the six enneads-第133章

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rength　and　grace　of　form　go　well　enough　with　the　idea　of　rarefied　body；　but　what　can　this　rarefied　body　want　with　moral　excellence？　On　the　contrary　its　interest　would　lie　in　being　comfortable　in　its　environments　and　contacts；　in　being　warmed　or　pleasantly　cool；　in　bringing　everything　smooth　and　caressing　and　soft　around　it：　what　could　it　care　about　a　just　distribution？　　　　　Then　consider　the　objects　of　the　soul's　contemplation；　virtue　and　the　other　Intellectual　forms　with　which　it　is　occupied；　are　these　eternal　or　are　we　to　think　that　virtue　rises　here　or　there；　helps；　then　perishes？　These　things　must　have　an　author　and　a　source　and　there；　again；　we　are　confronted　by　something　perdurable：　the　soul's　contemplation；　then；　must　be　of　the　eternal　and　unchanging；　like　the　concepts　of　geometry：　if　eternal　and　unchanging；　these　objects　are　not　bodies：　and　that　which　is　to　receive　them　must　be　of　equivalent　nature：　it　cannot　therefore　be　body；　since　all　body…nature　lacks　permanence；　is　a　thing　of　flux。　　　　　8。　A。　＇sometimes　appearing　as　9＇　There　are　those　who　insist　on　the　activities　observed　in　bodies…　warming；　chilling；　thrusting；　pressing…　and　class　soul　with　body；　as　it　were　to　assure　its　efficacy。　This　ignores　the　double　fact　that　the　very　bodies　themselves　exercise　such　efficiency　by　means　of　the　incorporeal　powers　operating　in　them；　and　that　these　are　not　the　powers　we　attribute　to　soul：　intellection；　perception；　reasoning；　desire；　wise　and　effective　action　in　all　regards；　these　point　to　a　very　different　form　of　being。　　　　　In　transferring　to　bodies　the　powers　of　the　unembodied；　this　school　leaves　nothing　to　that　higher　order。　And　yet　that　it　is　precisely　in　virtue　of　bodiless　powers　that　bodies　possess　their　efficiency　is　clear　from　certain　reflections：　　　　　It　will　be　admitted　that　quality　and　quantity　are　two　different　things；　that　body　is　always　a　thing　of　quantity　but　not　always　a　thing　of　quality：　matter　is　not　qualified。　This　admitted；　it　will　not　be　denied　that　quality；　being　a　different　thing　from　quantity；　is　a　different　thing　from　body。　Obviously　quality　could　not　be　body　when　it　has　not　quantity　as　all　body　must；　and；　again；　as　we　have　said；　body；　any　thing　of　mass；　on　being　reduced　to　fragments；　ceases　to　be　what　it　was；　but　the　quality　it　possessed　remains　intact　in　every　particle…　for　instance　the　sweetness　of　honey　is　still　sweetness　in　each　speck…　this　shows　that　sweetness　and　all　other　qualities　are　not　body。　　　　　Further：　if　the　powers　in　question　were　bodies；　then　necessarily　the　stronger　powers　would　be　large　masses　and　those　less　efficient　small　masses：　but　if　there　are　large　masses　with　small　while　not　a　few　of　the　smaller　masses　manifest　great　powers；　then　the　efficiency　must　be　vested　in　something　other　than　magnitude；　efficacy；　thus；　belongs　to　non…magnitude。　Again；　Matter；　they　tell　us；　remains　unchanged　as　long　as　it　is　body；　but　produces　variety　upon　accepting　qualities；　is　not　this　proof　enough　that　the　entrants　＇with　whose　arrival　the　changes　happen＇　are　Reason…Principles　and　not　of　the　bodily　order？　　　　　They　must　not　remind　us　that　when　pneuma　and　blood　are　no　longer　present；　animals　die：　these　are　necessary　no　doubt　to　life；　but　so　are　many　other　things　of　which　none　could　possibly　be　soul：　and　neither　pneuma　nor　blood　is　present　throughout　the　entire　being；　but　soul　is。　　　　　8。　B。　（10）　If　the　soul　is　body　and　permeates　the　entire　body…mass；　still　even　in　this　entire　permeation　the　blending　must　be　in　accord　with　what　occurs　in　all　cases　of　bodily　admixing。　　　　　