　image…taking　faculty　would　thus　co