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o render clear and to emphasise the contention that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals； great as it is； is one of degree and not of kind。 To this end Darwin not only recorded a large number of valuable observations of his own； and collected a considerable body of information from reliable sources； he presented the whole subject in a new light and showed that a natural history of mind might be written and that this method of study offered a wide and rich field for investigation。 Of course those who regarded the study of mind only as a branch of metaphysics smiled at the philosophical ineptitude of the mere man of science。 But the investigation； on natural history lines； has been prosecuted with a large measure of success。 Much indeed still remains to be done； for special training is required； and the workers are still few。 Promise for the future is however afforded by the fact that investigation is prosecuted on experimental lines and that something like organised methods of research are taking form。 There is now but little reliance on casual observations recorded by those who have not undergone the necessary discipline in these methods。 There is also some change of emphasis in formulating conclusions。 Now that the general evolutionary thesis is fully and freely accepted by those who carry on such researches； more stress is laid on the differentiation of the stages of evolutionary advance than on the fact of their underlying community of nature。 The conceptual intelligence which is especially characteristic of the higher mental procedure of man is more firmly distinguished from the perceptual intelligence which he shares with the lower animalsdistinguished now as a higher product of evolution； no longer as differing in origin or different in kind。 Some progress has been made； on the one hand in rendering an account of intelligent profiting by experience under the guidance of pleasure and pain in the perceptual field； on lines predetermined by instinctive differentiation for biological ends； and on the other hand in elucidating the method of conceptual thought employed； for example； by the investigator himself in interpreting the perceptual experience of the lower animals。
Thus there is a growing tendency to realise more fully that there are two orders of educabilityfirst an educability of the perceptual intelligence based on the biological foundation of instinct； and secondly an educability of the conceptual intelligence which refashions and rearranges the data afforded by previous inheritance and acquisition。 It is in relation to this second and higher order of educability that the cerebrum of man shows so large an increase of mass and a yet larger increase of effective surface through its rich convolutions。 It is through educability of this order that the human child is brought intellectually and affectively into touch with the ideal constructions by means of which man has endeavoured； with more or less success； to reach an interpretation of nature； and to guide the course of the further evolution of his raceideal constructions which form part of man's environment。
It formed no part of Darwin's purpose to consider； save in broad outline； the methods； or to discuss in any fulness of detail the results of the process by which a differentiation of the mental faculties of man from those of the lower animals has been brought abouta differentiation the existence of which he again and again acknowledges。 His purpose was rather to show that； notwithstanding this differentiation； there is basal community in kind。 This must be remembered in considering his treatment of the biological foundations on which man's systems of ethics are built。 He definitely stated that he approached the subject 〃exclusively from the side of natural history。〃 （〃Descent of Man〃； Vol。 I。 page 149。） His general conclusion is that the moral sense is fundamentally identical with the social instincts； which have been developed for the good of the community； and he suggests that the concept which thus enables us to interpret the biological ground…plan of morals also enables us to frame a rational ideal of the moral end。 〃As the social instincts；〃 he says （Ibid。 page 185。）； 〃both of man and the lower animals have no doubt been developed by nearly the same steps； it would be advisable； if found practicable； to use the same definition in both cases； and to take as the standard of morality； the general good or welfare of the community； rather than the general happiness。〃 But the kind of community for the good of which the social instincts of animals and primitive men were biologically developed may be different from that which is the product of civilisation； as Darwin no doubt realised。 Darwin's contention was that conscience is a social instinct and has been evolved because it is useful to the tribe in the struggle for existence against other tribes。 On the other hand； J。S。 Mill urged that the moral feelings are not innate but acquired； and Bain held the same view； believing that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his life…time。 Darwin； who notes （Ibid。 page 150 （footnote）。） their opinion with his usual candour； adds that 〃on the general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable。 It is impossible to enter into the question here： much turns on the exact connotation of the terms 〃conscience〃 and 〃moral sense；〃 and on the meaning we attach to the statement that the moral sense is fundamentally identical with the social instincts。
Presumably the majority of those who approach the subjects discussed in the third； fourth and fifth chapters of 〃The Descent of Man〃 in the full conviction that mental phenomena； not less than organic phenomena； have a natural genesis； would； without hesitation； admit that the intellectual and moral systems of civilised man are ideal constructions； the products of conceptual thought； and that as such they are； in their developed form； acquired。 The moral sentiments are the emotional analogues of highly developed concepts。 This does not however imply that they are outside the range of natural history treatment。 Even though it may be desirable to differentiate the moral conduct of men from the social behaviour of animals （to which some such term as 〃pre…moral〃 or 〃quasi…moral〃 may be applied）； still the fact remains that； as Darwin showed； there is abundant evidence of the occurrence of such social behavioursocial behaviour which； even granted that it is in large part intelligently acquired； and is itself so far a product of educability； is of survival value。 It makes for that integration without which no social group could hold together and escape elimination。 Furthermore； even if we grant that such behaviour is intelligently acquired； that is to say arises through the modification of hereditary instincts and emotions； the fact remains that only through these instinctive and emotional data is afforded the primary tissue of the experience which is susceptible of such modification。
Darwin sought to show； and succeeded in showing； that for the intellectual and moral life there are instinctive foundations which a biological treatment alone can disclose。 It