the six enneads-第132章

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onverging　from　every　point　of　occurrence　will　be　as　lines　striking　from　a　circumference　to　what　will　be　a　true　centre　of　perception　as　being　a　veritable　unity。　　　　　If　this　centre　were　to　break　into　separate　points…　so　that　the　sense…impressions　fell　upon　the　two　ends　of　a　line…　then；　either　it　must　reknit　itself　to　unity　and　identity；　perhaps　at　the　mid…point　of　the　line；　or　all　remains　unrelated；　every　end　receiving　the　report　of　its　particular　field　exactly　as　you　and　I　have　our　distinct　sense　experiences。　　　　　Suppose　the　sense…object　be　such　a　unity　as　a　face：　all　the　points　of　observation　must　be　brought　together　in　one　visual　total；　as　is　obvious　since　there　could　be　no　panorama　of　great　expanses　unless　the　detail　were　compressed　to　the　capacity　of　the　pupils。　　　　　Much　more　must　this　be　true　in　the　case　of　thoughts；　partless　entities　as　they　are；　impinging　upon　the　centre　of　consciousness　which　＇to　receive　them＇　must　itself　be　void　of　part。　　　　　Either　this　or；　supposing　the　centre　of　consciousness　to　be　a　thing　of　quantity　and　extension；　the　sensible　object　will　coincide　with　it　point　by　point　of　their　co…expansion　so　that　any　given　point　in　the　faculty　will　perceive　solely　what　coincides　with　it　in　the　object：　and　thus　nothing　in　us　could　perceive　any　thing　as　a　whole。　　　　　This　cannot　be：　the　faculty　entire　must　be　a　unity；　no　such　dividing　is　possible；　this　is　no　matter　in　which　we　can　think　of　equal　sections　coinciding；　the　centre　of　consciousness　has　no　such　relation　of　equality　with　any　sensible　object。　The　only　possible　ratio　of　divisibility　would　be　that　of　the　number　of　diverse　elements　in　the　impinging　sensation：　are　we　then　to　suppose　that　each　part　of　the　soul；　and　every　part　of　each　part；　will　have　perception？　Or　will　the　part　of　the　parts　have　none？　That　is　impossible：　every　part；　then；　has　perception；　the　＇hypothetical＇　magnitude；　of　soul　and　each　part　of　soul；　is　infinitely　divisible；　there　will　therefore　be　in　each　part　an　infinite　number　of　perceptions　of　the　object；　and　therefore　an　infinitude　of　representations　of　it　at　our　centre　of　consciousness。　　　　　If　the　sentient　be　a　material　entity　sensation　could　only　be　of　the　order　of　seal…impressions　struck　by　a　ring　on　wax；　in　this　case　by　sensible　objects　on　the　blood　or　on　the　intervenient　air。　　　　　If；　at　this；　the　impression　is　like　one　made　in　liquids…　as　would　be　reasonable…　it　will　be　confused　and　wavering　as　upon　water；　and　there　can　be　no　memory。　If　the　impressions　are　permanent；　then　either　no　fresh　ones　can　be　stamped　upon　the　occupied　ground…　and　there　can　be　no　change　of　sensations…　or；　others　being　made；　the　former　will　be　obliterated；　and　all　record　of　the　past　is　done　away　with。　　　　　If　memory　implies　fresh　sensations　imposed　upon　former　ones；　the　earlier　not　barring　their　way；　the　soul　cannot　be　a　material　entity。　　　　　7。　We　come　to　the　same　result　by　examining　the　sense　of　pain。　We　say　there　is　pain　in　the　finger：　the　trouble　is　doubtless　in　the　finger；　but　our　opponents　must　admit　that　the　sensation　of　the　pain　is　in　the　centre　of　consciousness。　The　suffering　member　is　one　thing；　the　sense　of　suffering　is　another：　how　does　this　happen？　　　　　By　transmission；　they　will　say：　the　psychic　pneuma　＇=　the　semi…material　principle　of　life＇　stationed　at　the　finger　suffers　first；　and　stage　by　stage　the　trouble　is　passed　on　until　at　last　it　reaches　the　centre　of　consciousness。　　　　　