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the legislature； and in the management of public deputies；
appointed and inspected by the legislature？
36 What have we to fear from such a bank； which may not be as
well feared without it？
37 How； why； by what means； or for what end； should it become an
instrument of oppression？
38 Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we
are already？ Whether it be not in the power of any particular
person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign
parts？ or whether there can be any security in an estate of land
when the demands upon it are unknown？
39 Whether the establishing of a national bank； if we suppose a
concurrence of the government； be not very practicable？
40 But； whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable
and useful to the pubic； yet； if conceived to interfere with a
private interest； it be not forthwith in danger of appearing
doubtful； difficult； and impracticable？
41 Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power
to hurt； if they may be supposed capable of it； and whether a
bank would give them any new power？
42 What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself？
43 Whether； if the legislature destroyed the public； it would not
be felo de se； and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent on
its own destruction？
44 Whether the objection to a pubic national bank； from want of
secrecy； be not in truth an argument for it？
45 Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing
that renders them so hazardous？ and whether； without that； there
could have been of late so many sufferers？
46 Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent
to answer surmises？
47 Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be
against any proposal they could not turn into a job？
48 Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private
banker； and regularly visited his books； would not money lodged
in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure？
49 In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be
trusted； what security can there be for trusting any one else？
50 If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can find
cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers
are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited
value？
53 Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private
banks can be admitted as objections against a public one？
54 Whether that which is an objection to everything be an
objection to anything； and whether the possibility of an abuse be
not of that kind？
55 Whether； in fact； all things are not more or less abused； and
yet notwithstanding such abuse； whether many things are not upon
the whole expedient and useful？
56 Whether those things that are subject to the most general
inspection are not the least subject to abuse？
57 Whether； for private ends； it may not be sometimes expedient
to object novelty to things that have been often tried；
difficulty to the plainest things； and hazard to the safest？
58 Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question
was between money and credit； and not （as in fact it is） which
ought to be preferred； private credit or public credit？
59 Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt； or to
be feared； on one side？
60 Whether； therefore； those that would make an impartial
judgment ought not to be on their guard； keeping both prospects
always in view； balancing the inconveniencies on each side and
considering neither absolutely？
61 Whether wilful mistakes； examples without a likeness； and
general addresses to the passions are not often more successful
than arguments？
62 Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as
to explain obscure ones？
63 Whether private men are not often an over…match for the
public； want of weight being made up for by activity？
64 If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or
representatives； whether we are not already undone； and so have
nothing further to fear？
65 Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means
of a national bank； yet what should give them the will to do
this？ Or supposing a will to do mischief； yet how could a
national bank； modelled and administered by Parliament； put it in
their power？
66 Whether even a wicked will entrusted with power can be
supposed to abuse it for no end？
67 Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh
such objections do not believe them？
68 Whether it be not vain to object that our fellow…subjects of
Great Britain would malign or obstruct our industry when it is
exerted in a way which cannot interfere with their own？
69 Whether it is to be supposed they should take delight in the
dirt and nakedness and famine of our people； or envy them shoes
for their feet and beef for their belies？
70 What possible handle or inclination could our having a
national bank give other people to distress us？
71 Whether it be not ridiculous to conceive that a project for
cloathing and feeding our natives should give any umbrage to
England？
72 Whether such unworthy surmises are not the pure effect of
spleen？
78 Whether the Protestant colony in this kingdom can ever forget
what they owe to England？
79 Whether there ever was in any part of the world a country in
such wretched circumstances； and which； at the same time； could
be so easily remedied； and nevertheless the remedy not applied？
80 What must become of a people that can neither see the plainest
things nor do the easiest？
81 Be the money lodged in the bank what it will； yet whether an
Act to make good deficiencies would not remove all scruples？
82 If it be objected that a national bank must lower interest；
and therefore hurt the monied man； whether the same objection
would not hold as strong against multiplying our gold and silver？
83 But whether a bank that utters bills； with the sole view of
promoting the public weal； may not so proportion their quantity
as to avoid several inconveniencies which might attend private
banks？
85 Whether anything be more reasonable than that the pubic； which
makes the whole profit of the bank； should engage to make good
its credit？
88 Whether； in order to make men see and feel； it be not often
necessary to inculcate the same thing； and place it in different
lights？
90 Whether the managers and officers of a national bank ought to
be considered otherwise than as the cashiers and clerks of
private banks？ Whether they are not in effect as little trusted；
have as little power； are as much limited by rules； and as liable
to inspection？
91 Whether the mistaking this point may not create some prejudice
against a national bank； as if it depended on the credit； or
wisdom； or honesty； of private men； rather than on the pubic；
which is really the sole proprietor and director thereof； and as
such obliged to support it？
93 Whether a national bank would not be the great means and
motive for employing our poor in manufactures？
94 Whether money； though lent out only to the rich； would not
soon circulate among the poor？ And whether any man borrows but
with an intent to cir