Now：　if　in　the　admixing　of　bodies　neither　constituent　can　retain　its　efficacy；　the　soul　too　could　no　longer　be　effective　within　the　bodies；　it　could　but　be　latent；　it　will　have　lost　that　by　which　it　is　soul；　just　as　in　an　admixture　of　sweet　and　bitter　the　sweet　disappears：　we　have；　thus；　no　soul。　　　　　Two　bodies　＇i。e。；　by　hypothesis；　the　soul　and　the　human　body＇　are　blended；　each　entire　through　the　entirety　of　the　other；　where　the　one　is；　the　other　is　also；　each　occupies　an　equal　extension　and　each　the　whole　extension；　no　increase　of　size　has　been　caused　by　the　juncture：　the　one　body　thus　inblended　can　have　left　in　the　other　nothing　undivided。　This　is　no　case　of　mixing　in　the　sense　of　considerable　portions　alternating；　that　would　be　described　as　collocation；　no；　the　incoming　entity　goes　through　the　other　to　the　very　minutest　point…　an　impossibility；　of　course；　the　less　becoming　equal　to　the　greater；　still；　all　is　traversed　throughout　and　divided　throughout。　Now　if；　thus；　the　inblending　is　to　occur　point　by　point；　leaving　no　undivided　material　anywhere；　the　division　of　the　body　concerned　must　have　been　a　division　into　（geometrical）　points：　an　impossibility。　The　division　is　an　infinite　series…　any　material　particle　may　be　cut　in　two…　and　the　infinities　are　not　merely　potential；　they　are　actual。　　　　　Therefore　body　cannot　traverse　anything　as　a　whole　traversing　a　whole。　But　soul　does　this。　It　is　therefore　incorporeal。　　　　　8。　C。　（11）　We　come　to　the　theory　that　this　pneuma　is　an　earlier　form；　one　which　on　entering　the　cold　and　being　tempered　by　it　develops　into　soul　by　growing　finer　under　that　new　condition。　This　is　absurd　at　the　start；　since　many　living　beings　rise　in　warmth　and　have　a　soul　that　has　been　tempered　by　cold：　still　that　is　the　theory…　the　soul　has　an　earlier　form；　and　develops　its　true　nature　by　force　of　external　accidents。　Thus　these　teachers　make　the　inferior　precede　the　higher；　and　before　that　inferior　they　put　something　still　lower；　their　〃Habitude。〃　It　is　obvious　that　the　Intellectual…Principle　is　last　and　has　sprung　from　the　soul；　for；　if　it　were　first　of　all；　the　order　of　the　series　must　be；　second　the　soul；　then　the　nature…principle；　and　always　the　later　inferior；　as　the　system　actually　stands。　　　　　If　they　treat　God　as　they　do　the　Intellectual…Principle…　as　later；　engendered　and　deriving　intellection　from　without…　soul　and　intellect　and　God　may　prove　to　have　no　existence：　this　would　follow　if　a　potentiality　could　not　come　to　existence；　or　does　not　become　actual；　unless　the　corresponding　actuality　exists。　And　what　could　lead　it　onward　if　there　were　no　separate　being　in　previous　actuality？　Even　on　the　absurd　supposition　that　the　potentially　existent　brings　itself　to　actuality；　it　must　be　looking　to　some　Term；　and　that　must　be　no　potentiality　but　actual。　　　　　No　doubt　the　eternally　self…identical　may　have　potentiality　and　be　self…led　to　self…realization；　but　even　in　this　case　the　being　considered　as　actualized　is　of　higher　order　than　the　being　considered　as　merely　capable　of　actualization　and　moving　towards　a　desired　Term。　　　　　Thus　the　higher　is　the　earlier；　and　it　has　a　nature　other　than　body；　and　it　exists　always　in　actuality：　Intellectual…Principle　and　Soul　precede　Nature：　thus；　Soul　does　not　stand　at　the　level　of　pneuma　or　of　body。　　　　　These　arguments　are　sufficient　in　themselves；　though　many　others　have　been　framed；　to　show　that　the　soul　is　not　to　be　thought　of　as　a　body。　　　　　8。　D。　（12）　Soul　belongs；　then；　to　another　Nature：　What　is　this？　Is　it　something　which；　while　distinct　from　body；　still　belongs　to　it；　for　example　a　harmony　or　accord？　　　　　The　Pythagorean　school　holds　this　view　thinking　that　the　soul　is；　with　some　difference；　co