But　on　this　theory；　there　must　be　a　sensation　in　the　spot　first　suffering　pain；　and　another　sensation　at　a　second　point　of　the　line　of　transmission；　another　in　the　third　and　so　on；　many　sensations；　in　fact　an　unlimited　series；　to　deal　with　one　pain；　and　at　the　last　moment　the　centre　of　consciousness　has　the　sensation　of　all　these　sensations　and　of　its　own　sensation　to　boot。　Or　to　be　exact；　these　serial　sensations　will　not　be　of　the　pain　in　the　finger：　the　sensation　next　in　succession　to　the　suffering　finger　will　be　of　pain　at　the　joint；　a　third　will　tell　of　a　pain　still　higher　up：　there　will　be　a　series　of　separate　pains：　The　centre　of　consciousness　will　not　feel　the　pain　seated　at　the　finger；　but　only　that　impinging　upon　itself：　it　will　know　this　alone；　ignore　the　rest　and　so　have　no　notion　that　the　finger　is　in　pain。　　　　　Thus：　Transmission　would　not　give　sensation　of　the　actual　condition　at　the　affected　spot：　it　is　not　in　the　nature　of　body　that　where　one　part　suffers　there　should　be　knowledge　in　another　part；　for　body　is　a　magnitude；　and　the　parts　of　every　magnitude　are　distinct　parts；　therefore　we　need；　as　the　sentient；　something　of　a　nature　to　be　identical　to　itself　at　any　and　every　spot；　this　property　can　belong　only　to　some　other　form　of　being　than　body。　　　　　8。　It　can　be　shown　also　that　the　intellectual　act　would　similarly　be　impossible　if　the　soul　were　any　form　of　body。　　　　　If　sensation　is　apprehension　by　means　of　the　soul's　employment　of　the　body；　intellection　cannot　be　a　similar　use　of　the　body　or　it　would　be　identical　with　sensation。　If　then　intellection　is　apprehension　apart　from　body；　much　more　must　there　be　a　distinction　between　the　body　and　the　intellective　principle：　sensation　for　objects　of　sense；　intellection　for　the　intellectual　object。　And　even　if　this　be　rejected；　it　must　still　be　admitted　that　there　do　exist　intellections　of　intellectual　objects　and　perceptions　of　objects　not　possessing　magnitude：　how；　we　may　then　ask；　can　a　thing　of　magnitude　know　a　thing　that　has　no　magnitude；　or　how　can　the　partless　be　known　by　means　of　what　has　parts？　We　will　be　told　〃By　some　partless　part。〃　But；　at　this；　the　intellective　will　not　be　body：　for　contact　does　not　need　a　whole；　one　point　suffices。　If　then　it　be　conceded…　and　it　cannot　be　denied…　that　the　primal　intellections　deal　with　objects　completely　incorporeal；　the　principle　of　intellection　itself　must　know　by　virtue　of　being；　or　becoming；　free　from　body。　Even　if　they　hold　that　all　intellection　deals　with　the　ideal　forms　in　Matter；　still　it　always　takes　place　by　abstraction　from　the　bodies　＇in　which　these　forms　appear＇　and　the　separating　agent　is　the　Intellectual…Principle。　For　assuredly　the　process　by　which　we　abstract　circle；　triangle；　line　or　point；　is　not　carried　through　by　the　aid　of　flesh　or　Matter　of　any　kind；　in　all　such　acts　the　soul　or　mind　must　separate　itself　from　the　material：　at　once　we　see　that　it　cannot　be　itself　material。　Similarly　it　will　be　agreed　that；　as　beauty　and　justice　are　things　without　magnitude；　so　must　be　the　intellective　act　that　grasps　them。　　　　　When　such　non…magnitudes　come　before　the　soul；　it　receives　them　by　means　of　its　partless　phase　and　they　will　take　position　there　in　partless　wise。　　　　　Again：　if　the　Soul　is　a　body；　how　can　we　account　for　its　virtues…　moral　excellence　＇Sophrosyne＇；　justice；　courage　and　so　forth？　All　these　could　be　only　some　kind　of　rarefied　body　＇pneuma＇；　or　blood　in　some　form；　or　we　might　see　courage　as　a　certain　resisting　power　in　that　pneuma；　moral　quality　would　be　its　happy　blending；　beauty　would　lie　wholly　in　the　agreeable　form　of　impressions　received；　such　comeliness　as　leads　us　to　describe　people　as　attractive　and　beautiful　from　their　bodily　appearance。　No　doubt　strength　and　grace　of　form　go　well　enough　with　the　idea　of　rarefied　body；　but　what　can　this　rarefied　b